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The idea of preparing this v;ork oame to mo 
originally whilst I wae Senior leoturer at the formez' 
Boottiah Go 13.eg© of Oommeroep but I vme unable to make 
any real progreea with reeearoh until I joined the 
Staff of the Department of Daw of Glasgow University 
in Ootober 1960c
A very oonsiderable amount of baokgroimd and 
general reading has been done during the oorapllatlon 
of this thesis* ’ Due acknowledgment'is made wherever 
appropriate and» of course» the remaindez» of the work 
±B entirely my own effort» as are the views (crltloa3. 
and otherwiael expressed» particularly those in 
chapters on© and five*
It is right and proper that I should aotoowledg© 
much valuable help from the following persons - Mise 
Margaret Martin of the Library Staff at Glasgow 
University» formerly in charge of the Law Branch 
Library there; Mr. Lawrence Ardern» Librarian of 
the former Seottish Oollege of Gormerce; and the 
Librarian to The Royal Faculty of Procurators in 
Glasgow. My requests and queries were always met 
with unfailing;'oourtosy and it never really surprised 
me that all three librarians could produce - as if by 
magic - copies of reference and general works which 
wore virtually unobtainable.
It 1b hoped that this minor ogua will prove to 
be a useful contribution to the l©i;aî* literature of 
"Master and Servant" in Scotland.
Glasgows Isaac P. Miller.
26th March» 1965*
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and helpful to this work.
Historical latroêuoMom to the period of BtvJv, 
The year 1830 has been selected as a convenient 
starting point for this particular study of the develop-^  
laemt of the oommon law rolatlonshlp of master and servant 
booauoe it représenta the closing phase of the Industrial
i
Eovolutlmi# During the period of that revolution Groat 
Britain had virtually changed over from being a nation 
almost wholly dependant upon an agricultural eeonomy to 
one which relied upon the output of the industrial 
machine* The final result was that Great Britain 
emerged as the leading Industrial nation in the latter 
part of the nineteenth century and perhaps the first 
quarter of the twentieth*
There 000ms little doubt» from a study of the pages 
of the economic historians and the aooiologiate» that 
conditions in the factories during the first half of the 
nineteenth century were frightful" and» in addition to
1* Bee ’’m e  Industrial Revolution" (1760-lE)g0) (o*n*P*) 
by Emeritus Professor T#B* Ashton *« and see also the 
bibliographical references annexed thereto.
2* Bee "A Social and Economic History of Britain 1760- 
I960" by Pauline Gregg (Harrap) (3rd Edn* revised 
1962)» particularly at pages 54-56 and pages 120-124? 
and also "The Bleak Age" by J.B* and Barbara Hammond 
on the important question of social conditions in 
Great Britain at this ttee* Boo particularly the 
Introductory chapter and also pages 26-32? and pages 
44 and 43 of the ^ book*
this» the housing and general living conditions of the 
working population (though it might he more accurate to 
refer to this section of the population as the employed 
classes) were almost comparable with conditions in the 
factories, Later» duz'ing the mid-Victorian period» 
there seemed to be a more hhpeful air of general 
prosperity hovering over the country as a whole.
Nevertheless» this illusion of prosperity did not 
mean that the employed classes were inactive and happy 
to maintain an attitude of "laisseg-fa,ire" towards their 
ovm position, Nothing could be more untrue, Not only 
had an early co-operative movement begun in Scotland
and also» as seems more widely Imown» in Eoohdale»
%
around 1844» but the trade unionists were striving to 
build up strong associations which would enable 
employees in numerous trades to bargain with their 
employers on terms which might be hoped to be reasonably 
equal. Of course, they did not go about this task in 
the same way within each union nor did each union adopt
3, See Gregg o^# eit, pages 74-77, explaining the early 
movement in Scotland; and G.D.Ii, GoXe’a "Short 
History of the British working class movement 1789- 
1947" (Allen & Unwin) (1948), stressing the develop­
ments in Rochdale - at pages 89 and 1X4 but 
particularly at pages 155 to 161 inclusive*
the same rôle in relation to the employers* It must he 
remembered that the Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800^ * 
had introduced strong-am legislation whieh was principal­
ly designed to stifle the growth of active combinations of 
workpeople for the purpose of improving their conditions 
of labour and their wages* These Acts were the successors 
of early statutes both in 3iîngland and Scotland which had 
been passed for precisely the same purpose* The 1799 and 
1800 Acts were repealed in 1824^ but some further tighten- 
ing up of the law took place in 1825 . Accordingly» 
during the first half of the nineteenth century and 
almost until the first Trade Union Act was formally 
passed in 1871, many criminal prosecutions were taken in 
England under the crime of "conspiracy" (which could also 
be a civil action for damages against the wrongdoer) and 
although prosecution© were also taken in Scotland it 
seems that the law of conspiracy (whether criminal or
4# 39 Geo* 3* o,81 and 39 and 40 Geo* 3* c*106 respective­
ly,
5* Oombination Laws Repeal Act (5 Geo. 4, e*95).
6* The Combination Laws Repeal Act Amendment Act» 1825 
(6 Geo. 4, 0.129),
4civilp but particularly criminal) never developed to the
7same extent as it did in England,
After a trade union revival circa the year 1841» one 
of the leading unions was the Amalgamated Society of 
35ngineers which developed as a so-called "new model" 
union* Later on again, it was to change its name to the 
Amalgamated Engineering Union and to remain as one of the 
major unions in modern 33ritain# It seems to he accepted 
that the Amalgamated Society of Engineers was not a mere 
benefit society looking to the needs of its members who 
were in siolmess and ill-health, but soraething much 
stronger than that - indeed a militant trade union fight-
£ing an individual struggle with the engineering employers, 
who ranked along v;ith the mine-owners as the toughest and 
most uneompromising of employers* The Engineers saw 
clearly that their only chance of survival was to fight - 
not for them the gradual slow-moving procese of parliament 
ary legislation.' In any case, they were disenfranchised.
7. Bee Macdonald on the "Griminal Law of Bcotland" (5th 
Edn.) (1948) (¥* Green & Bon) at pages 185 and 187 and 
relevant footnotes, particularly footnote number one 
on page 186.
8. See G.D.H# Oole, og, £it* pages 173 to 178 inclusive. 
The best known work dealing with the A.E.U* is J.B. 
Jeffery8 - "The Story of the Engineers"; see also Webb 
(Sidney and Beatrice) - History of Trade Unionism, 
chapter 4» pages 204**224; and Olegg, Fox and Thompson - 
History of British Trade Unions, vol. 1, chapter 1.
5In contrast to them, other workers - for example in the 
textile industries - followed a policy of gradual 
progression» looking to statutory protection to assist 
them in time* Strangely enough the miners» who fought 
many hitter struggles with their own employer© and event­
ually became a trade union of great strength and power, 
themselves adopted a policy of seeking industrial legis­
lative protection*
Prior to the statutory protection afforded to trade 
unions from 1871 onwards, the position of any combination 
whose main object was to impose restraint of trade meant 
that » from the'viewpoint of the ordinary civil la,w, the 
contractual obligations and trusts of that union or 
combination were quite void and un.enforceable* Moreover, 
the criminal law afforded no protection to the funds - and 
if a treasurez* or other official embessled those funds the 
union could not, in England at any rate, though not - it 
i© submitted - in Scotland where the prosecution is under­
taken 8/b the instance of the Grown Office, institute 
proceedings against the offending official* This latter 
point» in its relation to the position in England, was 
very clearly illustrated in the early case of Hornby v© 
Oloa^ e»^  although that decision was over-ruled by statute^^
9o (1867) 2 QoB. 153; followed in Parrer v« Close (1869)
4 Q.B, 602. —
10, The Trade Unions ï’unds Protection Aot, 1869. (52 and
35 Vlot. 0.61),
some two years later©
In the same year aa the dee!aion in Hornby v© Olos©
wae given, the Government had a et up a Royal QomiaBion to
look into the whole question of the position and status of
11trade unions. ' In the meantime the eleotoral franohise 
had been conferred upon worWen for the first time and it 
was duly exercised at the General Election of 1868©
Furthermore, the Report of the Royal Oommiesion on 
the Labour Laws appeared in 1875» but it was not very 
satisfactory from the unions’ point of view. It re­
commended some minor amendments to the law of conspiracy 
but without advising that strong measure of protection 
which the unions sought* However, the JMployers and
Worim en Act 1875“ and the Oonspiracy and Protection of
1Property Act 1075 did oontribute to the improvement of 
the legal status of the unions and confer a certain 
immunity in the conduct of indufstrial disputes# Bo much 
BO, that the unions genuinely thought that their funds 
were sacrosanct and untouchable - until their views were 
shattered into fragments by the impact of the decision in
11. Bee Vf ebb (Sidney and Beatrice), o^ . oit© chapter 4® 
pages 260-262; and 01 egg, 3?ox and ’ Thompson, op. cit> 
chapter 1.
12. 58 and 39 Viet. o.gO.
13. 36 and 39 Viet. c.86.
7the famous Taff Val.e oaee# when the House of Lords held 
that a registered trade union oould he sued In its 
registered name in a.n action based upon tort (that is 
delict, in Scotland) and its funds oould be attached in 
©atisfaotion of any judgment given by the court against 
the union* The legal force of this decision, on the point 
of liability in tort, was to be negatived in due course by 
the Trade Disputes Act of 1906.^^
Meanwhile, in relation to factories and workshops the 
legislators ha.d not been idle.^ '^  The 186? Act^ "^  was an 
important development because it applied to factories 
generally and to %mrkshops # A Royal Oommiasion was 
appointed in 1876 to consider the question of the Factory 
Statutes and thereafter, in 1878, a new Act^^ was passed 
which consolidated the Statute law relating to factories 
and which improved the administration, but without making
Ra3.1way Bery-antsVTWl] A . Ï Ï T W T  70 L.J.K.B. 9051 83 
L, T # 4/4#
15# 6 Edw., 7p o*47*
16. Bee Hutchins and Harrison - "History of Factory 
Legislation (3rd Edn., 1926), pa.gsim»
17. The Factory Act 1867 (30 and 31 ?iot* o.lOg), Be© also 
the Workshop Regulation Act 1867 (30 and 31 Viet, e.146),
18. 41 and 48 Viet. c.l6«
8any major changes* These changes did not really take place
until the Act of 1901^^ v/ent on the statute book, to be
replaced by the very extensive and comprehensive Factories
Act of 1937» amended in 1946 and 1959 and now all replaced
POêind consolidated by the Factories Act, 1961#
In the field of employers’ liability the harshness of 
the attitude to employees who were engaged in a common 
employment was modified, to some extent, by the Boaployers*
PI
Lisibility Act, 1880• This was to be followed by an early
PPform of Workmen’s Compensâtion which was itself to be 
replaced by the Industrial Injuries Scheme of 1946, 
introduced as part of the now statutory programmes dealing 
with social security in Britain after the second world war 
(following up the Beveridge Report^^) and pointing the way 
towards a better standard of living in the post-war era.
The National Insurance Act of 1946^ '^ and the National 
Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act^^ of the same year 
were the basic statutes in this new legislation.
pp.wnraffa!attMa{»gyiti>iiKKeJrtawyj*j<itaiC!<
19» The Factory and Workshop Act, 1901 (l Edw. 7 c*22)©
20* 9 and 10 Elig* 2. c.34; see Redgrave’s "Factories 
Acts" (20th Edn*, 1962)*
21o 43 and 44 Viet© c.42; see Fraser - Master and Servant.
22* See principally the Acts of 1897 (60 and 61 Viot* c*37)t 
1906 (9 Fdwo 7» C.16) and 1923 (13 and 14 Geo* 5© 0*42).
23» "Social Insurance and Allied Services", Report by Sir 
William Beveridge, 1942 (Omd* 6404)*
24» 8 and 9 Geo. 6* o.67«
25* 8 and 9 Geo* 6* o*62*
9Yet Industrial unreet oontlnued in the 1880s© The 
Scottish Miners’ Federation was formed in 1886, much of 
the active pioneering work being done by Jmiies Keir Hardie 
In 1889 the London dockers were involved in a serious 
dispute with their employers';® obtaining certain cone ess- 
ions as a result# Another Royal Oommlaslon wae appointed 
in 1891 this time to go into the whole question of 
Labour and Industrial Relatione* It proved to be quite 
abortive - and indeed a recommendation made by the 
Commiseion that collective agreements should be made 
legally enforceable and that trade union ;Cunds should 
become liable for any breaches of these agreements 
received very minor support*
One development of some moment occurred in the 
Lancashire Cotton industry, in the year 1893# This was 
the adoption of the "Brooklands Agreement", which 
provided machinery for settling disputes in that industry, 
without a stoppage of work*^^
At the General Election of 1906 the Liberal Party 
went back into power# The Labour members and trade- 
unionists (whether members of Parliament or active senior 
union officials) promised support to the government as a
'iT f i " I in-Ti-yf-TTTir-TTi^ F i-iT w -iT n ^ r iT rr ir  fF T It ft Ti ft i^ 'i i ir  f-# t T t I t  II#  c i i WüT-rft#<w X _i r?T  'f i Ti # r- | # -r  n r  r iM im W i- jru iM
26# See Clegg, Fox and Thompson, supra# pages 55-64 
27# Cole, ££* ait. at pages 235 and 344#
10
£Z2, £E2. the passage of the Trade Disputes' Act, 
1§0G^^© They had been campaigning actively for statutory 
protection for the imions, ever since the Taff Yalef  lUcrisaiïttari'rajjctSîTf^asgScüiEt^
deoisioxi of 1301 which prima facie seemed to the trade
|£5Xta.T3rr=»sste»ai5»
•unionists of the day to strike at the very root and 
foundation, of trade-unionism, namely by limiting their 
power to 03^ ganise a stoppage of work as this would he 
followed hy an action (or series of actions) against the 
union and substantial damages could we].l he awarded, the 
union funds being liable for arrestment or attachaient in 
any diligence proceea whereby the decree or judgment was 
being enforced# Perhaps the most famous section of the 
Trade Disputes Act is Beetion 4, which gives an absolute 
immunity or protection to the trade unions (or their 
representatives acting on their behalf) in delictual or 
tortious actions* This is a px'oteetion which they retain 
today* It is always possible, however, to sue trade miioh 
officials in their individual capacity Emd if they have 
committed any delictual or tortious act then damages can 
be awarded against them personally# In such a case the 
particular trade union concerned might make certain ex 
gratia payments to these officials to help meet the
28. See Clegg, Fox and Thompson, 0£* pit# pages 364^394; 
and also "Agenda for a Free Society",(Seddon, (ed©)) 
particularly chapter 8 thereof by Sir Henry Slesser#
11
damages-and legal expenses, although it ia not under any 
legal duty to do so©
Those persona who look upon the trade unions with 
disfavour hold strong viev/a that the immunity conferred by 
section 4 of the 1906 Act should either be abolished 
altogether’ or should be effectively ou:rtailed. The trade 
unioniets, on the other hand, take the view that the 
protection which they are supposed to have in the course 
of a trade dispute is not wide enough and should be 
extended to Include all actings (ivhether prima facie 
delictual or tortious) neoesaary to the effective conduct 
of a trade dispute and where the actings are done on beha3.f 
of or in the best interests of the union and its members 
(including, for example, all actings in support of a 
"closed shop" policy)»
Following the Taff Tale case (superseded by the Trade 
Disputes Act, 1906) there came in 1909 and 1910 the very 
important oases of Osborne v* The Amalgamated Society of 
Railway Servanta^^* The real crux of the litigation here 
was the question whether a trade union could, at this time, 
spend part of its fund for a political object - namely 
in support of the Labour Party and certain of their 
candidates* It was held that it could not do so* This 
decision was over-ruled by statute law, some three years
29. [1911] 1 Oh, 5405 80 L.J.Ch. 315; 104 h.T. 267?
27 ï.îi.H. 289.
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later, with the passing of the Trade Union Act, 1913#
The Labour Party and the trad© unions had achieved this 
object by continual pressure. The statute defined th© 
"specified political aotivitiee" upon which moneys from 
the political fund could be spent* The fund itself was 
to be governed by a separate code of rules, known as the 
"political fund rules". The true spirit of the Act was 
that there was to be no discrimination ©.gainst members 
who did not wish to contribute* This very point was 
tested in the comparatively recent case of Birch v. The
1^National Union of Railimvmen* where there was held to 
be discrimination against a Branch chairman, a non- 
contributor to the political fund, who was virtute 
officii a Trustee of the fund and who was dismissed from 
office©
Industrial unrest continued prior to the first 
world war, particularly in the coalfields. During the 
war years, 1914-1918» an industrial truce was proclaimed 
by the unions. Nevertheless an unofficial strike (that 
is to say, one which does not have the backing of the 
union or unions concerned) took place in the .Engineering 
industry in February 1915 on Clydeside, This was
30* 2 and 3 Geo* 5» o*30.
31., [1950] Gil. 602; 66 T.I.E. 1223; 94 S.J. 384;
[1950] 2 All E.ÏÏ. 253.
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ultimately settled by a reference to government arbitration
and an increase in wages, above the limit proposed by the
52employers» was awarded to the -employees in the industry*
Oompulaory arbitration was introduced by the Munitions 
of War Act 1915, which applied primarily to the shipbuild­
ing and engineering industries, but with powers to apply it 
to other war industries. In fact the statute was used 
during a major dispute in the South Wales coalfield by the 
"proclamation" procedure contained in the Act. The miners 
ignored this and struck* Finally, the government gave way 
and most of the dememds made by the miners wez’e conceded, 
Oompulsory arbitration was abolished in 1918. '*
The outstanding feature of the year 1917, in the 
field of industrial relations, was the first Whitley 
Committee Report which proposed Joint Industrial Councils, 
representing the trade unions and the employers’ assoc- 
imitions, with District Councils and Works Committees - 
but only in the well-organised industries* Apart from the
32. See Cole, on. olt. at page 354.
33. See Cole, 2^. clt.
34. By the Wages (temporary Regulation) Act, 1918;
(8 and 9 Geo. 5, o.5l).
35. See Cole, op. cit. pages 368 and 369 and the "Reports 
of the Whitley Committee on Relations between Employers 
and Employed". (See the Industrial Relations Handbook 
published by H.M.S.O.)
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development relating to Trade Boards the Whitley scheme 
was a failure0 The "heavy^  ^industries would have nothing 
to do with ito HoweverÇ the scheme did lead to a greater 
use of collective “bargaining in state and municipal 
services and to the passing of the Trade Boards Act of 
1918,^®
The Industrial Court was formed in 1919 hy a statute
passed in that year# The following year the Emergency 
58Powers Act gave the government special powers to deal 
with an emergency situation caused by widespread industrial 
unrest e#g# disruption of the transportation system or of 
the supply of essential foodstuffs to the general popul-^  
ation# The Labour Party continued its pressure on the 
government for the retention of the "right to strike" 
and the exclusion of "industrial conscription"#
After the close of the First World War there came 
a very brief period of prosperity with rising wages 
matched by rising prices and then the inevitable slump#
On 4th May 1926 the "General Strike" paralysed the country - 
its root cause being the "lock-out" of the miners by the 
coal-owners on 30th Aprilp 1926# The Trades Union 
Congress pledged "sympathetic" support to the aiiners and
36o 8 a,nd 9 Geo# 5? o#32^
37# The Industrial Courts Act, 1919 (9 and 10 Geo# 5 c#69)# 
380 10 and 11 Geo# 3» c#55d
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proceeded to call out union members in other trades# The 
general consenBUs of opinion among the social^ political 
and economic historians (looking back and being themselves 
noticeably wise after the events) was that whi3.st the 
strike itself indicated the great latent power of the 
masses it was badly organised after the initial calling*» 
out andg most importantly^ it lacked forceful direction 
from the top. Perhaps we can say after leafing through 
the pages of history from 1850 to the present time - that 
the year 1926 was the one and only time within that long 
period of soma one hundred and thirty five years whan the 
British nation stood onthe brink of a major political a>nd 
social revolution#
From the viewpoint of the lawyersp the most 
important question regarding the General Strike was 
whether or not it was 1egal# Sir John Simon (later 
Viscount Simon) a fomer Liberal Attorney-Generalp and 
one of the leading members of the English barg took the 
quite definite view that it was illegal9 but Sir Henry 
Blesser9 who had been Solicitor-General in the Labour 
Government did not agree with that view# The matter came 
before the court in the ease of National Sailors\ and 
Firemen's Union v. Eeed^^ and it is to the opinion of
39• [1926] Che 536# This was an application for an 
interlocutory injunction in England#
-LU
Mr# Justice Asfbury"^ '^  in that case that we must turn for 
judicial guidance# Mr# Justice Astbury stated categoric­
ally that the general strike was illegal and that those 
inciting or taking part in it were not protected by the 
Trade Disputes Act of 1906# The moat important sentence 
from the judgment reads thus s-
"lo trade dispute has been alleged or ehovm to exist in 
any of the unions affected, except in the miners' case, 
and no trade dispute does or can exist between the 
Trades Union Congress on the one hand, and the Government 
and the nationuon the other#"
His lordship’s view - which he gave as a personal view 
unsupported by authority - was quite contrary to the 
views of the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal in 
earlier oases (see Conway v# WW g  [1909] A.O# 506) where 
the principle of sympathetic action had been accepted#
Most members of the legal profession seemed to have taken 
the view that the actions of the strikers in coming out 
were not, in the strict legal view, illegal (being an 
action in sympathy with the miners it was thought to be 
protected under the 1906 Act) although the flames of anger 
and bad-feeling could have been fanned into something like 
active seditious uprisings# There can be no doubt that
eepti»fltiiKesi<aiiaieç=3«aii
40# See particularly at pages 539 and 540 of the report# 
Mr* N.A* Citrine (Trade Union Lav/ p# 508 footnote 30) 
considers the dictum to ha,ve been obiter*
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the tactics of the eoal-owners amounted to provocation of 
the very worst kind - heoause it struck, not only at the 
individual miner, but at his home and his family# Perhaps 
there is some force of argument in the view that the 
Briton - be he governor or governed - has an inbred dis­
taste for injustice and therefore the strikers carried a 
strong measure of sympathy on their aide from the ordinary 
reasonable citizens who understood their plight*
The Governraent reacted fairly quickly by pushing
A*]
through the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1927# 
(repealed, of course, by the Trade Disputes and Trade
A p
Unions Act of 1946# ) which outlawed the "sympathetic
strike" and indeed any strike which might have as its 
object the coercion of the government#
In 1929 major depression hit the United States of 
America and it spread to Europe in 1931« Conditions in 
Britain among the employed classes were extremely serious# 
The statistical returns of persons unemployed began to run 
into the millions figures# This was the era of heartache, 
heartbreak and hunger - and the goverimient ("responsible" 
in the general sense as well as the constitutional sense) 
seemed powerless to deal with the situation and pursued
41» 17 and 18 Seo. 5, 0.22. 
42. 9 ajid 19 Goo. G, o.52.
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the well-lmovm politieal attitude of more or less ignor­
ing the situation in the hope that some solution would 
turn up eventually#
From 1934 onwards the slow climb back to recovery 
began# Conditions at home were cmisiderably over­
shadowed by happenings in the realm of interrmtional 
affaire# Hitler was demanding "lebeneraum" and re­
arming the German nation at high-speed, in defiance of 
treaty limitations# Mussolini was strutting abroad, 
dreaming of a new Roman empire un.der his command, with 
its first colonies in Abyssinia and all of Worth Africa# 
The war clouds were gathering - but only Winston Churchill 
and a few other clear-sighted persons could see them# The 
alanms were sounded but there was no active response by 
those in authority# Too late, the policy of appeasement 
(on the face of it, an admission of weakness) was tried 
and, not surprisingly, it failed# The jackboot was again 
on the march - the rape of Chechoslovakia and of Poland 
followed# The cauldron of war bubbled furiously and 
spilled over into all Europe# France and Britain were 
again at war# Boon Russia was involved as Hitler, lack­
ing effective na;val support, shrank from the channel
crossing and turned east* Then Anerica, as the Japanese 
joined forces strategically vjith Ha2ji and Faaciet
plunderers#
19
During the second world war an industrial truce was 
again proolaimed# Direction of labour and the formulat­
ion and issue of Essential Works Orders were accepted by 
trade unioniste and politicians alike# Winston Ghurchill, 
very wisely, fomed a coalition government (i.e. 
representative of all political parties) which functioned
A %
extremely v/ell# Compulsory arbitration was again 
inti'oducGd in 1940 by the Rational Arbitration Order of 
(establishing the Rational Arbitration Tribunal) of that 
year (îmown familiarly as Order Mo* 1305) and continued 
after the war, until replaced in 1951 by the Industrial 
Disputes Order (Ro« 1376) which created the Industrial 
Disputes Tribunal* This Order was itself revoked in 
1953, which revocation became effective ih February 
1959* Today the only method of compulsory arbitration 
is the adoption of the "claims" procedure under Section 6 
of the Terms and Conditions of Employment Act, 1959,^' 
which enables the Industrial Court to ma.ke an Award 
which is equivalent in its legal force to an implied 
term in the contract of employment#
43# Bee VJinston S* Churchill (as he then was) - "The 
Second World War" (Gassell) volume 6, particularly 
at page 508*
44# 7 and 8 Ell^* 2, c#26* (This section is the only 
effective section left as the Wages Oouncila let 1959 
repealed the rest#)
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Strikes still oontimie to be a feature of modem 
industrial life in Britain and we are no further forward 
in eetablishing efficient methods of avoiding stoppages# 
Eanh side of industry at 13.1 continues to be suspicious 
of the other and the reason for this is based on the 
historical backcloth of constant struggle be'Ween 
employers on one side and wo rim en and their 'unions on 
the other#
Re cent innovations are the formation of the Eationo.1 
Incomes Commission (1#I#0#) and the-Rational Economic 
Development Council (R.E#D#G. ) to a.dvise the government 
respectively on .(a)- an Incomes policy for each profession 
or trade to v/hich the Commission’s attention is directed 
for investigation and report and (b) a general economic 
policy involving the British economy as a whole or 
directed towards a regional area whose economic develop­
ment requires sea?ious consideration and report#
Row, in 1964-0 the outstanding event which has shaken 
the trade unions to their foundations is the recent House 
of Lords judgment in the case of Rookes v# Barnard and
A R
others# This case will rank along with the Taff Vale
r nn [rwiHiiiwir-nwT n
ease of 1901 in the annals of trade union history. The 
U3iion’s view is that the House of Lords, by placing an 
unwarranted stress upon the civil wrong of Intimidation
45. [1964] 2 W.L.R. 269? [1964] 1 All E.E. 367 (H.I..).
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within the framework of a trade dispute, (the fact that 
there was a "trade dispute" v;as admitted by both parties 
in the action), have again indicated quite clearly a 
judicial contempt for the unions by allowing the legal 
machinery to operate against union officials 0.0ting aa 
individuals in the heat interests of the union as well as 
removing, by this judge-made law, the only effective 
weapon which is left to workmen - namely, the right to 
withdraw their labour (i.e. the right to strike). The 
main arguanent of the ixnions against the decision is that 
it seriously restricts the growth and development of 
membership and bargaining power by liiaiting the right to 
enforce membership (generally under a "closed shop" 
policy) upon individual employees or by bringing force to 
bear tipon eraployers by insisting upon union membership 
for all employees # It may be that the unions are taking 
a much too serious view of Eookee v. Barnard and others@ 
but quite understandably they see the decision as another 
source of danger to their functions and their powers, as 
well as to their funds and for tluvb reason they seem to 
be prepared to close their ranks for action*
Prior to the British General Election of 15th October 
1964, the indications from Westminster were that, if the 
Conservative Party went back into power they might - in 
the fullness of political time ha.ve appointed a Royal
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Commission to look into the whole position, functions and 
powe 1*6 of the trade unions, with a view to restricting 
the legal protection and privileges enjoyed by them mean­
time under the Trade Union Acts and kindred statutes# Row 
that the Labour Party has formed the new government (albei’ 
with an overall majority of four) there is a certain 
anticipation that a very brief statute wil3. be passed in 
early course, which will remove any danger of tmion 
officials being exposed to the risk of civil actions 
against them as individuals in respect of conduct by them 
whilst acting on behalf of or in the beet interests of 
their unions, which conduct might otherwise be actionable 
(e#g* as a species of intimidation as in Rookes) in a 
civil court if committed by an ordinary individual who was 
not a union official or member at the time. It seems to 
be îmown, fairly widely, that the trade unions (and 
specifically the Trades Union Congress) took legal advice, 
immediately following the Hookes decision, as to the effec 
of this decision upon their actions and also as to the leg* 
al machinery which would be required to render the deeiaioi 
ineffective# The general view upon the approach by the 
unions is that leading counsel advised a short statute 
which would amend the Conspiracy and Protection of Propert; 
lot, 1875 and the Trade Disputes Act, 1906 so as to 
protect the trade union officials, qua officials and
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individuals, who were acting bona fide in the best 
intereste of the union#
It seems reasonably certain that some important 
legal developments regarding the statue and powers of the 
trade unions, in relation to management as well as to 
their own individual membersj are due to take place with­
in the next few years# These developments could have a 
tremendous impact upon British industrial relations in 
the 1970s# and future years#
It is against the background of this historical 
canvas (shaded in its important aspects rather than being 
finely drawn in detail, as this is not a work dealing 
principally with industrial relations in the wider social 
and political sense) that we now turn to examine the 
contractual relationship between employer and employee 
and the ob3.igations, duties, liabilities and rights which 
one party has by law - towards and against the other 
party v/ithin the framework of that relationship#
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Chapter 2
Mature and Formation of the Contract of Service*
(1) Mature of the Contract of Service *
The contract of eervice is a epeeies of the contract
of looatio conductio - in two of its forms, viz
(a) looatio operis 1.e, the hiring of a person to do a
particular task or piece of work and (h) looatio
operarum - the hiring of a person's services, to act in
a particular capacity, without relation to any specific 
1business*“ It is mainly with the second form that we 
are concerned.
Definition of a Servant?- The distinction between the
modern servant and the slave cannot be defined satisfact­
orily* A most important point which might arise for 
consideration here is the legality of a contract for a Ion, 
term of years and in which harsh or intolerable conditions 
are sought to be imposed# It seems that old Scottish
lo Fraser - Master* and Servant (3rd Edition) page 1 ; see 
also Scottish Insurance Commissioners v# Church of 
Scotland 1914 Stagecraft Ltd* v# Minister of
Rational Insurance 1932 sTcT™28B™TpeF“Lord Patrick at
■*! w  tww i i in i,T .,w n*f j i  ^
Po 302I also the opinions of the Lord Justice Clerk 
and Lord Jamieson). In English law, see particularly 
Yewene v* Moakes (1880) 6 Q.B.D. 530 C.A# per Lord 
Bramwell at pp. 532/3§ and A.E.U# v# Minister of 
Pensions and Rational In8urancT*Tl9631 1 W.L.R. 441®r n i in  irmi-^TT-TTrTrit-rtiTrr-^irtriTTr i ^ i i #  m u  111.111*11-10.1 i#*rin      iii*iiMi#nf r.iw*** w iii.#n > w .T rtm i~ ~ n p ~  i t f .  It L  «J
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legal opinion holds that "the state of slavery is not 
reoognised by the laws of this Kingdom, and is inconsis­
tent with the principles thereof" and "that perpetual
p
service, without wages, is slavery"# Yet it cannot be 
accepted that both points quoted are absolutely and 
unquestionably correct. It seems to be agreed that the 
mere obligation of perpetual service is not slavery#
Justinian’s definition^ of slavery is - "qua quie 
dominio alieno contra naturam subjicitur".
Most help la, however, obtained from Viscount Stair, 
who saye^ "servants (slaves) being wholly their master*e, 
they could have nothing of their ovm, so that their 
peeulium* which their masters committed to them to 
negotiate with, was wholly in their master’s power and 
might be taken away at hie pleasure; neither could they 
be Èiable to any obligation; neither could there be any 
civil action for or against them; ... they were accounted 
as nobody, or as dead men", Accordingly, the master not 
only acquired a right to the fruits of the labour of his 
slave, but he also became the governor of one whom his 
power divested of the birthright of a human being# As an 
example of this attitude in early law there are the eases 
of the restrictions upon worlmen in coal and salt mines
2# See lüiight v* Wodderburn M. 14545 (1776). 
3. Inst. I, 39 2.
4# Institutions I, 2, 9»
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(oolliers and saltera) who were transferable to a 
purchaser of the. mineg and subject to prosecution if they 
quitted their employment*''^
According to more modern law, the definition of a 
servant is a person who, entirely of his own free will, 
agrees to give his services to another for a determinate 
time and an ascertained hire and who may get rid of the 
contract by paying damages*
To a certain limited extent a contract of service 
could - in older Boots law - be specifieally enforced. A 
worlwan refusing to enter upon his service, or deserting 
it after entry, could be sentenced to imprisonment; but 
subsequent legislation repealed the Statute (4 Geo. IV 
0.34) v/hich had authorised suoh.^
It seems possible that the law allows a person to 
enter into a contract of service for a long term of years 
(say 20, 25 or 30 years) or even for life. However, this 
theory is doubted by some writers,^ notably Banlcton, who 
say® that slavery is so much discountenanood that, even by 
agreement, one cannot be bound to serve another for life.
EijiMBa-edc*! itKf.g
5» These restrictions were finally abolished in 1799 (by 
the Statute 39 Geo* 3, g .56): see T.B.- Smith in Stair
Society volume 20, chapter III, page 130 ^  seg. ("Maatei 
end Servant").
6. Soe Erskine I, 7, 62.
7# Bee Fraser, op.cit.# Part III, chapter i.
8. See particularly Bankton I, 2, 83*
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fomdB his opinion upon the old case of All.an and
Mearns v# Bkene^. Later writers have not agreed with
10 13him, particularly Erskine. In Ehgland,'"" in the year
1837g the Court held that a contract to serve for life
was not illegal. But it seems to he undecided in Scotland
whether or not a contract to serve for life .is a pactual 
1 Pillicitum.'^ The writer submits that it is very doubtful, 
looking to the spirit of the latter half of the twentieth 
century, whether the court would be anxious to uphold a, 
"life-long contract" which is so much against the prin­
ciple of freedom of the individual. In the recent case
13
of Cook V. Grubb" the phrase "permanent employment" was 
considered by the Second Division of the Court of Session 
(on a Reclaiming Motion from an Interlocutor of Lord 
President Olyde) and it was held that - in view of an 
amendment made prior to the hearing - a sufficiently 
specific meaning cnuld be attached to the phrase so as 
to give the contract a terminus ad quern. But "permanent 
employment" in this sense is quite a different thing from
—       ,---------------------------------   ^ — ..............I ■ ■ -mr -iiTi       «   <i i     » i i i i i i i i n i      « i «m i u  m  ■ i ■■■ i i » i  iiim .ii
9. M. 9454 (1728).
10# Brakine I, 7# 62.
11. Bee Wallis v. D ^  (1837), 2 M. & ¥. 272.
12. Bee Muloahv"v. Herbert (1896) 25 H. 1136.
13. 1963 S.L.T. 78 (Bee opinion of the Lord Justice Clerk 
{Grant) at pagas 8.3 an.d 84). .(See earlier report in 
(O.H.) 1961 S.L.T, 405 when the Lord President (Clyde) 
held the phrase to be too vague and indefinite).
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a contract to serve "for life", ae we have been discussing 
above.
(2) Form of the Gontraot,
There must be consensus in idem before a valid and 
binding contract of service is completed# The consent 
itself hae to be a final one, otherwise an opportunity 
for resiling has been created* The consensus or agreement 
referred to does not mean that every possible term or 
condition likely to affect the relationship of parties 
has to be written into the contract* Many things will be 
afterwards settled by implication, from conduct of parties 
or intention of parties* What is important is a willing­
ness on the part of each to be bound by a basic general 
agreement «
The necessary elements of a valid offer and a valid 
acceptance to the constitution of a legal contract are 
fully discussed in the Institutional works^^ and in the 
general textbooks on the law of c o n t r a c t I t  is not 
proposed to elaborate the basic principles in this thesis. 
Suffice it to be said that so long as there is an offer
14* Bee Stair I, 10, 6; and Eraklne III, 1, 16; also 
Bell, Oomm. Ill, 1, 1 sect « (2); and Principles c* 1 
paras# 72-79.
15* Bee particularly Gloag on Contract (2nd Edition) 
chapter 2*
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which is met exactly by an acceptance there is a binding 
contract
The general rules of contract x^ elating to vitiation
by error, force and fear or fraud or illegality apply
equally to contracts of service* Bo long as the consent
is a real consent, willingly given, the contract is good*
Mere concealment of a fact, although a material fact, does
17not ordinarily affect the contract. ' It may do so v/here 
the concealment induces some error in essentials on the 
part of the other party or gives rise to some fraud which 
causes loss or injury to the other party*
Although, under the civil law, the contract of 
looatio was a consensual contract which did not require 
writing this rule has been departed from in developed 
Boots law* Row the contract of service is the actual
result of a contractual relationship (whether looatio
18operarum or the innominate contract facio ut des )or it 
is implied from the fact of service, presumed not to be 
given gratuitously and therefore it is a contract which 
may be made in writing or orally# However, it is now 
recognised that if the duration of the contract is to ex­
ceed one year it cannot be constituted by any other form
16* Bee Appleby v# Johnson (1874) 9 C.P* 156. 
17. Fletcher v. Knell (1872) 42 L.J.Q.B* 55.
    Trr-r--irni -- Tru ^ f ^ ^  ^
18* Bankton i* 20. 7; Erekine i* 7, 62*
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than writing and the oath of a party will not supply the 
deficiency of a w ri t in g *T h e theory behind this rule 
is based on the analogy of a hiring of services and a
O A
hiring of land*"^  There is, of course, the special case
of the hiring of services of seamen - and here the legal
position seems to be that whilst writing is not essential
to the actual hiring of seamen, nevertheless it is a
statutory requirement which must be fulfilled before they 
PIput to sea*
Oral Qontraotss- ¥here the contract is for less than
one year it may be constituted orally and be proved by
po
parole evidence# If it is, in fact, constituted in 
writing then its existence is proved by reference to the 
writ, but this does not necessarily exclude the use of 
the parole evidence to establish a contract, some of 
whose conditionB and terms have been set out in written 
form*^ '^ ' It must be kept in mind that where notices,
-i-pi—I... I..I "Ti,, Tir'd IB i-~‘^rfTVTi-miiir'Ti*^"i iTTr tti rrTrintTiinrni up m n'fTfn-minm- 11 < m  m ■ miiimrii r>i ■ f niin 'nii*! mu mi inriuMun fmiii i ti m  irr rrm nmnirn m w ni mi'im ■' n» mr^ i^iirr m>nii n“
19. Bee Oaddell v. Sinclair 1749 Hor. 12, 416; Paterson v* 
1830, ,8 S, 951? t. .Young 1837 1
Swinton 474 Î Stev/art. aaû McDonald v, Gall « 1869 a <7 M.
5445 also BeirVTHnGÎpT5FV;“”l75 5 anTmôkson ou
Evidence s* 567.
20* fraser, op* cit. p. 29.
21, See the Merohant Shipping Act 1894» sections 113 s-nd
114.
22» Smellie v, Gillespie 1833, 12 S. 125} Oaddell v.
Sinclair cit. supra; Bell loo. cits and Dickson loo. eit*
23. See Umpherston - Master and Servant, page 24 and 
cases cited at footnote number six thereof.
24. Barratt v. Stewart 1893, 1 S.L.T. p. 284*
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containing terme and condltione affecting the emplojmient, 
are exhibited in places of work or, alternatively, eueh 
terms and conditions are brought to the notice of the 
worîonen in some form other than a written and signed 
contract or are specified in a verbal agreement, such 
terms and conditions are then imported into the contract 
of service and it has to be shown that the wo rim en were
pR
aware of their existence#
It is the task of the party who founds upon a
contract to prove its terms
It does not seem to be decided as yet whether the
oral contract for a period in excess of one year is,
apart from rei interventus# quite ineffective and legally
USeless or whether it ie good for the usual term in
service of the particular type or whether it is good for
P7one year* Bell suggests that the latter view is more
9Acorrect, whilst Lord Fraser'" is Inclined to the former# 
The point has been discussed in several cases during the 
mid-nineteenth century period^^ and again, more recently,
25# Wright v# Hoimrd# Baker & Go,, 1893  ^ 21 H# 25; 
Cowdenbeath Goal Go# v# Drjlie 1886, 3 Sh*G‘C#Rep# 3.
26, Robson v. Overend 1878» 5 E. 213; and see -partlcular- 
ly“fôrïïêB v,“i n n ë “l827, 6 S. 75; Sixomson v.'lzab 1831, 
9 s7V98"(of.“¥niie v. Bethnne lB'487ir"D. 13277
27# Principles s# 173#
280 Master and Servant, page 30#
29® Oaddell v# Binolair, Paterson v# Edingtons, Stewart 
and M’Donald v. M’Oall eit# suprai Murray v# M'Gilchris'
.  j -  ^  mmimi if#i<TT#n» * p w m i i> ,# ................... i i in »  ^  #iij # i« n  Ü L * ^  .  m ,n w * i    '  ' '  p i iii H . i m v\
18649 4 Irv# 461; and ïoung v« Boott 1864, 4 Irv# 541? 
Currie v# M’Lean 1864, 2 M# 107ë; and Forbes v# Caxrd, 
1877, 4 R. 1141.
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30in the early twentieth century, where Lord .Low, in the 
Heater oaee, favoured validity for one year, where the 
service had been entered upon, proof being by writ or 
oathc The matter has again been considered in several 
cases of more recent date# '
Accordingly, the oral or informally executed written 
contract of service for a period exceeding one year is 
ineffective; but if an oral agreement has been acted 
upon to the extent that service ha,s been entered upon 
under it, the contract is binding upon the parties for 
one year or for a period of time regulated by custom or 
usage of the particular service, but in any case for no 
longer than a year* Wliat is said above, in relation to 
the position at common law, must be re-assessed in the 
light of the recent statutory change made by the • 
Contracts of Employment lot, 1963$ upon which some 
comment ie made in the eub-heading immediately following 
(viso "Written oontraots")*
Written contracts§- The writing required to prove the 
contract of aex'Viee exceeding one year may be either a 
formal document or bh exchange of missive letters* The
30# Heuter v« Douglas 1902, 10 S.L.T. p* 294? Brown v. 
ScottAh Antarctic Expedition 1902, 10 S.L.T. p. 433«
31o See particularly Murray v# Roussel Laboratories Ltd# 
(OsH*) i960 S*L#T« 31 and the oases therein ooneidered
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writing must be tested or be holograph of parties or be
3P"adopted as holograph" It appears that if a partner 
of a firm himself does the writing in question then 
signs it in the firm name, the writing is then regarded 
as being holograph of the firm *
Any writing which is improbatlve is not necessarily 
completely invalid and ineiffective, because a special 
statutory provision ‘ guards against a mere informality 
of execution.
It must be noted, however, that any alteration in 
the terme of a written contract can only be proved by
■2K
writing#
36
The Contracts of Employment Act, 1965? makes an 
interesting change in the common law position by requir­
ing that all employees, who are employed for more than 21 
hours per week, must be supplied with certain written 
particulars and conditions relating to their employment
32. Bee Stewart and M ’Donald v. M’Gall and Paterson v.
citTmipri} l»Aslan v. Plnl.ayBpn 1877, 1 
Guthrie'8 Sh.Ct.Cases 585; Sproul v. Wilson, 1809 Hume
y duQ O
53. See Buchanan v. Dennistoun & Oo.’s I’rs. 1855. 15 8. 
841; aïïd"HibSt v. " Gr a S  'îsFgTTWTing7.
34c See the Conveyancing (Scotland) Act 1874, s. 39# 
35. DmbaMon.m_a_ss ffp. v. Opatswqrth 1847, 9 D. 732 
360 1963, o. 49.
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or, alternatively, a notice containing such particulars 
and conditions must be displayed prominently within the 
particular establishment. ' This important statutory 
change will mean that, in all cases of full-time 
employments reference will require to be made to the 
written particulars supplied to or made available for 
consultation by the employees# Aecordingly, the oral 
contract will probably now cease to be of any real 
importance, except perhaps in part-time engagements. It 
will be appreciated, however, that the particulars 
supplied under section fotir of the statute may be couched 
in such general terms that the meaning is not at all clear# 
In endeavouring to ascertain the true intention of parties 
the court may require to hear parole evidence or other 
evidence from both sides#
Looue poenltentia©s- The general principle relating 
to the period within which any party may resile without 
incurring any liability for breach of contract applies 
v/ith equal force to negotiations which are taking place 
towards the formation of a contract of service# As soon 
as there is a true consensus in Idem the right to resile is
«tiysjfrtortmeaaerzuse
<i #mii#wi i.nm -■i##m|nr , wti,i7, ■ # i# i, i #, a.m ■■ ### w mi—m iw ii
37® Be© particularly section 4 of the Act# The penalties 
for any failure to comply with section 4 are set out in 
section 5«
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It may bo nooossary to take aooount of some trade 
custom or usage, which must be fulfilled before the 
bargain or agreement is regarded as being final. An 
example of this, taken from the practice of earlier 
times, would have been the giving of arles or "earnest", 
when an agreement was completed between the parties - and 
if not yet given it would seem that the rule of locus 
poenitentiae was still applicable and effective until 
such time as the earnest has been given*
Rei Interventuss- This principle may operate so as 
to exclude the rule of locus poenitentiae and it then 
becomes equivalent to the completion of a formal contract# 
The classic definition is to be found in the writings of 
Erskine and Bell#*'^  ^ The contract ie perfected by the 
operation of rei interventue'^ "^  although it is still 
essential that there should be a proper consenstis in idem 
as to the terms and conditions which have been agreed and 
accepted between the parties
The acts which constitute and support the principle 
of rei Interventus should follow upon the agreement# Acts
** îî tp a s » ïn »  # w * a a i* a c  im w rn 'Min 'm i
*38# See Bell’s Oommentaxdes 1 345? Principles s# 25; 
Erskine 3, 2, 3#
39* Bell’s Principles s# 26; Oommentaries i 346; Erskine 
3, 2p 3; Bee also Dickson on Evidence ss# 841-5*
40* Walker_v# Flint. 1863, 1 M# 417 per L.J.O# Inglis at
p# 421#
41» Al^^dOT. V. MojatgojLerx_A.,Go.., 1773, 2 Pat.App. 300.
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p3?ior to a written agreement could only constitute rei 
intercTentus if they folloxired unon a preceding oral agree-
WK.wtli'T. *faw)' ^ rMTitrtmfc*oiaatrtt#.«n^:>rwgag» w  —* ^  ^  ’ * * '
A p
ment which was subsequently reduced to writing#
Where rei interventus follows upon an informal 
contract a double proof is necessary, v i s ( i )  evidence 
as to the contract itself and (ii) evidence as to the acts 
forming rei interventus# Mr# Umpherston points outw  ie t2 jie *ü ttic»  e » W iO *w re W 6 *« W W 6 6 W ^^
that the strict rules as to proof have not always been 
adhered to in the case of master and servant# There 
seems to be no doubt that proof of the acts relied upon 
as constituting rei interventus may be adduced prout de
f fjffw u jw w ^ im i inwrim m  ti- ^  aasjCu X M -w *  j>;.ry q  aw m zn 'n
44jure* '
Hei interventus may follow upon (a) the contract 
which is constituted orally or (b) the contract which is 
constituted by a writing which is infoxnaal*
In practice the most common form is where the 
servant enters upon the service and is paid wages by the 
master under the contract#
One of the most important questions arises where rei 
interventus follows upon a verbal contract for more than
42# See Umpherston page 29 and oases cited at footnote 
number 5 thereof*
43* Op* oit* pages 29 and 30 and cases etc., cited at 
footnote 1 to page 30*
44# Dickson on Evidence s# 832«
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a year* This was speoifioally considered in Dale v*
A K
Dumbarton G1 ass wo x»k ' Company « where the contract v/as 
held binding for the whole term# The case is not wholly 
author!ta.tive because the ground of decision was based 
upon Ihgllsh law (as the lex loci contractus), wherein
^  ~ tsaes£JlH!*374«: ctusefifSb-tuxniKssci '
an oral contract for more than a year has been held to be 
binding*
4 6There have been few eases of rei interventus 
following u%)on the informal writing* It seems that a 
rule analogous to that by which possession under an 
informal written lease constitutes sufficient rei 
interventus to validate the lease for its whole duration 
has been applied to service under an informal written 
contract* Once sex^ vice has been entered into under the 
contract and is continued therein this sets up the 
contract for the full term agreed upon by the partieso 
With the advent of the Oontraets of Employment Act, 
1963, it could well be the case, in full-time employaient 
contracts (i#e# where the hours worked exceed 21 per 
week), that the doctrine of rei interventus is now of
%WMSK.«VOT«yfaivayiitiUamr»iww«*TtVie2»6*<to»^&'rt5iSii5tT«iicueai»t/9!»Acfcsatitc;AW5ixwe=oir«e*i*tt«M## n _i.: "W
45* 1829$ 7 369« Bee also Murray v. Roussel Labor­
atories Ltd* oit* supra#
Tr rm 'rT iiT -n w n m i w,wrw im â t f fw w  iimiiiii
46# Bee, however, lap1er v# Dick, 1805 Hume 388*
47* See lîmpherston - op* eit* page 31 and oases cited at 
foocnoTje rmmber 2 Tliereof.
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little moment, althougîi It oonld retain its importance 
via-à'^vla the part-time engagement#
Earnest (or Arlee) The praotioe of giving ear no at 
1b now of hiatorioal intereat only, as it eeeme to be 
need no longer in any modern trad© or employment# It
âla said to have been a "teat of engagement"# Maolcenaie 
calls it "a ayiabol or mark of agreement"* It appear® to 
be only suitable to a contract founded upon an oral 
agreement and even then lends nothing at all to the 
'particular agroement, although custom of the particular
rr,A
employment may demand that it be given
To hand baolc a sum given ae earnest did not destroy
51or dissolve the contract* If the contraot was not 
effectively oonoluded because loous^
operated, although earnest had been given, the.ro was an 
obligation upon the party who received the earnest and
480 An analogous oaue perhapu, in relation to regular
enlistmont in H«M» Faroes is the giving of the "( u^een’e 
shilling" to the newly enlisted man as a token of the 
completed act of engagement and of loyalty to Her 
Majesty# But of coureg thio type of engagement ie 
quit© outwitli the contractual relationship of master 
Û servant, which is under consideration hero®
49o Institutes 3, 1©
50# Bell - Principles e# 173.
51® Wallace v® Wishart 1800 Hum©, 303I Tonpl% v® Barr
3-
5 2who was then seeking to resile to return it to the giver<, 
Where a sum was given as evidence of a bargain 
closed and perfeotedJ^  this wa.s termed *’dead earnest 
It should not he confused with part payment under a con*- 
tract A which may well amount to rei interventus,
It would be most unusual^ in modern practice9 to 
require the giving of earnest as evidence of a completed 
bargain^  ^ Indeed none of the present-day writers upon 
Industrial Law makes any reference to it at all*
Implied contracts of services*" Any claim for wages 
has to be founded upon a contract to pay wages or upon 
services rendered by the claimant which were not under­
stood to be gratuitous, ifhere is a presumption that 
services are given for wages - and not gratuitously. 
Should it appear from the circumstances that there is a
52. See Lawson v. Auohinleok* 1699? Mor. 8402 
33* See Stair I9 14? 3*
34 A Lawson v. Auohinleck supra g Graham v. Corbet 1708 Mor.
llTdt*r»ia#»*Be«4riCTT<p ^  c:ijnigivf^ag?3iiaBjswi3»cpT«
84285 Clerk vnCirchison 1799, Mor, 9186.
 ^ *îft«ateM;»ïfyï.i«airMr* «zae ie rB tf.e rN ïW ssm iiraw xa fw g iim »  ^
33 o The v/riter believes that it may have been used in
practice in agz'iculturalservice - particularly in Morth- 
Eastern districts of Scotland and up to the beginning of 
the second world war - as token evidence of the complétée 
s ervie e agreement «
36*-; Anderson v. Hailey 1847? 9 D. 1222; and Thoms on v. 
%g|5ü%3p5rr;r-$r. :U38?); il6 %. 333 and 26 S,]L.srr"ir[7ir-aj%a
Bfrier"vnXller 1393  ^ 25 H* 995? but in the case of a 
fsimily relationship subsisting between the parties thex*e 
is no presumption of a contract to pay wages - see 
ïïrcruhart v. ÏÏrqtihart^ s Tr* 1905? 8 1* 42 etc., (where a 
Child assisted in his father’s business and is provided 
with keep etc.) ** where the pursuer or claimant re­
ceives his keep etc., (i«e. an equivalent to wages).
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reason - other than wages - for the giving of the
57servioes, then the presiasiption does not apply. The
test to he applied is this did the parties aet in the
58respective oapacities of master and servant?*^  If oo, 
then wages \irill he payable upon an implied contract of 
eervice.^^
The onus of proof lies upon the person who founds 
upon the services rendered* Where an implied contract 
appears to he in existence the onus of challenging it 
would then lie upon the master who v;ould aver (and would 
require to prove to the court’s satisfaction) that the 
agreement between himself and the servant relating to 
the giving of services gratuitously or merely related to 
the giving of food and clothing by the master, but in any 
case it was not in respect of w a g e s T h e  mere provision
57# Bitchie v* Ferguson 1849? 12 33* 119; F.vffe v. Lawson 
189Ï, *8 8h.0t.kep. ^20? Pratt v. Ranltine, 1898, 6 S.L.Ï.
Pe 126*
58* 8ee M’laui^hton v. M *Hau/^ hton 1813, Hume, 396; Bhenhero 
V* Meldrum 1812, Hume*‘3 W o H F ^ h e  trilogy of eases in 
which pursuer was the same person, vis;- Smell!e v* 
Gillespie 1833, 12 S. 125; 1834, 13 B* 700; Smell!e v* 
Ooohrane "1855* 13 S* 544; and Smell!e v* Miller 1835 
14 S* 12.
59# Bee Bitchie v* Ferguson 1849, 12 3). 119  ___ _
Dawson V# Thorburn 1888. 15 R* 891% M’Naughton v. Ross*
T K  10 sTCTTpT 322* ----
60* Bee M ’Haughton v. M’Waughton oit* supra? and Anderson*y,-m. n  tn  « n ïM M irw  « i«nii i# I w i P# l i  I «111II woaiwweOïfiiMîrjeert» f  l'iræAzzw am jK iLut.Tfg#
V. Hailey oit.
41
61of food and clothing does not displace the onus “ upon 
the master, though of importance in relation to an 
evaluation or asaessment of the aervices rendered to 
the master#
Finally, a contraot of servioe may he implied where
there ie a change of eircuraetaneee in the status or legal
personality of the raaster* Moat oosmion examples are the
conversion of a business, owned by an individual or
partnership, into a limited company (whether public or
private) or the liquidation of a company and subsequent
appointment of a liquidator* The employees will usually
continue to serve the new company (i#e# their new master)
ore the liquidator without the preparation of fresh contracts
of service or formal consents and in such a, case their old
contractual relationship is continued by implication to
form the new oontraotual basis which governs their
6Prelationshipo This new contract would then be affected 
by legislation designed to protect the legal position of 
the employee anxl the employer would require to comply
61* Shepherd v* Meldrum oit»gunras Bmellie v. 
oâl'Mams Anderson vTVailey git.BUpga.
62. Da% V. g.'alt 1900, 8 S.L.S. p. 40; Saylor r, R.H.
fhomgoa A  Qo.. M d  1901, 9 S.L.Œ, p. 573; 1902, 10 S.L.Ï.
p* 195; Houston v, Qalioo Printers’ Assocn* 1903, 10 
8*L*T. p* 532# ~BerlXtii'*'''Soli'5pr”^  Vo Buchène
1903, 6 P. 181 per Lord H’.Laren a,t p* 185#
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therewith*
(3) Terms ,and duration of the contract of service*
f the services- The servant’s duty is to
. ' I 6 *5
enter upon the service at the time agreed unless illness 
or other cause (over which he has ho control ov for which 
he is not responsible) prevent him from so doing* Any 
failure to do so renders him liable to an action in 
damages for breach of c o n t r a c t I t  is equally a breach 
of contract by the master, should he refuse to accept the 
employee into his service*
Mr* Umpherston points out^ "^  that the date of 
commencing service may not be expressly stated and, 
accordingly, resort must be had to the custom of the 
particular occupation or trade* This difficulty is 
"imlikely to arise in modern practice where "hiring and 
firing®’ may be done by a foreman (or foremen) who 
specifies dates end times*
65* See Oomaakv v# Jeffrey 1887, 2 Guthrie’s Sh* Gt* 
Gases 353§ Boast v* Firth 1868, 4 G*P* 1.
64. Bee later note at chapter 5, part (i), sub* nom* 
"breach of contract"*
65. 0£* oit* pages 43 and 44.
The servie G Itself s- It is most unusual to find that
iK j^ K i tW r w a a B i iJ a iM W A ’a g n ja a itn tW g aa i'f. w i  thM nacM Bm ^wO Kwa
the total duties of the employee are carefully and express- 
ly aet forth in the contract# Uaiially the employee is 
engaged in - a particular character or type of employment 
and thia la simply stated as, for example, chauffeur, 
housekeeper, qualified olerk or othesTwiee as the case may 
he#
The servant usually undertakes to give his time
66exclusively to the business of hie master and 2>erform
all services which pertain to the pa.rtiaular type or
character of employment, as well as to obey all orders
which the master is entitled to give a servant of the
67particular capacity oonoernad# ’
The undertaking to give hie time oxolusively to the 
master’s business does not mean tha,t the servant cannot 
engage in business himself or take paid imrk elsewhere on 
a part- t^ime basis* What is meant is that the servant 
cannot under tales emy other ©mp3,oyrjient which conflicts with 
or is ih^ompetition with the business of his master# He 
may, for example, be a cost accountant for the X shipbiiild*
66. Cameron & Go#, v. Gibb, 1867# 3 B.L.B. 282s In the 
case ox Currie v# Glasgow Central Stores I/ud# 1905. 13 
S.L.T# 88 i'u was held, in relation to uha particular con­
tract oonoerned, that there was no implied term that the 
servant must devote his whole time to his master’s busi­
ness# This was a decision given in a Reclaiming Motion 
against an Interlocutor of Lord Rearson (see 1904, 12 
S.L.T. 651), in which his Lordship took the view that, ii 
the circumstances (e.g. no mention in the contract; and 
also looking to the remuneration), there was no such 
implied term#
67# Selby v. Baldry 1867, 5 S.L.R# 64#
68* Bee Ourrie v* Glasgow 0entrai Stores Ltd* cit*
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ing company toring the d&iy ami be a barman in the local 
XJablie^ «hcmsG at night, but he cannot do part'^ tlmo work aa 
a ooct**^ aoooimtant for the 1 ehipbmiMing oompamy, which ie 
in compétition with his maim omployors*#"^ ^^  This qucetiom 
of dual employment is aa extremely Imtcresting and delioat' 
one# Loyalty to the primary employer might be taken to be 
the malm gmldimg prlmolple# Im this era of "two~"Oar 
fetmiliea" and "working wives" it • will be seem that a 
certain conflict of imtoreat if not of duty might 
arise where the Imelaamd works for firm X and M e  wife 
for rival firm Y, each holding a position of reaponaibil*^  
Ity# It would bo contrary to humam mature if am omhm,go 
of ideas did mot take plaeo'eaeasionally between hmaband 
and wife# This might well give riao to Interdict prooood«* 
imgs or disinieaal prooeedlmga # Buoh happenings would 
hardly be ealoulated to preservo the oelestial blios of 
the matrimonial home#
Duty to obey lawful orderss## The ordinary servant 
must obey all lawful oxAWrs # The personal or domestic
â) 17 
?
on Beon37itios* who was Mias elf dealing in 8 took Jàacliaage
M m t r n  [ i W ^ K n e g *  i w i m
JÜ.ÎU 350 G.A,
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aervanto however, mua t conform to the regulations of hia 
ma.0ter’'e household# He ie not pemittod to have quite the
seme freedom m  the ordinary servant e#g*$ to keep lato
heure, be âmuÆ, disobey a lawful inatruetion or to leave 
the ImiBG against his master^a wiohoa may each oonetituto
70a failure by the servant in hi© household dutioa# ' The 
master ie, of oouree@ the gudge ae to what la reaeonable 
for the administration of M a  household*• Failure to obey
may be due to mere neglect and am iaolatod aot of negleot 
or forgetfuluoea doee justify inatent dlamlaeal#*^^ 
MoverthelmGp' whore a aervagit la hired In one 
capaolty he oaimot be held bound to perform work whioh la
72
outside of Ills normal ©cope of duties* He may have to 
perform suoli oxtra#^ordinary duties if the oontraot pro- 
vldm fo3? this exprmsly or if there la a looal custom
TO,
 , , .   _ .the
sesvaaiî v&o, agniaet ner emplojrer's wiefeee arid s.*efiissl 
to pess-flit iier aWtmoe, atoentoa heesolf to viait hm?
6Î5 m a a  v.'8jigmgi, i83orx"irioio—
«what eonatitwtes eoMuot ;}ii8tifyiag Inattmt dlamlaaal 
is alwaye oa« of Hogree”. If the aegleot relates to aa 
ijijpoa?ta:at matter them Imstaat âleraissal womld very 
probably be justified» ■
v Y s i m m m  îi||:f%^0»“Î2lfr’this’iast ease iâvolvimg^a' 
eooHaTIuty w M o h  the oowt supported on the evldenoe
ami gave judgmont favourable to the master (the servam 
had claimed damages for wrongom dlomlosal)* sos also 
CiQbbem v$ Lawson 1068, 6 S#ÎJ#E# 60, where the dooisron 
egŒTprovor^avourablo to the master#
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indioatiBg ©uoli obligation#
But a servant, of a higher grade or level i© not 
bound to perform 'Khe tasks of a lower*"grado employee, 
even although he is paid the same wagoe# '
The courts today are reluctant to regard a single 
isolated aot of diaobodienôo aa justifying dlemlsesl# 
Although this an &%gllah oaee it is not unroasoïiablo to 
asstme that the Booistlsh courte would take a similar view 
at the proaeat time#
A most interesting ease of legitimate refusal to 
carry out aa laotruotioa from hla master le permitted to 
the servant when the actual doing of the particular task, 
though otherwise nmnmlly within the soopo of his duties, 
would expose him to undue personal danger or rlek^^ (e#g* 
death or ph;/Bloal injury) or would be illegal
Gimp V* Bammj 1801, Htime 384 (a cook cannot be compelled 
to worA a© a Mr# Bmphorston^s comment om
this ease ia that am employee hired ea cook and house"* 
keeper was held justified Im deellnlng to do the work of 
a cook after -hor employer had deprived her of the office 
of housekeeper pago 47)*
74# Igwa Té London Ohroniole (Indicator lîewspaners) Ltd#
11939J 1 WihéB# 698A
Biitherlaad v* Mcmklamcl HaiSwav Comnanv 1867. 10 D#
m m x m .  la^Vs T  Es* 340.
V* M m m  xs35, n  s* m i  t m h  s s* & m»i.
4?
The risk, or throatenod risk, of persoaiaS. danger 
hm again risen in England in the 1930a la two rather 
4»«Qa?®etlag oases - firstly, la ôM êMM^MmbM v.
775|}B|mg|a||p ’ where the employee was aueooeaful la aa
aotlorn for wrongful diemlaaal, based on proof of danger to
%
feis life, m&, soeonâly., in SfiMaïUffia v. S S S M U M E
where the employee waa imaueoeeaful, siaoe he waa unable 
to discharge the ggg, of proof relating to danger to life# 
Ab the oomtraet of service is personal by its mature 
the law requires that the servant should himself perform 
the obligations and duties laid upon him# Delegation is 
not permitted,unless, of course, this is specifically 
authorised and provided for in the oomtraot or the 
mature of the partioular employment itself Implies a 
right by the employee to delegate#
Any performance by a third party cannot, In the 
general case, be rolled upon as a proper performanoe of
BÙthe contraot#
0 K * i ' j ï ta e ïS ! f^ îT / f 'x -T î" w ;w e = - j r c '“ j :M iK fe ï c r : » c r i3 ! '- »
?T. [1930] A.C, 211»
IB, [1950] A.a. 271.
Ï9* V. a m  3.031, 9 S. 264.
80. Mltiafe_iiaagoii...C*« v. ,£ga (1880) 5 Q.B.D, 149;
49 B.cC.Q.B. 3211 $0lhuest v. AsbooI ' " ' " -- *« --»
Gemœt l7anufaotugegs^1"Ï902l 2 K.B. ■ 
lloB..all.eM Goal Go. (1918), 107 45TT
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There may bo olromi©tamee© in 'whioh an employee 
woxild purport to delegate hla duties (oog* the driving 
of a veMalo) 'and M o  employer a^ ould aeoape liability 
beeauea there "would be no proper•relationship of master 
and.servant# If, however, the employee retained some 
control over the delegate, them the employer is mormally
fHiliable qua employer#
®ba rule is -Wmt where m e  om-
tract of aerviee stipulâtee for a particular place as 
the place v/horo the service is to be performed, the
QQ
master cannot have that service performed elsev/hea?©# 
That the rule has to bo Interpreted reasonably is 
illustrated Im the ease of Amdera% v# Moon^ '^  ^whore the 
proprietor of two aplmnlng mills hired M o  workers from
81# Bee opinion of the Lord Ordinary (Fleming) In ,Fulton,’ ^
644 C0o*hrt ofAppéal)#
82# ândoMén v# Moan 1837# 15 S. 4128 Btuart v# Riohardeon
»v ^  -ï» !• m ■rs # w r*#*!.* %k'#* ( t f  'Wf wR# "W  0
1893, 9 Sü.O-b.Reji. 66} see also W è  BngÜsS oaée of 
.Miss '»’* Wgslsm Ciaea) 9 Q.B.D, 6r»6 wHeree -by aa 
instrument of appre^tioeship an apprentice wae to be 
boarded and lodged by his parent Iwlio lived in London 
and to attend daily at the we rim of Mb maater ( then 
carrying on buainesa jirCWndon)* The master moved his 
buainesB to Derby and called upon the apprentice to 
attend there. Eelcl that the apprentice "was not bound 
•GO ?rfc'ceiKl a'b Doi'bÿ ,
83o  Git.
m%r Cp:»ŒUt<cii'»5n»fc3tt
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year to year* In the middle of a term he directed a fernal 
employee (who had been employed for some years at one mill 
to go to work at the other miill, which was a, half-mile 
distant from her home* The kind of work was the same, as 
were the wages* The proprietor offered to have her meals 
sent to her each day* It was established that there was 
a practice of transferring workers from number one to 
number two mill at the proprietor’s discretion. It was 
held timt the employee’s objections were not capricious 
or imaginary and that she was entitled to refuse to go.
In more modern times there are instances of the 
creation of new Industrial Estates which involve the 
transfer of large numbers of employees from place to place 
Unless there was a specific clause in the service agree­
ment which covered this eventuality, it is probably 
right to say that no employee would be forced to move. 
Nevertheless he may forfeit valuable rights or benefits 
if ho does not go and therefore he may be forced by 
cireumatanees to follow his employer. The real hardship 
in cases of this type lies with the older employee who is 
nearing retirement* Generally em arrangement will be 
made whereby he is pensioned off, without reduction of 
the actual pension sum and, in addition, he will probably 
receive a lump sum paymeht as a measure of compensation* 
But these payments do not dispel his feeling that he i©
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being "thrmm cm the oorap heap" tern joaro or bo before
he need be# A humane mid more ©^lightened appx*oaoh ie
needed to this problem#
The personal servant Is, however, hound to attend
his maator wherever he goes# T M b has been interpreted
by the text-wsrltera ae moeming that he ehould aoooBipany
hie master within the United ICingdom# but If the master
is going abroad permanently he meed aot go with him#
Should the master be going abroad for a short term only
the personal eervaxit is probably boimd to aeoompany him
for a reaeomable period# It i© suggested by Mr«
84
Umpheraton that the domestic servant oaimot be moved 
permanently^ but this point ie not of great Importance
in modem timee#
Generally, the days and
hour© of ear vice depend upon throe thixigas- (a) the 
nature of the bwtIüù (b) the oumtom of the locality and 
(c) the regulations which are applicable within the 
master’s eetabliohment# If the contract stipulâtod 
expressly the hours and days which the servant had to 
work then the terms of the contraot vk)uM be binding upon 
the servantv Before the servant could absent himself
040 oit. 9 imges 48 aM 49»
85' , v. bsi;iAs.o 1 8 8 6 , 3 sh.ct.itopo 3 .
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from the employraent during the stipulated period he would 
require to obtain permission from the master (illnesa, of 
course, being always excusable)* The matter of periods 
of employment is generally always a question of agreement 
in each particular trade between the tirade union concerned 
on the one side and the particular employer or federation 
of employers on the other side. There is today a fairly 
general acceptance of the principle of a, 44-hour we.ek 
(which looks like becoming a 40-hour week in the very 
near future) spread over five normal working days 
(Monday to Friday inclusive)* Daily starting and 
finishing times may vary slightly from industry to 
industry or from one establishment to another®
It is also, essential to remember that statute law^^ 
may lay down special provisions regarding periods of 
employment or, more pax^tioularly, restrict the periods 
and place of employment for special clauses of persons 
e.g. young persons and female employees* It must be 
said, however, that statute (meaning by that, Parliament) 
has tended to leave a maximum amount of freedom of 
contraot between the adult male employee and his
86. E#g. in factories and mines and quarries by - the 
Factories Act, 1961 (sections 66 to 119 inolusive); and 
the ’Mines and Quarries Act/ 1954 (sections 124 to 152 
inclusive).
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employer. To restrict this freedom might give rise to 
tMo %)erfeetly valid objections - firstly, it might be 
Interpreted as an attempt by the particular govermaent in 
power to limit the earning capacity of the employed claeoGE 
(this would be a major political blunder as;, it v/oiild 
alienate the political affections of that section of the 
employed class which had previously voted for the party 
in power) and secondly, and equally importantly, it might 
bo regarded as restricting the productive capacity and 
output of British industry generally*
As against this so-called "freedom of contract" 
theory it has to be stated at once that moat employees 
have very little, if any, bargaining power as individuals 
in the matter of fixing wages. This is usually done by 
"group pressure", that is to say by a union or national 
association or other body negotiating on behalf of work­
people with a. federation of employers or with a department 
of State or with the Treasury* For example, school- 
teachers may be subject to a fixed scale laid down by the 
Scottish Education Department (or the Burnham Scale, as in 
ThgXand) or University teachers may be subject to scales 
stipulated by the National Incomes Commission and accepted 
by the University Grants Committee (H.M. Treasury holding 
the purs0-BtringsO* Alternatively, a statutory provision 
or wages council order - applicable to a particular trade
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or I n û m â t r ^  ^ may opeoify a minimum wago rate* It would 
be 0X0 optional la modern praetloe to find am Individual 
employee who eouM claim that liie salary or wage waa the 
aubjaet of free and unreetrioted negotiation between hie 
employer .and M m © elf o
On the epooifie qaeetlom of Overtime, the ooBimon law 
rules applicable would oeom to be that, where n o ©zpreea 
stipulation is made m  to hours or days, the employee does
3*“
Bût require to work overtiiiie If ho does mat wish to do oo 
(though If h e cloeo he might be able to do b o  upon 
ditloma favourable to him) and fcrthermore the law will 
aot interfere in the ordinary case unleaa the master is 
trying to impose umduly harsh and Injurious conditions 
upon the employee#
So far as Ihglieh oommon law is conoemed, the rule 
seems to be that the heure to be worked by am employee 
are a matter for regulation by the express terms of the 
contract# Some term or terme as to hours of work may be 
implied into the contract by ouatom or from agreemonta 
made balmoea the employer (or a federation of employers) 
and the union to which the employee belongs# Whether
such a term or terms cam be implied dopends upon eircum-
SBstances sux^ roiuiding the contract of amployiiiont (i»0o
87. m i É S  V. Mmlmlsm 1903, 19 Sfa.Ct.Eep. 204
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whether the agreement in question ;h:ua been accepted as 
forming part of the agreement)* .
Should an emergency arise within a partioulax 
employments = the master is entitled to the labour of his 
employees for a much longer period than n o r m a l T h e  
reason for this is doubtless that the interest of the 
master is the interest of the servant and the latter must 
have regard at all times to the business of his master*
Sunday work;- By the Aot 1579 o« 70 all "handy labour­
ing or wirklng" was prohibited on a Sunday® That Act was 
confirmed by a further Act of 1690 0.5? which now, how­
ever, excepted v/orlts of heoessity and mercy*These
QTstatutes are apparently still in force, so that an 
employee cannot be forced to work on a Sunday uni es s the 
service required is classified as beisag either one of 
necessity or of mercy (these exceptions will arise, for 
example, in the industries relating to the supply of
89. Grelg t .  Moir 1893, 9 Sh.Ot.Eep. 341.
90* See Rhillins v. ïxxnes 1837? 2 S* & Melu 465 (per L.C* 
Oottenham av p* 486) - a contract to work on Sunday in 
contravention of the 1579 and 1690 Acts was illegal. Soo 
also the cases of - Wilson v* Simeon 1844, 6 D* 1256 and 
Middleton v. Patex^ sons 1904, 11 S.L.T# Mo* 610*
91 e In Smith v, ¥m. Beardraore & Oo. 1922 S.O* 131; 1922 
B.L.T. 58; 59 SZL*RT §4 deciding that the statute of 
1579 Oo 70 did not apply to the occupation of a watchman - 
the qxiestion was raised as to whether the said statute was 
in desuetude, but of course it was not specifically ans-* 
wered (see the opinion of the Lord Justice Clerk (Scott 
Dickson) at page 153 of the Session Oases and particularly 
the opinion of Lord Salvesen at page 134? indicating that? 
in practice, the old statutes are really disregarded).
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water, gas and electricity and again in the Ambulance 
services etc.)* Interpretation will be reasonably wide 
and dependent upon the eiroumstances of the particular 
easel*
There is also the point to note that any particular 
statute governing employment in certain places, may itself 
enforce and confirm an absolute prohibition against Sunday 
work by certain classe© of persons.
Holidays 8" Before an employer comes under a duty to 
allow holidays to his employees the common law position 
seems to be that provision therefor must be expressed in 
the contraot between them or be implied by custom of the 
trade or locality#Accordingly, if an employee under­
took to work on holidays he would be bound by hie oblig­
ation, unless the fact of hie so working constituted a 
breach of a particular statute#
92# For example, the Factories Act 1961, section 93; and 
the Mines and Quarries Act 1954» section© 126(5) and 127 
(1) aaid (4)®
In England, the matter is governed by the Sunday 
Observance Act 1677 which has been continued in force 
(see ©# 1 for the penalties applicable; also 34 and 35 
Viet# C.87)«
95. H. T. im#itmt©_ of StokeTomTTreht (1843) 5 Q.B. 303.
94. Learmonth v. Blackie 1828. 6 S. 533% and 
Innés, 1837, 2 S. & MeL. 465.
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Great care mast be iuflten by oraployera to aeoortain 
whether aiif particular* ©tatute applicable to their 
iBduetry or trade rocrairee certain holidays to be. .given 
to their employe08# If eo the terms of the statute must 
be obeyed#
Bank holidays were Imtrodueed in 1871 to allow for 
001110 holidays being granted to the working class os » Thia 
measure was of apeeifio value to shop aseietante and 
others who were providing a daily service to the oonaumer 
publia#
Holidays with pay wore intx^ odueed, ao a principle, 
by the Holidays with Pay Act, 1938 (whioh applied to read 
haulage and agriculture), although the normal effects of 
this statute ooulà not be made the subject of careful 
study beaaxise of the advent of the sec end world war in 
1939#
iiio powers and functions of wages OouneilB, under 
the Wages Oouncnlls Act 1959# must be kept in mind - ae 
thoir task Includes the fixing of holiday periods and 
holiday pay In the particular industry for which the 
Oounoll Is established#' The question then to be
95* Bee,-for example, the faotox’ioe Aot 1961, s#94e 
relating to the holidays to be allowed to women and 
young persons' employed In factories#
96# For other emmploe, see the Catering Wages Aot 1943. 
(since x^ epealed) and the Agrioiiltural Wages (ScotlaM) 
Ao'èï , 1949 e
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decided la whether an order exists regulating holidays 
or whether a collective agreement governs the matter and 
its provisions have become implied into the service 
relationship*
Public policy forbids the subordination of the 
duties of citizenship to the obligations of a private 
contract. In this respect Government Departments as 
employers tend perhaps to be more understanding than the 
private employer? who is more personally concerned with 
any form of absenteeism. Hence the private employer 
may tend to discourage his employees from seeking election 
to the local town council or cuunty council. Legally, he 
is very probably in the right in so doing if he can show 
that their absences are detrimental or injurious to the 
business* But he cannot prevent the employee from 
exercising any citizenship right which can only be done 
by the employee during the course of his employment?^ 
unless possibly in the case,of emergency or necessity.
The older common law accepted the position that when 
the period of service was drawing to a close, the employee
97. Bee? for example, the employee’s right to vote? 
protected by the Corrupt stnd Illegal Practiees 
Prevention Aot, 1883, section 2.
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was to be al3.owed suffioient freedom to look for other 
employment. This was certainly so in the case of 
agricultural employees, who could take time off to 
attend a hiring fair, though they could not advance this 
claim so as to convert a whole working day into a hollda?^ 
Vs/hilot this principle may apply generally in modern times 
it is safer in practice for an employee seeking a change 
of situation to obtain permission for any essential 
absences# He need not neoessarl3.y diaelose the real 
reason for his intended absence, except that if he ie 
working out a notice period his employer may not trouble 
to enquire about absences, but would easily deduce the 
reason for these.
Property in i n v e n t i o n s Both Lord Fraser^^ and Mr#
1Umpherston dealt very briefly with the topic of
employee’s inventions and, not unexpectedly rely upon
Pseveral old cases in support of their views. Mr. 
Umpherston relies upon the cases of Ma^ rtin & Ore. v.
Boyd  ^and Lindsay v. MacKenaie  ^for hie proposition that
98* See Alexander v* Gardner 1863^ 1 Guthrie^ Bh.Gt.
Cases 369.
99. "Master and Servant", first published in 1846 as part 
of a larger work; 2nd Edition 1872; 3rd Edition 1882*
1* "Master and Servant" (I904).
2# Bee Blgxam V# Elsee, 1 0* & P. 558; Abbott, 6 B and 0 
169 (1827)T"Hollo V *  Thomson* 1857, 19 D. 994; Martin â 
Ore* V *  Boyd 1882, 19 B.L.Hep. 447.
3*“”™0it. supra.
4. 1885, 2 Guthrie’s Sh*Ot.Oases 498.
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as the servant engages to give services in return for
wages, the property of whatever is produced by hie labour
*5in his employment belongs to his master. If, however,
the servant’s invention is not part of the vmrk which he
was engaged to perform then he, and not the employer, is
entitled to the patent for the invention, even although
the invention la made during the employment and while the
service relationship exists,^
7The English oases,' which are more recent than the 
Scottish ones, tend to support the employer’s claim, 
taking the view that it is an act of bad faith for an 
employee to infringe patents or dispose of inventions 
v/hich relate specifically to the first employer’s business, 
Therefore the courts will genex'ally grant an injunction 
restraining any Infringement or may give a declarator 
that the employee is to hold the patent or invention in 
trust for the employer*
To obtain the modern view on this difficult question 
we must turn to the famous, and comparatively recent, 
trilogy of cases known as Triplex Safety Glass Oo* v*
5* cit# p. 51#
6. See Anemoetat (Scotland) v* Miohaelis, [1957] R.PoO* 
167.
7. Bee particularly Workington. Pumping EngineOo. v. 
Moore, (1902) 19 T.L.R* 84s British Reinforced Concrete 
Engineering Co. v. Lind (igiTT^sF Ii« J.TCh^T and 
hrfRsh _%phon Co. Ltd# v. Homewood, [1956J 2 All E.R# 
097.
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8 C)
âssg#.: M S I s à - M j m s & J â â »  y. StessiMS $ ««a
V* Iii8àa,ttA^ aiO SlM-œs o s m o  
agala Imvokeê the taniet prlwlple la favour of the
sHiployiag eompaays the Ooi«*t of Appeal toofe a aifflilas? 
view in the Celeuaep.^  ease aha finally la the
oæ® the Houe© of lords h © M  (i)
that the ordinary rule governing the maator a M  servant 
a?elatioB0lilp that» if an employee*0 invention v m  patented 
in joint mamea of employer and employee# the employee 
hold hie interest aa trustee for hie employez*# oould only 
be varied by the oxiatenoo of am estprees agreement allowing 
for this or the orêatiom of m mew legal relationship g &n€i 
(ii) that am the court was satisfied that the appellant 
company was legally entitled to the benefit of the 
inventions to the mmlualom of the respondent# ©ootiom 
36(8) of the Patomto Aet# 3J49# (‘Upon which Mr© Patohett 
had relied for am apportionmont of the benefit of the 
imvemtioms) did mot apply. In the Qourt of Appeal (the
judgment of which wao revoa?s©d by the House of Lords ) the
question of apportlonmeat had been received with favour* 
Mow the Ilonae of Lords gave mo binding opinions upon the 
applioatiom of section 56(2) but the epeeeh of Lord Held
8» [1938] &iu 811; [1937] 4 All S„Eo 693,
9. [194a] S All K.H. 44,
10, [1993] A.C. 534; [1955] 3. All E.B. 369» But see now the
Patents (Employees Inventions) Bill which proposes to regard 
parties' agreements as the main test, otherwise equitable 
apportionment will be made*
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is interesting for his vievra. admittedly obiter, on that• V  <;te;m eity{acT*iTCcogaja '
section* These views are extremely limited and restricted
and of coui*ee the maitter of the correct interpretation of
section 56(2) is still open for a full an.d detailed
eons id oration by the House in any future case raising its 
11application# *
Servant’s earnings from a person other than the masters
Where the master lends his employee to another person,
for a temporary period, although the employee remains to
all intents and purposes an employee of his nmster, it
seems that any moneys paid in respect of the service
belong to the master.
The English lawyers take the view that if the
employee? in violation of his contract with master
number one, enters into a contract of service with
master number two? thon the first master is entitled to
claim all wages earned by the employee under the second 
IPcontract.
Mr. Umpherston suggest©’'^ that the Scottish courts 
would not follow the English method# Instead, their view
mrni i umi , .*........................................... .......
11. For further comment on section 56(2) and the general 
position re inventions see the author’s Paper on "The 
legal position of the inventive employee" submitted to 
the International Academy of Comparative Law, Sixth 
Oongrees, Hamburg, July 1962.
12. See Smith - Master and Servant p. 132 and ca,ses there 
citedo
13" Os- page 52.
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would be that the master’a (that ie the first master# and 
poaaihly also the second master for any 'lose sustained by 
him) proper claim would b© against the employee for damages 
for breach of contraot# the measure of‘damages being the 
master’s loss for want of the services# It le submitted 
that tlïia view Is correct, aa the claim by the primary 
master la equated with other oaaea of a similar type, where 
the obligation of loyalty is destroyed e#g# in giving away 
trade eacretSo
Duration of services^ Where the period of service ie 
not epeolfled, this- may be Inferred from the nature of the 
service or from other terms of the contract#
There was (and probably still is) a presumption
that a gardener ’ is hired for a year and an agricultural 
servant and a game keeper for a similar period, whilst 
a domestic employee* in an urban area is presumed to bo 
hired for six months# Those presumptions arc a helpful 
guide only «« they have no weight of absolute legal author*» 
ity behind them# In the case of the agricultural servant,
21 D. 831
15, See Mujg v. }VKmzî,& 1829, 7 8. 717» aad the Maboa ease 
and Scott case above cited.flrrii Ti?n>ffrfHfc‘wia~~~lt>
y - T O s ,  t e j .  i m a a p R — -R. 3557 
3.1. ïeÈsK isUiaa isaaa» “»*»•
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the writer iinderstand© that they ©till apply? fairly
generally? in the Scottish farming countlea*
It may he, however, that in a particular type of
service the duration thereof ie fixed hy cuetom® This
may he for a year or half-year, as appropriate and this
may he indicated where service c’orflmenoes at a Whitsunday
or Martinmas term.
failing an express or implied term in the contract
or an eatahlished local custom, it seems that the service
18Should continue at the pleasure of hoth parties® The 
extent of the duration of the contract may he indicated 
hy the circumstances of each particular case, parties’ 
intentions and so on, so that these things would have to 
he looked at carefully. Payment of wages or salary at so 
much per annum or per month or per week, whilst certainly 
not hy itself conclusive in fixing the duration of the 
contract, may raise an underatandahle inference that the 
period of hire is on a yearly, monthly or weekly basis.
But all clroumstances must he examined. For example, 
schoolteachers employed hy a Local Authority, under the 
provisions of the various Education Acts, are so employed
3-8• -V. lerguson 1850, 13 B. 51;
iSMsa V- .J-878, 6 H. 213; r. Heathery
 ^1880, 7 E. 887 ; Horrlgom t . A^rnethg 
Soho&LBomiâ, J-876., 3 R. 945.
19* See Moffat v. Bhedden 1839, 1 D* 460 (per Lord 
MaoKenziiTF^Hoey V# & Auld 1867, 5 M. 814 (per
Lord President Ingli© at p. 818); Dowling v. Henderson 
1890, 17 R. 921 (per Lord Trayner aF*^ge 924lT””anH7" 
very importantly, Oamphell v. Fyfo 1851? 13 D. 1041®
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a,t the pleasure of the Education Committees of the 
oounties and may be dismissed upon reasonable notice# 
Schoolteachers' employed in a school -which is regarded 
and classified aa a ’^ private’’ school in Scotland are so 
employed under the terms of their individual contracts 
with the Governors or other Managing Body of the school# 
SJhere is no cas e-law authority in Scotland on the 
question of the legality or otheTOise of a contract of 
service for life or for an imllm.ited (but nevertheless
OA
extremely lengthy) period# She old cases'^  do not help 
much# i'he most that can be said is that any contract whlc, 
appears to lean towards slavery or an unreasonable re­
striction upon the employee will not be upheld by the 
courts#
Wagggj - 0?he return for the servi ces given is wages # 
(generally wages are payable in money but may be combined 
with boardy occupation of a dwellinghouse^ clothing 
allowance or other benefits or perquisites#
!Ehe general rule seems to be that service is 
performed for remuneration, which means wages payable in 
money and this can be inferred from a contract of service 
which is silent on the point of remuneration# Otherwise^ , 
the onus would be upon the employee claiming money wages
LS
at page 27 hereof and also the oomments thereto annexed 
,re the case of Cook v# Grubb.
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to prove that tho ag2?eemant did in fact relate to the
payement or settlement of the reimnderation by money
wages e ‘ Proof (j^ rout^  de that an agreement to pay
22wages was conoluded would be good enough#
If the oontraot is silent as to the means of caleulact­
ing the amount of wages due or if the contract is an 
implied oontraotg them the employee will be entitled to 
receive what is the customary amount in the particular 
locality for the type of service which has been rendered; 
otherwisep he is entitled to a quantum meruit *^0
Many induetries were and still are regulated to a 
substantial extent by statute law^ '^ ' but it is inappropriate
pK
to consider the various statutory pr.ovislono " in the 
course of this work where we are principally^ if not 
wholly^ concerned with the common law developments#
The wages may be oaloulated (a) in relation to either
21# Bee particularly Smellie v* Gillespie5, 1835 12 B. 125; 
and Oowan v* McMioki^ 1846« 19 S.Jur. 91#
22, Stuart V. Hiclaasjdson 1806 Hume 390; Stewart v. Olyne 
183Î7"9“S. 3'S2ri835ril S. 727; 1835," T s T %  McLT 457 
also OimGla^ v, 3.831, 9 S. 487.
23# See Stewart v# Olynes Binolair v# Erskine cit# suprag__ #re;*itsyxù.6mjpA«sÇ‘* ^ * ^ 2 4 e i *  #i m tstserataHtu^anail mw a  ■WBaKsatara# e^-atfte tfU ^ccsS irLgi i  “
also Stuart v, M'lieod 1901, 9 S.I.Ï. p. 192; Bellas
Principles s# 184#
24# E*gfi Hosiery (1845)g Bilk Weaving (1845); Factories 
(miraerous - the latest statute^ in 1961) ; Goal Mines and 
Quarries (several - the latest statute being ths.t of 1954% 
The existence of a Wages Oounoil order under the Wages 
Ooimcils Act, 1969 must not be overlooked#
25# Bee G#H#h* Fridman '-'* The Modern Haw of Employment, 
(1963)9 pâges 390 - 405 inclusive^ for a usefiil collect­
ion of examples of statutory control*
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the actual amount of work done (1#e, piecework) or (b) in 
relation to the period of time served by the employee#
This division also raises the question as to whether an 
employer must provide work#
In the case of "pieoework^ ^ the principle established 
seems to be that an employer is bound to provide constant 
employment whilst the contractual relationship is in 
foroe#^^ In the latter case^ he is under no such oblig-
p«7
at ion to provide wox’k'“ and 5 furthermore g he cannot make 
any deduction for idle time# If the employee is merely 
standing by** a machine for a proportion of his working 
shift this makes no difference - he is entitled to his 
full rate of pay for the whole period of the working 
shift*
It is accepted9 however^ that there may be oiroum- 
stances in which there is an implied obligation upon the 
master to provide work e»g* if the employee is an actor 
or other paid- publio-performer, then his interests require 
that he be given the opportunity of appearing before the
%i mi* " i M iimmim *u  ■»*!■»kwh
26. Bell's Prlneiples s, 192; GovfdeaTaeath Coal Oo. t. 
Srylie 1886, 3 HH.O-fc.Eep, 3 at p, 11; furaes? t. 
goMgmim .1891 1 Q.B. 544. —
27. V. WIIM^s m , 1899, 80 L.Ï. 55; Æ u m r  v.
gawdom 1901 , 2 K.B. 653.
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publie as thia le ee senti al to tîie< *builcl.*'^up and maint en^
PBance of hie reputation# The English casesgive most 
help on this particular pointy upon which it is submitted 
thi'Xt the lavf in both countries is the same# In Tvirmer v0
Sawdon^^ the court held that a master commits no broach
of oosatract in refusing to give his servent any work to
do9 so long as he pays the agreed wages# The problem of
an implied term in **pieoework*^  contracts was mentioned 
but not decided in Davies v* Richard Johnspii etc# p 
where Luxmoore J* was g however^ prepared to assume its 
existence*
The question as to when wages are payable is a most 
important one. Do wages accrue cle die in diem or as a
^  aasMWRv» ti«fl<ie3B4RS3r tsp^stisj»
unum quid payable at stated intervals?
Where the contract is for a period of some durait ion
ii- r rr tT T iiir r r i ir rr irrT n - t  m \ 'iM 'ui <r i r\ rp T irm u - ir u r n n n  i  i ir  ri »pt l ' i t  niri i , f i , , i7» r^  w i 'i »  r a  " i^ ir r r  ai -  i i*  w#i * i  in » , i# i, ii firM lUi miIT fc"'' < T ' « l ' l i -Ui  ^
28, See pariiicularly G3.ayt,on y , Oliver 1930 A.C. 209;
99 163; 142 L.~P, SSSl’VrTTl.E. 230; MarW v.
■teg ^ liggdg^ta. 1928 1 K.B. 269s 96 L.JTk .B." 980;
1940 2 K.B. 647; 164 L.Ï. lO; 109 L.J.K.B. 974| 57
l.L.B* 2| .ÎÎSSSS. èSiââSÜfe 1891 1 Q»B. 544§ 60
L.J*Q*B* 247#
29* 1901 2 K*B* 653 applying Bmnena v* I^ lderton (1853)
13 0#B* 495# The use of the w o ^  ”emplolp®*"do^ not 
involve an obligation upon'the master to find employ­
ment or work> but merely to keep the servant in his - 
employ in the Bi^ nse of paying him wages*
30a (1934) 51 T#h#R. 115#
6 8
v/ith wages of £X per year, moath or ,half-»year, then the
umm cmid theory is preferred*"^ There seems to he no
<S:jcW?.vr4r??a'^ 5i^ ^
douht t3iat this rule does apply to the dœneatie or agri­
cultural se3^vant engaged for a term or terms - the wages 
being regarded as a unum quid and the right to deînand
ftt\7WP5TiCrfc»îSv»
payment thereof does not arise until the completion of
5Pthe full term# Rayaients to a,oooimt may always be ma,de
at intervals throughout the term#
In other cases (and particularly in the case of the
contract of service at pleasure) wages accrue from day to
day and fall to be paid at intervals g whether in terms
of the agreement itself or in accordance with the custom
applicable in the particular establishment# Usage between
the parties may help to show what their agreement really 
35means 0'^"
There mEty be a custom which is applicable within a 
particular trade whereby the employer is able to retain 
at credit or in hand an agreed portion of the wages (for
T^-n-r-^'— n— 1— n— rr'i-rniT t— t~i— i-firrr-rr-niTi-T-r^ rftT-iTr-rTi^ im-r 1— nfrr i n-irT-i-i-ni r^ irrriT #-tii-^ -r -n ^«r-iTHiHTTH'iir i i " i ■ n i rr t t  ^  n   ... . mi i , i pin , n *11, r, 1 .......... i m ir. iKWiiiiTrtf'
^1# Bee Hogy v. MHilwan and Auld 1867j 5 H# 814§ Boston 
.fiÿilsrf. Gh.k 3395 ank jugEog v.
r n m m m  1869, 4 O.P. 330.
32. See ^quglas v, Argyle 1736, Mor. 11, 102.
33. V. Park 1899, 2 P. 272 (particularly the Lorâ
President*s opinion at p* 275 where he stresses the need
for a teCTlms a ggo » i.e. a date from which the 
contract must he taken to have run » if the de die in 
diem principle is to apply).
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examplej one week's wages is quite usual in the shipbuild­
ing and engineering Industry) during the subsistenoe of 
the oontraot of service# This is known as "wages of lying 
time"# The purpose seems to be to enable an employer to 
protect himself against sudden desertion by his employees. 
This custom will# after proof to the court# receive effect 
As regards "piecework" it seems that wages vest on 
the completion of each piece of work# even although they 
are payable at stated intervals
Bo far as the possible application of the Apportion­
ment Act# 1870 (or any later statute on this topic) to 
employees' wages was concerned# it will be recalled from 
Maogill V *  Park‘dthat although the point of the applic­
ability of the Act Was argued on behalf of the defenders, 
the court ignored this question completely."^
f  yrwh l i m-i ""Ai i im n m n n y r,  i i n i i m in—iT r ' l un l - " in  r  ' i ■ i -
54* Warburton v. Heyworth 1880# 6 Q.B.D* 1.
35. git. supra.
36. The English common law rule of non-appox*tionment of 
wages is illustrated in the old case of Cutter v. Powell 
(1795) 6 T.E. 320 where a seaman died on voyage from 
Jamaica to England and it v;as held in the circumstances 
that payment was only due if Cutter had completed the 
voyage. Payment here clearly depended upon the completion 
of the voyage and it may be that this type of contract 
was a special one*
The matter was very fully discussed in Moriarty v* 
Regents Garage Go,* 1921 1 K.B* 423 (Bir'ector's salary
was ap’portionable). Whether a servant is entitled to a 
proportion of his wages depends upon the contract of 
service* Otherwise# it appears that no apportionment is 
possible in English law# until the House of ‘Lords (or 
perhaps the Court of Appeal) support the dicta of 
MoOardil J* in the Moriarty case# equating the position 
south of the border with the more equitable rule which 
seems to be accepted at Scottish common law.
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Interest aocrues upon v;ages from the date upon whioh 
57payment Is due#"*^ ' Should the amount be unspecified then
interest will run from the date upon tvhich the debt is
5Bvalidly constituted.
The liability for payment rests squarely upon# the 
master. Any works manager or foreman or other person with 
power to take on or engage employees incurs no personal 
liability vis-à-vis wages#  ^unless# of course# he acts in 
an individual capacity (for example# the Agent assimiing thi 
rôle of the principal),
In the special case of merchant shipping the master 
of the ship is always responsible for the payment of the 
wages of seamen who are signed on by him.
Where an employee does extra work# that is to say 
work outifith his ordinary service# the question arises as 
to whether or not ha is entitled to payment therefor?
From the opinions in two older cases# ^ there has been 
evolved a general rule thsit whez*e the employee was- bound 
to give his whole time to his master's business; and the
ipi-|.,.||f| I If n  Yurrti ii # ' iMt i . ^ nimi'rn' imi0* iin,'w;ii', i im  i<<*iir fty riiir r r T-iiTTii>niniii<tiiw*i ii î i ^^r-iarTfci i i i r i i iw :-  <iw i uwnnrn._k i i  i<*wi]<'ï* i'rw rT .rif‘*ir^imf'i'i|-i;i-- r i-iiiin '.Tni^i-' - fiy iiij n  n .i
37. MmSiÀMâ V* Scott 1831# 9 S. 780; 1833, 6 W.S. 277.
38. Wallace v. Gedd^ 1821# 1 Sh.Ap. 42.
39. Habonie v. Scott 1813# Hume 3531 Cullen v. Thomson's 
Trs. 18Ê2# 24 D. TH.L.) 10# 4 Macq. 424.
40. Money v. Hannan and Kerr 1867. 5 S.L.R. 32g Latham v. 
Edinburgh and Glasgow Railway Co. 1866# 4M. 1084. (See 
Lord President M'Heill's opinion# in partioularo)
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particular woxik done was suitable to the particular type 
or character of servant and the nature of the employment 
no extra wages would be due to him* This meant that an 
employee could only succeed in his claim if he could prove 
some agreement or stipulation governing extra pay for 
extra work. Nevertheless the old general rule mentioned 
must not be overstressed «> it is merely a guide for the 
court in reaching a decision - and indeed in modern 
employment practice today it is probably more aocurate to 
say that# apart fr*om custom, there îiay well be a strong 
inference or implication that where extra work is needed 
and is performed then there is an implied obligation upon 
the master to pay for it*
Where "overtime" is worked# the position in modern 
industrial relations is that the days etc*# for working 
overtime and the rates of pay applicable are generally a 
matter of agx’eement between the trade unions concerned 
and the employers* Otherwise# the matter is settled by 
the custom of the particular trade or by the custom of 
the particular industrial establishment*
The "white-collar" clerical v/orker or professional 
employee may usually find that there is no remuneration 
for extra work# but that he or she will receive a payment 
of a fixed amount (e*g« five shillings) to meet the cost 
of a meal and expenses incidental to the performance of 
the extra work*
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I'Llnesa of servants- The contractual relationship
A1bet\iroen master and servant may be terminated by illnesso 
If not 80 terminated# the question to be resolved is whether 
the employee oan claim v/ages during his illness or whether 
the employer can reduce the wages or pay no wages at all 
during the period of incapacity* It is true that under the 
modern welfare state the incapacitated employee will receive 
sickness benefit and others under the National Insurance 
Acta and it is also very often the case that an arrangement 
is made between an employer and an employee who is in 
receipt of full wages that any benefit payments received 
by the employee will be handed over by him to the employer* 
But this arrangement does not affect the legal question of 
liability or non-liability for payment to the employee 
during illness*
Stair^^ and Ersklme^ '"^  take the view that wages suffer 
no abatement and this seems to be supported in two o3-.der 
cases'^ '^  of which the earlier one# Whit© v. Bailli a conoorned
41* Bee chapter 4 post on Termination of the relationship; 
and Hanson v# Down!a 1885# 12 E* 1103# also Westwood v* 
â . M î G 0^ Ï M T T O . )  1958 S,I. a.
42. ;l„ 15, 2.
43. Ill, 3, 16.
44* iMte V* Baims, 1794 Mor. 10, 147. THoiMSa ’«'• M U M *  
1806 Mor* (vooe Mutual Oontraot) App* 4* Bee also M'Lean v* 
Fyf@# 4th February# 1813# F*0» per Lord MeadowbanlC
master and servant* Here the Court held that a farm 
servant# hired for a year# was entitled to full wages for 
that period although he had been incapacitated from work­
ing for eleven weeks within the year*
In M'Ewan v* Malcolm^^ it was decided that where the
disahility to give the services required arose through 
fault or misconduct of the servant# he had disabled him­
self from performing his part of the contract and he could 
not call upon the master to pay wages for the time of 
disablement* A special sta/butory provision applies this 
same principle in the case of merchant seamen*
Where the contract is for service for a term, or
terms# with v/ages accruing at the end of each term as a 
unum quid# then the wages payable for each term do not
AJ
suffer any abatement*
Where wages are payable according to the actual 
giving of servie© by the employee, then he is not entitled 
to any wages payment for any period during v;hioh he does 
not serve* Should the wages be calculated on a time basis 
(e*g. at an agreed rate per hour or per day) wages are 
normally only payable for the time served* Where the
45, 1867, 5 62*
46* See the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, s* 160 
47* H o^  V* M'mrnn 1867, 5 M. 814*
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wages are stated to be or understood to be at a certain 
sum per week or month (or longer) it seems that the 
wages will continue to accrue# unless the contract# is 
terminated by notice or by the failure of the employee 
to attend at his place of employment * Custom may play 
an important part in this matter - for example# as Mr* 
Umpherston sa.ys#^  ^in parts of Scotland the agricultural 
servant# hired for a year# is entitled to full wages if 
not absent from work through illness for more than six 
consecutive weeks during the year# disregarding the 
total length of time of his absences throughout the whole 
year# It is thought that this custom still ho3.ds good in 
modemn times *
lo claim can be made for wages during a period of 
illness x^ hioh began before the date of commencement of 
the service and ended after that date# The reason for 
this is that the entering upon the service is a necessary 
preliminary to the earning of wages @
.MMi pal.,.. At t end^  ^ . and . Medi pin e g - The master is not 
obliged to provide medicine or medical attendance during
tir.axsewAmTa^wereeeentsr.'itis'Lat'tr* ## =»rtyt«ta^ 4
48# Be© Umpherston cit. page 65 and footnote 2 thereat
49. Og. Ml* pasos 65 and 66,
50. See Comasley v. Jeffrey. 1887, 2 Gnthrle's Sh.Ct.Cases 
353.
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til© employee's illness, even although the injury was 
sustained in the master's service or the employe© resided 
in the master's house#^^
If g hov/ever# there i© a duty of protection owed to 
an employee# then it would seem that the master is obliged 
to obtain medical help or to notify parents of the 
employee timeously# so that medical assistance can be 
obtained
It is also to be kept in mind that the neglect by a 
master to obtain medical assistance for an injured 
employee# who is subject to his control# may well be £i 
breach of a legal obligation owed to that employee, with * 
the result that the master will be liable in damages 
The most interesting case on this question is that of 
M'Keating v# f r a m e where a female employee died from 
double pneumonia and the employer's attitude in the 
cirommtances of the employee's serious illness seemed 
to be extremely heartless* Lord Ormidale, in the course 
of explaining the master's obligation, stated^^ the 
master's position thuss- "It was the duty of the defender,
51# Bollen v. Norman 1829# 4 0# & P# 80; a,nd Mitchell v* 
Adam 1874^ 1 GuShrTe's Bh.Gt* Oases 361*
52; V. Donald 1901# 9 S.L.T* p* 199; see also
y* lîWûg 1921 8.0. 382.
See T. Hill 1900, 7 8.I.Ï. p. 318 and M*Keating
V* frame„ cit# supra*
54. Ml* gnpra, at footnote number 145.
55. See page 389 of the report on the ease.
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I do not say to provide medioal attenclanoo for the girl, 
but to obtain for her the medical assistance to which she 
was entitled by calling in her panel doctor, <» <> ® and was 
thus in breach of his duty at common law to take such 
steps to relieve the girl as were reasonable and practic­
able in the circumstances"* It was held that a relevant 
case had been made out to send the ease itself for trial 
by a jury.
It is open to the master# though it is most unusual 
and unlikely to be met with in modern practice# to under­
take liability for medical attendance, whether expressly
66or by implioation* Where he does so the test of his 
liability is the extent of his undertaking*
A claim for wages is regarded as being subject to 
the triennial prescription# which means that it must be 
pursued within the period of three years from the date 
when the claim eme3?geB# otherwise the claimant would only 
be able to prove the obligation to pay by relying upon 
the writ or oath of the employer*
56. See Montgomery v# North British Railway Gomnanv 1878.
5 R. 79^."^™— ^  ---— —
57. y. 1854, 16 D. ,944 ; ,v. '
1859, 21 D. 801; and on the question of defenoes to a 
Claim for wages, as well as possible counterclaims# 
see Umpherston# op. cit. pages 73-79 inclusive*
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Truckü“ The common law relating to wages has hoen
modified from time to time by various Truck Acts* The 
statutes which are currently in force are those of 1831#’ 
1887 (an amending Act), 1896 and 1940^ (The 1940 Statut© 
being a "remedial" form of statute which wa,s passed to 
avoid a spate of actions baaed upon irregular agreements 
covering deductions from wages"^ )^# these being designed to 
strike at the system of "trucking"» This system enabled 
unEiorupulouB employer?© to take adva.ntage of their employ­
ees by forcing them to buy at shops owned by the employers 
or at shops in which employers had an Interest@ It is 
necessary to mention the Acts as these are still in force 
and are complementary to the common law# It is wrong to 
imagine or suggest that all employers prior to 1031 or 
1096 were unscrupulous# yet it did become obvious that 
certain employers were acting unfairly towards their 
employees® The possibility of this practice spreading had 
to be negatived and legislation was the only method
58* Bee Pratt v* Gook, Bon & Oo* (St* Paul's) Ltd* 1940
A.c, 4TfTTi94orriariG:Rriîôt^r5^
59* For an interesting historical survey of the system of 
"trucking" see the recent work by Professor George W« 
Hilton "The Truck Bystem" (I960). Truck legislation is 
fully discussed in Chapters IV and V of this W 03?k and 
some very interesting comments on the 1831 Act (which 
Professor Hilton considers to have been in ineffeotive 
statute) are contained in Chapter VI thereof* See also 
the Earmel Committee's Report of $7th March# 1961# upon 
proposed changes in this branch of law*
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(whether it was effective or not is probably still an 
open question) by which it could be done. The Acts# 
therefore# provided for payment of v;ages in coinage of 
the realm, subject to deductions for certain approved 
services (see the Truck Act 1831# section 23)/which were 
governed by a xœltten memorandum or agreement* The 1896 
Act permitted certain further deductions for late-ooming, 
spoiled work and the like, provided details were exhibit­
ed or notified to employees enabling them to cheek the 
ground upon which the employer was claiming to make the 
deduction and the actual method of oaleul8.ting the 
deduction which was claimed or made#
Several oases have arisen from time to time on the
application and Interpretation of the Acts and mention is
60made hereunder of the main Scottish oases* It is con­
sidered unnecessary to elaborate this question (which is
raeiinly one of statute law) as it very fully dealt with in
Sithe leading textbooks ‘ in Industrial Law#
60. See Cowdenbeath Goal Oo# v* Drylie, 3 Sh.Ct.Eepte# 3# ^ TtVW«t.-»q*rtSMev»rtewi»r#i«.-llutte.wi«=^'*tol»ïeKrWtT«#  ^ -L  W
SMMMu^tep2L.,82.* 3.864, 2 .1, .1297? . 
y. Oaaj£bell C0.H.) l892, 30 S.L.H. 226? Pej“  v 
n-M_goa.ijOo_. 1935 B.C* (H.It.) 39? and, more reoe,n-fcly,
3-952 SiL.E
433| 1952 S»0. 131*
61* See, particularly# Mansfield Cooper and Johsa 0* Wood 
"Outlines of Industrial Law"§ Batt - "The Law of Master 
.and Servant"; and G.H.L» Fridman - "The Modern Law of 
Employinent".
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No major change in the method of paying wages to 
workpeople v/aa made until Parliament passed the Paynent 
of Wages Aotp I960 (after various Bills by private members 
had been attempted* following upon the Pye Radio Case in 
England in 1956)* The preamble to this statute calls it 
"an Act to remove certain restrictions imposed by the 
Truck Acts# 1851 to 1940# and other enactments# with 
respect to the payment of wages. #
There is little doubt that with a general improvement 
in économie conditions after the second world war more 
and more of the ordinary people in the lower middle class 
and working class bracket were in a position to fsave 
money and perhaps invest it in building societies# Defence 
Bonds# National Savings Gertificates and the like* 'The 
bank account (whother' in a Joint Stock bank or Trustee 
Savings Bank) was becoming more popular# Administratively 
it was an advantage to employers to pay direct to employ­
ees' acoovmts with a bank * However^ this is probably not 
the main reason for the statutory departure in the I960 
Act, Unfortunately the crime etatistics (particularly 
theft# robbery# house-breaking with intent to steal etc,#) 
appear to have climbed steadily from the 1950s and still 
continue to do so in the 1960s# Attacks upon wages 
clerks, office safes# banks and even mail trains have 
become such a regular feature of our modern way of life
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that It is little wonder that the world of commerce and 
industry now aH^ most classify these actings as a form of 
ordinary business risk or hasard. Accordingly# some 
method of payment othc3? than cash had to be sought. The 
I960 Act stipulates for payment by cheque or money order 
01* postal order o:c by: payment into a bank account# As the 
statute only became effective on 2nd December 1960^^ (six 
months after it was passed) it is perhaps too early as 
yet to a.ttempt a reasonably ao<mrat.e assessment of its 
effect# The provisions of the statute are not obligatory 
- any method of payment under the Act requires the clear 
consent of the employee.
The trade unions took a stand against this legis­
lation when it was first proposed, upon the pretext that 
to pay the workman in a form other than cash was an un- 
v/ax^ rairted breslc with tradition and, moreover it might 
well be a breach of privacy - because the personal 
delivery and confidential nature of the pay-packet was a 
safeguard to the woz'ker. He# and only he, received it 
and disposed of it. The suggested replacement system 
might, they said, allow others to obtain Information 
about his wages. It is difficult to see any real 
substance in the trade unions’ arguments# However, their
62. Eaicept for seotion 4, v/laioli operated from 2nd July 
1960.
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fears were calmed vixen it ‘became obvious that the consent 
of the employee was required as a condition precedent 
before a change in method of payment could be made.
Local Custom or Usage qualifying the agreements-
Where local custOBi or usage is being relied upon to
support an. implied term in a contract of service, it is
necessary that the custom which is being averred must be
"uniform and notorious" in the locality,
Millst it 1b undoubtedly correct to say that custom
may define or may modify an obligation or term of the
oontraot, nevertheless it cannot be made use ofin an
\
attempt to create an additional or new obligation 03: term* 
If custom is excluded - either impliedly or expressly - 
when the contract is entered into then it cannot be relied 
upon at all for a proposed or alleged modification of the 
contraet *
Recent developmentsi- Some considerable changes in the.. . .  - ,  _____  , ______ _  . . . ________________          f X '
relationship of employer and employee are pi'oposed and 
contained in the new Contracts of l't%ployme.nt Act, 1962*^
63* See Morrison v* Allardyee 1823, 2 S* 38?l and dicta of 
Lyles J* in Foxall v* International Land Oredit Go# 1867* 
16 L*J* 637 a S r o I m n n e i r i T W T E u r ^ ^
1 Q.B, 125 at p# 129#
64* 19630 chapter 49* This Act received the Royal Assent 
on .31st July 1963# but it did not come into operation 
until 6th July, 1964, following upon the issue of the 
appropriate commencing order, being Contracts of Employ- 
îuent Act, 1965 (Commoneement) Order, 1963 (No, 1916) made 
on 27th November, 1963*
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Thi8 statute now introduoes minimum periods of notice by 
employer and omployee^^ and makes provision for written 
particulars^® of the terms of employment to be given to 
the employe©# The statute also excludes certain categor­
ies of employees, of whom doclcworkers, ships' masters and 
apprentices in the sea service are the main examples. Nor 
is the Crown bound by or affected by the statute.
The above-mentioned provisions relating to statutory 
minirimm periods of notice are more fully dealt with and 
explained in chapter four hereof#
Bee section 1 of the Act* 
e Bee section 4 of the Act,
Chapter p
Common law duties, obligationo emê remodloa 
of the employer and employe© in relation to 
(i) eaoh other and (ii) third partie©.
Part (:l)
(1) Employée'e duties end obligation© generally §-
^   ^ r^> a ïS M =ti'i^^--p tt#4 î» .e» «yb iïm T t^» iL >v^< iW m i*jU J in -rfA a ir*e N H *ïu« S R N te tw te T titw w «àe jto
There are oertaln general dutlea and obligation©
v/ialah the eommon law places upon the employee, arising
from the creation of the oomtraotual relationship* It
le neoeeaary to e^ tmalne these In oom© detail and to
consider how, if at all, these duties and obligation©
have altered in mod m m  lav; and praetloe, vies-
(a) IMtei' into aervioe and continue in it.
The employee is obliged to enter into the oorvice at
the agreed time, otherwlee ho beoorao© liable in damages
for breaeîi of oontraot* He cannot compel the employer to
aooept a substitute for him, a© the rule of djjlggtiig
1
peraonae la implied in the oontraot**'” After entry upon 
the aorvioa, the requiromont ie that the servant ohould 
continue therein, until such time a© the oontraot itself
3-* SlmSÈSàÂ MMâ. (1831), 9 s, 254,
g
le legally torarlnatod^ or mitil the maater la in breach 
of oontraot, when the servant will noBaally he justified 
in leaving* Any desertion of the servieo would result 
in a forfeiture of wages, as well ao enabling the master 
to eue (If he âemieû it prudent and/or worthwhile ao to 
do) for breach of oontraot*
When the aervEmt takoo on hie particular omploymont 
he la held to be giving an aasurano© or guarantee to his 
employer that he is competent to perform the taelca eus tom- 
arlly to be exoeutod within the particular type of employ­
ment* He (i*e# the employee) must eseroiee all roaaonablo
%
eare and cllligonoe In the porformanoo of his work*' The 
maxime-applicable here is onondet poriti.am art Is*
It follows fr’om wimt has been said above that if one 
employee ie required to work with valuable materials 
belonging to his employer, whilst another employee work© 
with inferior materials, then a greater degree of oare 
and diligence ie required from the first employeo*^
2* Boo chapter 4 jji&a on the eubjoot of Termination.
3.* See particularly Boll's Brinolplee aoce. 14S-150 and 
154$ Brekine 3,3,16$ Hamer v# Cornelius, 28 I**J.G.Pm 
85 (1858) g dicte of WÏfïîoo J. approved of by Lord 
Oampbell InT G ^ kggn v* Stonee* 28 L.J.Q.B* 25*
4o Bee Bell'a Oommentariee, vol. I, pages 488*^ 490; and
IllSlMi V. M m  <1B70). 8 933. “
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The rule ie the same whether the employee is hired to
discharged a particular office or perform a particular
task# ïnoompetenoy of the employee will free the employer
5from his own contractual obligation, unless there ie an 
acquiescence in the situation by the employer himself. He 
may hope that the employee will learn eventually to do his 
work reasonably efficiently. On the other hand if the 
employee frankly discloses his incompetence but neverthe­
less is engaged, the master cannot break the contract on a
6plea of incompetence, because the new test becomes the 
reasonable exercise of the actual skill which the employee 
possesses•
The employee ie always required to exercise care in
the handling of property belonging to his master, any
failure in reasonable care rendering him liable in damages
g
for any loss suffered by the master.'
Nor does the servant guarantee his master's property 
against all risks* There is no liability upon him for any 
loss caused, for example, by inevitable accident or 
damnum fatale.
5# Erskine 3,3,16$ Bell's Principles sec. 154.
6. Gunn v. Ramsay (1801) Hume's Decisions p. 384| Bell's 
Principles loo. cit*
«C AM KKKM . - PIWlOrtllKnin
7* Walker v. The British Guarantee Association (1852) 18 
Q.B. 277; see also Bankton 1,20,21$ Erskine 3,3,16.
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(c) Be respectful emd obedient*
It 1© an employee's duty to be respectful to M s
employer at all times* Insolence provides a good ground
for dismissal - though the test of insolence has to be
related to the actual•relationship between the parties as
individuals, e*g* it may be easier to establish insolence
8from a menial servant than from a qualified employee 
(whose qualifications may, indeed, be superior to his 
employer's), who may be - firmly, but tactlessly - 
questioning his employer's opinion or view on a technical 
matter*
Blatant disobedience is, however, quite another 
matter* Any wilful refusal to obey ordex’s or any action 
committed in violation of orders may generally,, and usually 
does, amount to a major breach of contract justifying the 
employee's dismissal (provided always that the order was 
lawful and that the employer had a right to give it and 
perhaps also, following in this respect the English legal 
view, that it was a reasonable order in the cirewastaneea)* 
The trend of the cases illustrates that each side 
must act reasonably and with common sense* This is an 
understandable guiding principle in modern industrial 
relationships between employer and employees but it may be 
extremely difficult to follow in practice, where there is
c=z#*tio‘.«re-itaa.«
8. See ï'raser, og, cit.. page 71
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a YoeiferoziB "hot-headed" element on one side and an 
arazogant and unbending attitude on the other aide. The 
result Gould be a lengthy stoppage of work with eaeh side 
being aa stubborn as possible# Therefore, the strict 
legal course may not always be the most sensible one to 
take in the oiroumstanees# Compromise, without loss of 
face, very often pays handsome dividends.
The employer is not obliged to give explanations or 
reasons to the employee for any general order or inatx^uct- 
ion or particular order or instruction# It is quite 
sufficient that the order is lawful and is one which would 
normally be expected from the employer in the particular 
type and scope of employment. Her, indeed, may the 
employee refuse to perform the ordered task until explana­
tions are given to him.^
1 A
In a well-known English ease," the master was held
justified in dismissing a housemaid who persistently left
his household, against orders, to visit her sick and dying
11mother. Three of the older Scottish cases"""' illustrate a 
similar approach by the courts here, whex^ e again there was 
disobedience (after due warnings) to the lawful orders of
9» Sàssap» V. JJouglas, Hume's Decisions 392 (1807).
10' lHS>S.E V. Mggon (1845), 14 M. & W. 112; 2 D. and 1. 89!
11. Elder v. Bennet, Hume's Decisions 386 (1802)s Hamilton 
V. M'Lean, 1824% 3 S. 268: and A. v. B. 1853. 16 D. 269.L * ....   .ujj. .ir-n-TTiTi.-rij r  I' Ifjr'Ta '  f
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the employez». It is submitted that the modern eourt© 
would take a more husuane view of the circiûnstances, 
particularly in eases of the Turner v. Mas on type#
It does not seem to be a* valid defence for the 
employee to say that he disobeyed his master's instructions 
so as to benefit his master or to say that his conduct was 
due to over-anxiety or over s^ealousness*
Should the employer order the servant to do something 
which is morally or legally wrong the courts will recognise 
that such an order - unlawful or immoral « cannot be forced 
upon the servant. Disobedience in such a case will not 
constitute a ground for the employee's dismissal, nor will 
the court impose on the employee any penalty or other 
award in respect of his non-performance. Of course, any 
agreement by the employee to do for his master any act 
which ie illegal or immoral will usually result in both 
employee and employer being held liable under the criminal 
law as well as in damages under the civil law. It is no 
defence to the employee to plead that he was ordered to do 
the particular act by his master.
(a) @#e_durmg. vhioh employee must work.
Where the contract specifies the times during which 
the employee is to work, then any question between the 
parties becomes a question of construction and inter­
pretation of the contract itself. If nothing is said In 
the contract then the length of time of employment falls to
89
he cleoided by refererace to the custom or usage of the
locality or of the particular establishment or^  failing
all of these tests, by reference to what is a reasonable
time in the oireumatances,* This will vary according to
the nature of the woxdr involved and the status of the
employee ooneerned#
It is essential that the servant attend punctually
at his place of eBiploysïient and he must not be absent v/ith^
1 2out lawful cause or excuse#*" Any failure to do so may 
lead, in most circumstances, to dismissal of the employee# 
It seems to be accepted that when a servant is under 
notice from his employer or is '^working his own notice'^  he 
is entitled to some time off to look for another situation 
As the legal requirement of notice is primarily designed 
to enable the employer to obtain a replacement and the 
employee to obtain altexviative employment, some reasonable: 
freedom of movement is to be allowed# The authority for 
this proposition is basically an old l^ nglish case,' in 
which it was stressed that absence by a servant to seek 
other employment did not justify dismissal#
The employee himself must act reasonably in the 
matter, so as not to cause any unnecessary inconvenience
" nTT'IT * * f  n T Trm—ip#"f fïTTW I" »Ti *11' K T irm ' iWi I I  I I III iirrnrt#'! m r mi~r~Hi' n r 11b;~i >iiMw ih ii. m ""  w  k ' i i i nr'i i
12* See chapter 4 infra, on Tertninsition of the relation-
**♦ <ca(<cto'R3e»ti*ettT*5«L» ^
ship*
13m Bee particularly E* v. Polesworth* 2 B and AulcU 483 
(1819). ■” -----------
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to his master,,e*g* if the absence can be arranged during 
a slightly exteîided lunoh^houa? period this is quite reason 
able, rather than have the employer inconvenienced during 
a particularly busy morning or afternoon period*
Where the employee ie not under notice he must ask 
permission from his master before absenting himself for 
interview or for the purpose of seeking other employment# 
If'/hilst he is not bound to disclose the reason for hie 
intended absence, nevertheless he must protect himself by 
obtaining a proper permission#
(e) Kind of work he must perform.mmnmié’' , w  wm ■<! mi w * n h iimi n i r >
The obligation upon the servant is to perform the 
kind of work for which he was engaged* There is no 
obligation upon him, in the ordinary case (i#e# apart 
from an emergency) to perform some other type of work or 
to a.ct in. some other capacity. Obviously, this question 
as to what is a different type of work or a different 
capacity from that which was contracted upon between the 
parties, is one which can give rise to Innumerable dis­
putes between employer and employee.
Lord Fraser saye^ *^ ” that a general rule has been 
evolved to the effect that although the work demanded from 
the servant may not be within the precise line of his
14, 023# oit, page 78.
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contract, yet if asked of him during an emergency, his 
scruples to do it will not be listened to aaxd he will be 
guilty of disobedience.
Mxv Bell suggests^^ that orders inferring trifling 
deviations from the line of duty form no grounds of 
objection in favour of the employee, so long as these 
orders are not constantly repeatedBut if the deviation 
is substantial or takes place on numerous occasions or if 
the employee is placed in some personal danger then the 
Court will protect the employee by upholding his refusa,! 
to perform.
Moreover? an employee cannot be obliged or compelled
to work on a lower status than that at which he was
16
engaged. There are several older Scottish eases"' which 
support this view* It will be appreciated that if the 
servant is taken on for the performance of general duties 
(perhaps, for example, on the basis of an unskilled 
labourer) then he or she can be ordered to perform any 
lawful task within the scope of that general employment. 
There is no room for a demarcation dispute (in theory) 
between the employer concerned and the particular employee
15. PrincipleSs bqo  ^ 176.
16. See, y * Ramsaj;» Hume * b Deeis. 384 (1801
El-cH§£â£aa> Hume's Deois. 390 (1806);
V. DouglM, Hume's Deels. 392 (1807)? and 
Ross Y* Pender (l874), 1 E. 352,
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Om the quoslïlon of risk of persoBal danger or 
vlolemeog juetifylng refusal, to obey an order from the 
master^ reference may be made to certain of the older
17
oaeee# ' The teat aeam to be that the risk involved
ie not fairly within the contemplation of the oontraat# 
This approach to the question has been continued 
in modern law and It ie further illustrated by several 
notable oases, both English and Soottiah, of which the
1 Athree e3:a,m%)le8 quoted helaw"- are porhapD the moat 
oivîîsttmdiag aad well-knowa*
17. See Sluraer y. <1845) 14 M. & \U  118;
h  # ^ A g J g # m § L S â '  (1857) 0 19 D. 
1004? aad Araser - oi>. oi.t. eap.X aad osises therela 
OltOtU
r
Ifôo Bee particularly ^
 ^ElSiillM V, ISfat» 1921 8,0, 382 (sa order to a
domoatic eervwb to go home whom she was too ill to 
move from her bed wae quite unreaeonable)§
, Ô M S m L M l ^  V. jgha&arlœ [1950.] A,0 . 877 (an ord®
to an Armmilam employee of the bank a ending him to 
Istanbul (them Constantinople) where his life was in 
danger^ employee's refusal to continue serving in 
latanbml and M a  subsequent dlsmioaal* Ha auceeoded 
in hia action for wrongful dlamlsaal);
poata?aeU JIgspima V* OJl<llsaJl@ife, [ 3-930] A,0. 271
(where it was h e %  that the appellant, Bou^ourou, had 
failed to âisoïSge the oniia of proof upon him that 
hie life waa in danger aïST'^ therefora hie action for 
wrongful dismiaeal could mot euaoGeci)®
§3
(f) Must conduot himself morally*
The servant must behave himself during the employ­
ment , that is to say conduct himself in a respectable and 
decent mmmer* He must not do anything which scandalises 
or brings disrepute upon hie employer or his family# This 
is particularly so in the ease of servants who are residen* 
within the employer ^ s household*^® (though they are a 
rapidly diminishing class of employee)#
Although the immoral act is committed outwith the 
master's household, this will still justify dismissal if 
the master's interests, feelings or reputation are
pA
seriously prejudiced thereby.
The misconduct in question must occur during the 
service* Prior misconduct does not - unless continued - 
justify dismissal
19. See M M n  v. Acton (1850) 4 0. & I>. 208 (#8tlfleâ
diamrssal of a resident eBiployee, guilty of assaulting 
a maid-servant with intent to ravish her)*
20. O o m o M  V. £ustice (1862), 15 Ir.G.L.R. 457.
21. R. V. Westraeon (1781), Calfl. 134.
Moreover0 Im the absence of fraud by the employee, 
there i® no obligation upon a servant to cliecloee to his 
employer, when he is being taken on as an employee, any 
material fact ocmoeraing hia oharaotor* The principle of 
uberrima fldoa has no applioatlon in the Blaster and
PP
Bervant ralat ionahlp # "
Dishonesty is one of the more oonmon types of acts 
of moral turpitude# If an employee steal® hia employer®® 
prope)rty then he hae broken hi® contract and may bo 
diemiasod at onoo*^^
Any other' act of moral turpitude may justify dla^ 
missalp although a prosecution had not been or could not 
bo tgd^ en; for example, the us© of oboeone language by a 
tutor to his master's oMldren justifies his immediate
OA
dismissal;"  ^ or gross misconduct in the treatment of 
female workers on a farm by the foremen, thereby causing 
quarrels etc#, v;ith his wife and oonaeqiiimt Interruptions
p q 
of v/orko
22. See Krell, 42 I,.J,Q,B. 55; a M  also Itofe
V. (1928) 44 S.Ij.R. 295B
also Bedl V. MgËSLJSÔs^ZMâ.. !l932j Â.O. 101.
25p Bell's Brinoiplo® see* 178; fumex* v# Bqblnqon (1033) 
6 Od è P# 15; Smith v# Thompson# 8 ïï#B# 44; 18^7i#J#0#P# 
Ci849h vnili£ Ë L..BijJiaMxJg.» (1067) „
16 L.'i’.M.S,
24. Mathoson v. KaoEimioa (1852), 10 S. 025
25. 0rel« V. SantlerBon 1864, 2 M. 1270.
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Intoxication is another example of improper conduct* 
Before dismissal is justified the intoxication must he 
habitual or frequent, unless of course it can he shown 
that one partioulai? instance was of itself of such a 
serious and aggravated character as to justify dismissal, 
It is always a question of oircumstanee© as to the 
extent of intoxication which justifies dismissal* Hot 
only is the degree of intoxication and its frequency to 
he looked at but, in addition, the position of parties
P 7and the nature of the service should also be considered, '
The basic general test as between employer and employee 
would be whether the state of Intoxication interferes 
with the proper function of the employee's duties* If it 
does then he may be dismissed.
(g) Revealing secrets »
In important manufactures or processes or trades the 
master may have some secret or hidden method of manufaotur« 
which may be quite unlOiown to rival traders* His reput­
ation and hi© business superiority and sucoeee will
K* 6 6 2 *
27. MlMUar v. Maofarlame (1852), 15 3. 246; (the mas ter
of a ship dismissed for drunkenness in a foreign port; 
reinstated; and told not to oari'y spirits abroad; dis­
obeyed; incapacitated by drink for part of homev/ard 
voyage; held to have forfeited his wages in con- 
©eciuonce)
go
usually depend upon that proeoss, which he deeires to keep 
eeorot and la regard to which the lav/ will give him a 
measure of proteotloa# When an employee le engaged it ia 
not umuoual la certain trades or manufaotories to require 
him to maintain a strict alienee as to the methods or 
prooeoses wed by his employer® If he should break that 
undertaking which he hao given them ho may be liable in
O C-'
damagoB to M s  master and he may well bo dieirrissed*'’""^
During all the hours of employment the employee's 
tiB'AO and labour belong to M e  master# By the contract 
itself the employer is purohaaing the skill, ingonuity 
and labour of the servant# Therefore, the servant oomea 
under a legal obligation (not jUBt a moral obligation) to 
exert hio skill, hia Ingenuity and his labour to the 
maximum for the advantage and benefit of Ills raaster©'''^"* 
Should the first master give M a  consent to the
28, ^ See 19 March, 1836 R,0, t e y  
Sattiaga vol. xi p. 32§ amd
Sgo^. V. Houston, 1900 3 ¥, 48* 8 S.Wi. 2^0. See also
31 Sh.Ot.Rep. p. 161 to the effoot 
that it is open to the employer to take Interdict 
proceedlugs to prevent disoloaure by the employeo®
 ^ A fairly rooent end more well«*knovm English oaso 
illustrating the employer's remedy of Imjimotlem (the 
.iCngliali version of the Interdict) ie that of hlvac Ltd* 
V# .Park Royal Beieratlfie Instruments ltd# [1946 ] Oh# 169#
29. ShOiBPBOS'i V, Havelock (1808) 1 Camp. 527 pe?? TjoM  
iill oa'bor OKgb «
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second employment then it is possible that the first 
master might recover the employee's wages g based upon an 
agency contract* But if the employee takes a second 
situation or appointment without the consent of his first 
mas ter g the correct remedjr is to proceed against the 
second employer for loss of service or against the servant 
himself for breach of contract<, It is useless to claim 
the wages from the second employer because he and the 
pursuer (i#e« the first employer) are not parties to any 
contractual relationship* If the wages have already been 
paid to the employee it seems competent for the first 
employer to sue the employee for the amount of the wages 
paid to him by the second employer*
The rules noted above will apply whore the employee's 
actings are clearly prejudicial to the first employer, 
based on the theory that the ''second'^  contract is against 
publie policy and therefore it is void and unenforceable* 
Should the actings of the servunt vis -^à-vie his 
second employment be in no way prejudicial to hie original 
master it would seem that the second employment is perfect 
ly lawful and the first master cannot interfere*
It is now aoceptedg in modern practice, that an 
employee may take employment (which is, of course, non- 
prejudicial to hie master) elsewhere, during his spare 
time, but he cannot imdartake without special consent to
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work for a second master during a period of time when he 
is under contract to his original master»
(i) Bound to accompany employer*
There seems to he no doubt that, in certain cases, 
an employee must accompany his employer wherever the 
latter goes within the United Kingdom and particularly 
where the nature of the service is personal e*go a domestic 
employee such as a valet, a chauffeur or also a prlvi'ite 
secretary. ‘ But an employee is not bomid to go outwith the 
United Kingdom, if he does not wish to do so."^
Both Mr# Bell'^  and Mi% Tait" " took the view that a 
servant employed in Scotland was not bound to move outside 
of Scotland even to another part of the United Kingdom *
It will be appreciated that where the servant's 
contract is terminated whilst he is absent from home he is 
entitled to his expenses for the journey home* Mox^ eover, 
it is reasonable to allow him a certain time during which 
to seek alternative employment and accordingly the employer 
should permit him to return home at a reasonable time 
before the final termination of the engagement, for this 
purpos e e
30* 9^ait'S Justice - vide servant; and see also Stuart 
V* -Riehardeon, Hume's Decis* p* 390 (1806)»
31* Principles seo* 180«
320 Op* oit* (vide servant).
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Where the work to be performed by a particular 
servant has reference to a place rather than to a person, 
it would appear-that the master cannot remove him to 
another place which ie at an inconvenient distance for 
the servant. This rule is departed from during emergencie 
(particularly in war-time) when movement of employees 
becomes regulated generally by the Ministry of Labour 
(under Essential Woi*ks Orders, Control of Engagement 
Orders and the like) and the actual engagement of artisan 
employees is subject to compulsory regulation by the 
state*
The place where the master has hia work at the time 
of the engagement is (unless stipulated expressly other­
wise) held to be the place where it is implied that the 
servant is to labour* This point was quite clearly 
Illustrated in the old caee of Anderson v* Moon^^, where
all the facts and ciroumstances were carefully weighed 
and upon an examination of these the court held that the 
female employee concerned could not be compelled by her 
master to work at another factory, some distance away from 
the original place of employment*
(3) Mot to injure the business of his employer*
If there is any question of the servant's conduct 
causing serious harm or loss to the master's business then
33. (1637), 15 S* 412*
1 0 0
diomissal is justified* The conduct here is aomething 
other than moral turpitude, disobedience or habitua,! 
negligence,,*^
A case where the possibility of causing injury to an 
employer's business arises not infrequently and whzleh is 
of the epeoias of conduct which we have in mind in this 
paragraph,, is that where an employee ©blicits business 
from his master's customers knowing that he (the employee) 
ie about to conmenoe in business for himself* The 
principle which ie applied here would seem to be this - 
that if the servant is soliciting business when the 
service relationship ie at an end then there is no 
justification for dismissal. However, if the service 
relationship is still subsisting then the master may 
justifiably dismiss him and sue for damages for the loss 
incurred.
If the servant engages in business on his own 
account and that business is in competition with the 
business of his master then he becomes liable to dismissal 
even although he can show that he has given full time
34. Turner v* Robinson, 5 B, and Ad. 7B9| 6 G. & P. 15 
(1833) (foreman assisting an apprentice to escape to 
America)# see also Read v. Bunsmore, 9 0, & P. 588 
(1840)§ and Lacy v. Qsbaldiston. 8 G* & P. (1837); also 
V .  .Eearon. 9 A. & E, 548 (1839).
35. lichola v. Martin, 2 Esp. 732 (1799).
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56and attention to the master's business.
As soon as the service relationship is over there 
is no restriction upon the ex-employee from ooïïmieneing 
business on his own account# If he can persuade hie 
forraer employer's customers to patronise his new business 
then it seems that his old employer can do nothing about 
this* In view of this possible danger it is not unusual 
to find that somewhat strict restrictive covenants or 
obligations are introduced into the contract of employ­
ment itself so as to prevent the former employee from 
setting up business in opposition to his old master for 
a specified number of years and within a certain 
prescribed area# The question which then arises is 
whether - looking to the public interest and also that 
of the person claiming to enforce the restriction - the 
particular restrictive covenant is wholly or partially 
enforceable.* If it is too wide then it will be void and 
quite unenforceable*
This important topic of agreements in restraint of 
trade is very fully covered in many of the leading
Scottish and English textbooks and general reference 
57works and it is not proposed therefore to deal with the
36,. See Mercer v. %all* 5 Q#B# 447 (1845) 5 and Hobson v.
OowleyTTrL#J#BSrr^5 (1858). ^
37* See particularly Gloag on Contract (2nd Edn.)§ Gloag 
and Henderson - Introduction to the Law of Scotland 
(5th Edn.); Cheshire and Fifoot - The Law of Contract 
(6th Edn.); and Ohitty on Contracts (22nd Edn.), 
particularly volume I thereof#
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topic in the courae of this work# It is sufficient to
note what seems to be the broad basic role of both
Scottish and English law, namelys- that any agreement by
which a man binds himself that he will not carry on a tradi
of any kind, although limited in space or tlmt he will not
carry on a particular* trade, if unlimited in space, are
both equally bad in law and accordingly are quite void
58and imenforceable#
(2) l^ Tiplojer's duties and obligations generallys - 
As the law places certain duties and obligations 
upon an employee towards his employer so it places a 
corresponding set of duties and obligations upon the 
employer in relation to each of his employees# It is now 
appropriate to consider what these duties and obligations 
are and also to note in what respects, if at all, they 
have ehan,ged and developed in modern law#
(a) To receive employee and allow him to continue in 
service#
The master's primary duty is to take the servant into 
his eraployment and to allow him to continue therein# The 
exceptions to this obligation are considered in chapter
38* See Iraser ™ o^# git* page 91; and the leading case of 
Hordenfeldt v, fexim Mordenfeldt Guns & Ammunition Go. 
(1894) A*0* 535*
39* Bell's Principles sec# 182; Bracegirdle v* Heald- 1 B. 
and Aid* 722; Olarke v* AllattTT"oTBr335*
^  f*3*MBSFi*eT#i*2rttrtBK3HrtÆ»» V ’ »p^
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four hereof (imdw iàm .gonoraX heading of ''Termlmatlon*' ) 
(mê also In that of #1^ :; work dealing with
jaatlfIsihle
The natœe of the rolattoneliip a mutual
reapeot for oaoh other ^  a forbearcmoey lenity emd 
remowe in ueimg the mervloe and a mi3.âm#8® in giving 
oMoro#'^ '^  It h#e b e w  pointed out oarllor Im tMe work 
that an omployeo rmmt Impllodly give oboâitmooç buI>  ^
mieeloa# loyalty aad reapoot to hla maoter9 Bqnsllyo 
la mm imp3.ied obllgaMoa apom the master of 
proteotiom emd modwatlem towwd the mervant^ that lo to 
oay in hi® g m o m l  treatment of the morvtmt* % o  teat as 
to whether mi #%>loyae iiay leave Me employment heoaiiee 
the master lii) not fulfilling hia olÆlgatlom hme to be a 
toet of reaeonablemeeo Im the oirommtanoeo# The Imw 
âom m#t «* miû aan hardly be ozpooted tm proteot th© 
ovoM)eaeitlve employee* the employee himself oaymot 
leave* without any jmtlfleatlem* %#om the g^ c^mmd that 
M o  employee la perpetually pétulant or gmff or 111^ 
mammo###. or bacl^ toiiperod or indeed eve# jaot plaimly cmd 
generally dioagreaable* SomotMag more la aoodod
40» Bob o&aptes" 8^  ims‘agmpli C3) (reaeciios of tlm 
employ to,*) «
4Io S®o Pi%8#e «» Bastes? îSîîa SoswasSit p* 124o î^ uotlng 'fK'orii 
Paley“a Mos*ai aad Political ffailGaopby»
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perhaps personal violenee or a threat of such violence,
the habitual use of intemperate language or acts of
cruelty such as destroy the whole basis of a relationship
Ù pwhich should rest upon mutual trust and mutual respect.
The court will look at the oireiniQatances of each oaae‘ 
and while the decision in any one case of this type may 
be a guide to a set of circumstances arising subsequently 
it should not necessarily be regarded as a precedent (it 
is an exceeding rarity in practice to find a reported 
decision which agrees, in all respects, with the particu­
lar problem in hand). The Court will be concerned to see 
that the principle of "natural justice" is not trans­
gressed by the employer.
One aspect of the authority which the master had over 
his servant is illustrated by the question of personal 
ohastieement. Erskine took the view"^ ’^ that the master 
had a powex” of moderate chastisement over his servants# 
Later writers have opposed that view because there was no
42f See particularly Bankton 1,2,55s and Smart v. Gairns 
Hume'a Decisions IB (1Y94) as to cruel treatment of an 
apprentice,
43# See Fraser, Qit.. page 125 and also footnote (B) 
thereto.
44# See Palmer v. Inverness Hospitals Boa,rd 
VO.H.) 1963 S»L,‘J?, 124«
45* Ersk, 1,7,62,
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need, they said, fox* a master to have such power, which 
could be an instrument of oppression* It is conceded that, 
in earlier days, when young servants and apprentices spent 
their time at the employer's place of work or in his house­
hold some quasi-pax*ental authority was necessary and the 
practice of mild chastisement might at that time have been 
acoeptable^'^ but it is submitted that this so-called power 
of chastisement (whether termed "mild" or not) must be 
disregarded completely in modern times# The same is 
probably true of the master and apprenticeship relation­
ship also, in which of course in former days the idea of 
personal chastisement had been more readily accepted* It 
may be that today the only master with a power to chastise 
those who work under him is the ship'sr#aster and he is 
pi^ otected by the Merchant Shipping Acts.
In the general ease of employer and employee there is 
no need for personal chastisement when the law permits 
dismissal to the master and an action in damages to the 
servant*
The female employe© would be entitled to leave the
* T^^ *^ Tr^ irtnriW‘-ii‘»‘irn,*rininriTirrrTi‘inTin wriit*ir#f#im iiii*-mriiiifn#fiii'- iw»-   mu n ,i wmn iw#i. iwr ~ii»u iiM~
46» See Slacketoiie, 6 1c* 14? and Wins bone v* Mim, 
1 B. a 0* 4595 • 2 D, and R. 465. “-™=“  — '
iUb
A?service if lier employer had attempted to seduce her* In 
such a case the employer would be obliged to pay the wages 
for the whole period of the service.and perhaps also for 
such further lose or damage as she has suffered* This 
conduct by the master is a distinct breach of hie implied 
obligation to protect a female servant#
Most importantly, as soon as a good reason for leav­
ing arises the employee should depart at once* If he does 
not do BO he will be held to have condoned the particular 
act complained of and therefore he will have debarred 
himself from founding upon It*^^
(c) To provide work*
It is accepted that wages aree payable (a) in 
proportion to the amount of work done, i.e. "piecework" 
or (b) according to the time served* In the former.case 
the master is bound to provide constant employment during
KA
the subsistence of the agreement# In the latter case,
47* M'Lean v# Miller (1838) 5 Boas' Rep* 270; also Gray v* 
m i l ^  1901, 39 S.L*H# 256; and Reid v# Macfarla^ne 1919 
518; 1919, 2 B.L.T* 24; 56 BTlTR# 4% T T # r i a 8t- 
mentioned case being most interesting for the observations
it contains regarding the evidence necessary to prove 
seduction by the employer).
48. See Bo]^ v. M!CgrMMale, 39 Sii.Ot.lep. p. 325.
49* 8ee the opinion of L# Pres# ïnglis in Fraser v# Laing 
1878, 5 R* 596 (a catalogue of condoned grievances cannot 
be brought up as a ground for damages where a domestic 
servant remained in service for the full period)*
50* Bell's Prineiplee s# 192; Cowdenbeath Coal Co# v*
5 bii.Ot.Eep, at p. n? ïvœaer v. GoMBmith, 
[1891J 1 Q.B* 544 (wages were payable here by commission 
and it was held that the employer was bound to give the 
opportunity of ea-rning it).
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51there la generally no obligation to provide work and 
wages must be paid on the agreed basis although the 
employee be merely standing by doing nothing®
It may be that there is an implied obligation, under 
certain eiroumst&mces, to provide work - for example, where 
the employee is an actor, concert pianist or other person 
who has to maintain a reputation before the public or 
whose business interests require him to maintain contact 
with a particular market* It is, furthermore, important 
to note that where the contract is a written one its terms 
provide the basis of agreement and the master cannot say 
that he has an implied right or privilege of varying these 
terms# There is an old Scottish case" ‘ illustrating the 
attempt by a master to vary the terms upon the ground that 
as the new raw materials supplied to him were of better 
quality and more easily processed in manufacture therefore 
he was entitled to reduce the piecework rate of w£iges. But 
the Court refused to accept the master's contention#
The question of implied terras had also arisen in 
certain English eases which were decided not long after 
the Beottish case aboVermontloned# For example, there 
might be a written agreement between the employer (colliery
51. Lagerwall v. Wllklaaon. 1899, SO l.I, 55.
V. .Bawaon~TI^rr"2 K.B. 653.
52. Mieye r, Gorflon. 1821, 1 S. 41.
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-ovmera) and the employee stipiilatiB.g that when the pit 
was idle the employee should continue to serve the employ­
ers and he auhject to their orders and directions and do a 
full day's work on every working day® The English oourts 
took the view that the employers were not hound to employ 
the plaintiff (Scottish "pursuer") on all reasonable work­
ing days or to create work for him so as to give him some- 
thing to do# There was nothing impei/ative in an agree­
ment of this type#
In a later caee again concerning a colliery worker 
there was a provision that wages should be paid fortnightly 
and that the employee should not be discharged without 
twenty-one days' notice in writing, except in cases of 
misconduct* It was held that this implied an obliga,tlon to 
find work for the servant and to pay him wage© every fort­
night *
The trend of the more recent decisions - where the 
question of an implied obligation hae arisen - has been 
to support the general principle stated in the opening 
sentence of the second paragraph of this chapter# It must 
be observed at one© that most of these decisions are from
r, . i» *... ,,|. i  Trf~~ T71 ' l*V VT“ |~ |I I V'| l#| I *~l 'H H lDfrW ll»~TTI<~«ll #W'lf » imil*ir f  I fr'IF J~ # 'III. IfT  lT~7 > I TT Mf Il1|l|l I f f  J #| T III
55. WüllamBoa V. fajflor. 13 81 (1843)? Hartley
y. Gummnss (1847). 17 L.J.G.P. 84: PillcLnrton v. Scott. 
15 W r T W T 6 5 7  (1846). — . 6 ^  — *
54* Whittle v* Frankland (1862) 2 B, and S* 49® See also 
V. SlLQTOoM ( W 5 )  11 W.R. 595.
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England^but nevertheless this ie a topic upon which 
there is little if any variation between the laivs of 
Scotland and England®
However, the basic principle on this question of 
provision of work still remains - that there is no general 
obligation upon an employer to provide work#
(d.) To provide food and clothi^#
It will depend upon the terms of the agreement (or 
engagement) or upon the nature of the service itself 
whether or not an employer is bound to provide food and 
lodging for his employee# Obviously, this obligation will 
arise towards the domestie servant and any failure in 
the performance of that obligation.will allox^  the employee 
to leave the service - although, in the first place, the 
servant has a duty to notify the master of his grievance 
and give him a chance to put matters right® Once the
55o,See v. OliZM [1930] A.G, 209? 99 L.J.K.B. 165?
46 Ï.I..R. 230. iHsier [0.901] 2 K.B. 653.
Martoe v. George Jklwardes IitC TÏ928] 1 K.B. 269? 96 
L.J.K.B. 980? 43 50.L,H. 809? tout see Withers v. General 
|fegafee_^ orpQratiQn [1933] 2 K.B, 536? 102 L.J.K.B. 719 
(no oompensation for alleged damage to an existing 
reputation). See also - Collier v, Sunday Referee 
Putoliehing Co.. [1940] 2 K 3 T W 7 ?  l o V X J ^ C T T T f 4?
U  17e R e u ] ^ B ^ o n ^ ^  , [1918] 1 K.B. 315?
87 L.J.K.B, 466? 34 Ï.L.R. 171,
56. See Bell's Principles sec,. 182? Banlcton 1.2,55? 2 
Hutch,, 170.
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grievance îiae been reported and nothing has been done 
about It0 then it is in order for the servant to leave
Lord Fraser says that so far as lodgings are concerned 
the master may compel a male domestic servant to reside 
out of the house upon paying board wages, but he oarmot do 
so in the ease of the female servant, because it is implied 
in her engagement that she shall have the protection of the 
master's house and family®
Mr# ïïmpheraton explainsthat it is not uncommon in 
agricultural service and perhaps in other cases too by 
agreement, for the employer to give or allow to the servant 
a apeoified quantity of meal, potatoes, coal etc®, although 
the employee has not necessarily a right to demand the 
particular items themselves* It seems, however, that he is 
absolutely entitled to a similar quantity of sustenance or 
fuel* The case of fiheills v* Dalyell* cited in the foot- 
note to this page, supports the view that the master may 
not make any change in the specific articles supplied 
unless the cireumstances becsmie so extrao3cdInary and unfore- 
seen as to make the fulfilment of the letter of the eontrad 
Impracticable o'
This question of board and lodging was quite important
57.- Eraser, 0£, cU. p. 127. '
58* loe* Git* (see footnote (b))#
59. ol. gI F  p. 72.
60. Ses aWlls. V. Dalyell 1825, 4 S. 1
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to the employee in the Tictorian era and perhaps even clovm 
to the commencement of the Second World War, but einoe then 
it has hardly been a material matter» Oddly enough though$ 
it has re-occurred in modern buslneae life in the form of 
the px’ovision of Luncheon Vouchers as an added inducement 
to employees to x*emain in the particular service or to 
prospective employees to join the particular establishment® 
This nev/ device raises interesting questions in relation 
to income tax and legitiraate business expenses, but these 
are not relevant to the question as to whether or not the 
provision of Luncheon Vouchers has or has not become a 
term or stipulation or condition of the contract of employ­
ment® The matter is important to the employee as it may 
mean a benefit being conferred upon him which is equivalent 
to a x*1b0 in wages of, say, one pound sterling per week 
(calculated on the basis of a four shillings voucher per 
day for a five-day week),
It is also 3?elevant to this particular section to 
consider whether there is any obligation upon an employer 
to provide medical and or attendance for his employees*
It seems to be beyond doubt that there is no obliga­
tion upon a master to provide medicine or medical attend­
ance during the illneaa of his employee. More is any 
exception made to this rule where the illness is caused by 
Injury received in the service or during residence in the
11o
61 62 master's household ® Mr® Umpheraton suggests ' that the
master's obligation of proteotlon, in the case of female 
emd young domestic servante, implies a quasi-parental care 
of and for the servant's health and morals, similar to the 
master and apprentice relationship of the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries* He also thinks that such an 
obligation might, in certain oircumstanees, include the 
provision of medical attendance* In support of this, he 
cites Jeff3:?ey v* Donald, a case where a young female 
domestic servant was injured within the household and 
subsequantly died without the employer having sent for a 
doctor or having eonmmnioated with the girl's parents 
until three days after the accident* Whilst agreeing that 
the particular decision was justified upon a failure to 
fulfil his duty of protection, Mr* tjmpherston submit 
that the master's conduot in the cireumstances was not 
just a moral delinqueney but a failure in a legal oblig­
ation, because the employee was, at the relevant time, 
subject to the master's oontx’ol and being helpless, such 
an emergency imposed a legal duty upon the master to
4 0. a p. 80; .MisàâU. V.
Mam 18/4, 1 Guthrie's bh*Ot, oases 361*
62. 02. oit. p. 66.
65. 1901, 9 S.L.'j;. p. 199.
64. 0£, clt. p. 67.
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65obtain medical ass is ta.no e* ‘
The question of the legal duty of ca3?e imposed upon
the master has ooaue up again In the important ease of
M'Keating v# Frame,^^ where the principle of liability
upon the master arising out of his legal duty of care was
very clearly accepted by the court® The breach of that
legal duty will give rise to an action in dmiages against
the master based upon reparation®
It seems that English law takes a similar view^^ of
the duty of oare so Imposed upon the master/*
In certain cire m s  tances a master may undertake
liability for medical attendance, whether expressly or
impliedly, but this liability was limited to the extent of
68his undertaking* He cannot make any deduction from wages 
in respect of that medical attendance, unless he is able to 
point to a stipulation to that effect
Taking into account t'hb development of lational Health 
Insurance schemes, administered by the State, during this
O TSf.Trino r r r T T f r r r " r - T - f - T - n r - | - | t ' n~i>'ii>r T#'i‘-ti~inn~~ir~iiiat i’; t r  iirriirnr~trfTi~ii~ ii iTih rn  i;i i T f r  i*  .r iwrr## #  w# p  , »m\
5^® See Taylor v* HUl, 1900, 7 S#L.T* p® 318*
66* 1921 6 * 0 * 382*
67. See Mansfield-Oooper & J#0* Wood "Outlines of Industria] 
Law"; Diamond "Master and Servant" and Batt "The Law of 
Master and Servant", being the principal textbooks in 
Engliah law, for examples of this duty*
68. Montgomea v. & .  1878, 5 R. 796.
69. Mito^n V. Mam 1874, 1 Guthrie's Sh.Ct. Cases 361.
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centuiejj this question of liability for medical attendance 
upon an employee (in the nature of a quaoi^parental pro*- 
tection) Is no longer important. Howeverg the question of 
the Employer ^ s legal duty of care towards his employee la 
still very important^ as has been indicated in this main 
sectionA
It is also Interesting to note that the Conspiracy and
70Protection of Property Act, 1875 makes it a criminal 
offenoGp punishable by fine or Impz^ieonmont and after a 
summary conviction^ , for a master who is legally liable to 
provide for his servant or apprentice any necessary food*
clothings medical aid or lodging, to refuse or neglect to
2Î0 indemnify the employee for injury sustained in 
the employment «
(e) 3)0 indemnify the employee for injury sustained in 
the emr
S?he common law position of the employer in relation to 
his own pEîrsonal faulty v/hioh oauses injury to an employee, 
seems to be clear* The employer is bound to conduct his 
business or trade so as not to endanger the lives or limbs 
of his workmen* Therefore, if he acts negligently or oare*- 
lessly (e*ga ±ii failing to take proper safety precautions 
in the course of a aianufaeturing process) ho becomes liable 
in a re]paration action to the injured employee*
Nevertheless, the employee himself is regarded as 
assuming all ordinary risks of the particular employment, 
even where the work is of a highly dangerous nature # lo
70* 38 and 39 Viet, c*86g section 6
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master is, nor oan he be expected to be an insurer against
all risks whateoever which arise in the scope of employ-*
ment* It is the failure in the legal duty of care based
upon all the circumstances which gives rise to the common
law lia.bility* If the master ought to have foreseen the
particular danger, which caused the injury, and thereafter
have taken appropriate steps to guard against that danger,
he will be liable for any failure eo to act* Of course,
the employee himself may have the same opportunity as the
master of appreciating the danger and yet continue to work
without protest or objection or he may assume a greater
risk than necessary or, even act contrary to hie employer
instructions* Where he does any of these things he would
normally lose his right of recourse against the employer
71as the maxim volenti non fit injuria applies*
71. S«e M'lelll v. Wallaoe (1853), 15 D. 818; Gray v. 
Lawson 1860, 22 D* 710 (but compare M^Aulay v* Brownlee 
isëb, 22 D. 975); Cook v. Bell 1857, 20 ». 137;"iHdV’Hell3 
V. Wilson 1858, gO~V“4 2 7 , ~ '  _
OnThe **volenti” principle see particularly Lord 
Gurriehlll’a opinion in Gook v* Bell eit* supra.g and also 
the opinion of L.J.O. Hope in Paterson v. Wallace 1855s 17
_y_ y *  /  «  à m f  >i w i w m mt  .............. ..................................  ^
». 623 (rase lord Oranvrortli'a remarks on this ease in 
Bartonahill Goal Go. v. Held 1858. 3 M'Q. 286). Paterson's
« !*a « ia U jK .-c h ix ii^< « u iU M « u .< .n in m s iH r i'iia iiw i ■ i i m M M M U H n M m w      *  * * . r J M M a s a iie w iw jg nw M in ii i -T ri
case was reversed on appeal but the principle that know- 
ledge of risk on the employee*e part was a material factor, 
was fully accepted*
The principle was raised again in Wallace v* Culter 
Paper Mills Go. Ltd * 1892, 19 E, 915, where an employe was 
kilTeawhilst pointing out a defect in a machine to his 
employer*8 engineer* The machine was proved to have been 
dangerous. The employers were held to be in fault for 
failing to fence the machine and the court o,lso took the 
view that where an employee continues to work in the îmow- 
legge of an existing danger there is no implied agreement 
by him to relieve the employers of their .responsibility*
The opinions of Lord Adam and Lord McLaren are most help*- 
fill see pages 918 to 920 inclusive of the report and
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The duty which the common law places upon the employ-»
er is that of taking reasonable care* This was referred
to by Lord Ablnger in the early English case of Priestley^
V# fowler*^  ^and the principle has been accepted in later 
cases* If the danger is concealed from the employee or if
71» continued
both were quite clearly of the view that this present was 
ruled by the leading :iingllsh. case of Smith v. Bak^&_8ons 
L.R* [1891] 1,0» 525 before the House of Lords, as the 
principle of law was the same in both countries.
In Wilkinson v* Kinneil Oannel and Poking Company 
Limited 1697* 24 R» 1001, by a majority ox a oourt of 
seven judges, the pursuer was allowed an issue, based on 
the volenti principle and, more importantly perhaps, upon 
the '^volunteer" principle (later to become more well-knovm 
from the leading English case of Haynes v, Harwood [1935]
1 K,B, 146; [1954] All E,R. 103V' ‘
The volenti principle again ai'ose fox'* consideration in 
Robertson v, Primroee & Go, 1910 S,C, 111, where an employ 
ee was injured on two separate occasions by a defective 
crane. The Lord Ordinary disallowed the claim, holding 
that the pursuer had known of the risk on each occasion 
and had accepted it. The First Division recalled the Lord 
Ordinary * s interlocutor end allowed an issue, stressing 
that the question whether pursuer knew of and had accepted 
the risks v/hioh v/ero not ordinax^ y risks incidental to th 
employment, but additional risks alleged to be caused by 
the employers' fault •« was a question of fact to be 
answered by a jury. Lord President Dunedin's opinion is 
most valuable (see pages 114 and 115) and here he followed 
the guiding principle of Smith v. Baker & Bonso eit, eupx^ a 
In the moat recent Bctiitish case of Sirîdxam v* Oernent- 
a t i o n ^ , (0»H#) 1964 8,L,T» (Eotes) oT—
volentT fton fit injuria, was again put fox^ ward by the 
employer. The court repelled the plea on this occasion, 
however* holding that it was not supported by relevant 
averments on behalf of the employer,
72, (1837) 3 M, & W, 1; see also Riley v, Baxendale (1861)
f — — ™  ^  — -4. «  ctteanartJSu ^ M ÎK Tc* ,  '
30 L,J*Ex, 87; and Ogden v. Rummens, (1863T*3 F, & P,
f pX $
73, Woodley v* Metropolitan District Railway Go. (1877)*
2 Ex.D, 384; Ageojp v, Yates, 21 L.J.Ex, 156; Baxtpn v. 
Hawksworth (1872)* 26 lTtT 851; Bkipp v« Eastern Counties 
Railvmy Go,, 23 L,J,Ex, 23; and Robertson v, Adamson (1862 
24 D, 1231,
he 1(3 given a falae aeeumnee that precautions have been
taken or he is told that some pa?eoairtion will bo taken 
and the aooldomt happons the employer will be liable.
A situation may aomotlmoB arise whwoln the employee 
may have been induced by the employer to continue work 
which was dangerous and the employee himself Imew of the 
danger and had complained of It# Does the law then regard 
the employee aa having him©elf aaaumed the rlak? It eeamo 
that it does not# Lord Ooekbwm (Uookburn 6»J#) gave a 
moot InatruotlVG opinion in which he diatinguiahod olearly 
between the oaao where the employe© Imowllngly enter© into 
m contract to work upon defective machinery' and the other 
case whore# upon a defoot arising# tho employee Is induood 
by the employer# to whoa© notice the defect ha© now been 
brought# to continue working in the usual manner# under a 
promise that the defect will be remedied#
The English oaao of Holme© v# Olarke' ' cloee not seem
C ï« x « )c -K J « b î ira . , lî î , -*  n )Pï?k;i*»:ï*»»,-'.sw’^ " î m
to be oaaily reconciled with the Bcottleh case of Ohiohtpn 
V# Kgign where defender knowllngly ouppliod mi unfit
74, liolaea v, Olayke (3.862), 31 L*J,Ess« 3 5 6 (#iero fonoiag 
iiaû ©3?olséîî and me m#loyer promised to s?eplaoe it, 
AooosTâingly aa element of posesonal aogllgesiee arose - asi 
t&@ o»ee v/as âeoldeâ aa tblo gxeuna, i’atiiox* tben toeaoU 
ef etatntozy fittty) t ooo also Sgtegg v, rnvMmSim (1861) 
g p# a Ilk 533#
75* m m m *
76# 186-3# 1 M$ 40? (oQG the opinion of L$J#0# Ingli© *»
(as he thon was))#
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horse* hut indueed the pursuer to continue his work, 
promising M m  another horse. Pursuer was well aware of the 
risk. It was held that he had no ground of action. He 
ought to have refused to continue working in face of the 
manifest danger, Presumably the difference really lies in 
the fact that the danger in Orichton's ease was more mani** 
feat and therefore perhaps more likely to cause injury 
than it was in Holmes so that the rea.sonahle and sensible 
employee would ha,ve refused to accept the unfair balance of 
risk# It is submitted that the cases of Wallace v# Culter 
Paper Mills Go. M d , a M  Rpbertson v. Priairpse & Go., 
referred to in footnote numbei* 71 above* taken along with 
Bmith V# .Baker & BonSo ao one of the leading oases on the 
volenti principle, have done a great deal to clarify the 
law on this very difficult point and that the old case of 
V. Ke|r might well be eompletely disregarded. 
Although the employer may have been negligent, nevor- 
theless he escaped liability completely - under the old 
law ^ if he could show that the employee’s own recklessness 
or negligence materially contributed to the accident
The Employers' Liability Act, 1880 (since repealed) 
made important limitations in the common law doctrine of
1 TtfN-#Tnp irw ii iw i 1'i* r i  i*yiw ^*"n >gài»aaeMsa#piü i#«,i i w  www
77* Bee, ae a matter of historical interest, «• Senior v# 
Ward (1859) L.J.Q.B, 139; M 'Naughton v, Caledonian Eailv/ay 
Go,, 1858, 21 D, 160; a.lso M'Martin v, Eannay# 1872 10 M#
t a w i iM I . im n m in w l i n '
413s Galloway v. King 1872. 10 M. 788s Dublin ete., Rail-
(18 Jo )V, Slatkery 78) 3 App.Casae l l w T Ëâdley v. 
Mndon and Morth-^Weotem Railway Co.. (1876) 1 App.Cases 
754; see also Fraser# o^, cit# # chapter 13,
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collaborateur'' (or fellov/^sorvant) but it left imoliangeâ 
the position where the employer could-plead negligence by 
a servant which materially contributed to his own injury.
Although a modification of this strict common law rule 
of protection to the employer was sought by the trade 
unions and by the workpeople and their Parliamentary 
3?eprosentatives it was not finally achieved until the law 
Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act of 1945,^^ This Act 
enabled the jury (or the court* if no jury sitting) to 
assess the total amount of the loss arising from the 
accident and then to apportion ' the blaiae between pursuer 
and defender, Damages would then be awarded to the 
pursuer which took into account his own contribution by 
way of blame for example* if the total loss or injury 
were assessed at £10,000 and pursuer'a blataeworthiness was 
agreed at 20^, the pursuer would recover £8,000 (which is 
precisely equivalent to defender's blameworthiness)o The 
Act effected an. Important change by enabling an employee to 
recover an adjusted and agreed proportion of the loss based 
upon the employer's degree of fault,whereas prior to the 
Act, he was virtually without any remedy where he had 
contributed to the loss in any respect,
76, 8 & 9 Geo* 6 cap, 26,
79, Bee Professor D,M. Weilker's ''Lav; of Damage© in Scotland'* 
particularly at chapter 27, pages 779^781 and also the 
illustrations of types of claim contained in Appendix A 
thereof, in many in©tan.ces a reduction in the award being 
made upon proof of contributory negligence.
120
One very important question which may well settle at
©nee the question of the employer’s liability in the oircum-
stances is whether or not the employee was acting within tin
scope of M b employment at the time when the accident 
80occurred* Where the employee clearly volunteers to do
something outwith the scope of M s  duties then the risk of
injury normally lies v/holly upon himself and he cannot hold
81hie employer responsible.
Where there la a latent danger in the particular 
operation and the employer Imows or ought to have known of 
this* and neglects to inform the employee, then the employ­
er will be liable for the injury to the e m p l o y e e T h e  
rule is the same where the danger is not obvious to a 
person in the servant’s position and where the latter might 
reasonably be held to have relied upon the judgment of his
80* See Brydon or Marshall v, Stj3v;ar,t 1852, 14 D* 596;
1855 2 M*Queen 30; Paterson App"* 4475 also Lord Oranworth’c 
remarks in Bartonshill Goal Go. '^* Hold 1858, 3 M’Queen 
286; Paterson App* J93* See a3.so eases of Jardine v. Lang 
1911 (0*H* j 2 S*L»T* 494 and Go5?manlev v* Evening Oitisaen 
Ltd* (1962) 78 Bh*Ot*H©p* 885 and also Docherty v* Anoell 
MoMr. Go.. (1965) 79 Sh.Ot.Eop, 50, a case in whlah employ- 
ers had failed to prove that the employee was acting out- 
with the scope of his employment*
81* Sutherland v* Monkland Railways Oo * .1857, 19 D* 1004 *
82, mvlrn V, England (1864), 33 L.J.Q.B. 321.
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employer for M s  protection.
The employer may also be liable If he is guilty of 
negligence and the risk involved is not incidental to tl 
service#^^'
On the subject of machinery^ the position at comnon 
law seems to be this, ^ the employer must provide reliable 
and sufficient machinery but it need not be the very latest 
up-to-the-rainute appliance produced within the particular
AK
industry - which is to be kept in a proper state of repair, 
though he does not warrant absolutely the condition of that 
machinery# Hie liability is not equated with that of the 
ineurmr - his duty is to exercise that skill and caution 
which is the hallmark of the prudent mmi of business (i.e. 
in his particular trad© or business). He cannot be liable 
for 3,atent defects quite unknown to him or of whose exist­
ence he could reasonably be supposed to be unaware.Th© 
onus of proving negligence and Imowledge of a defect (or 
reasonable apprehension of a defect by using ordinary skill.
and attention) lies upon the employee who is averring
87negligence by his employer. '
83. See £ollo^ v. Gaasi^ 1870, 8 M. v. Hjjarea 
1871, 10 ¥U 31; RgMztSam V. Brown 1876, 3^7^52.
84. Sse MajOgfleM v, Baddgley 1876, 34 B.Ï. 696.
85. See the observations of the Lord Jnstioe Olerk In
V, Hutoheon 1889, 16 R. 694; 26 S.L.R. 550; and
87. See W£oras r . lytatHeson, 1851, 4 M'Q, 215; Paterson App, 
1044; also Lord MacKeaale in Sneddon v. Addle 1849, 11 D. 
J^ 59s see also ir. Bop.ewpylc Go., 1861, 25
Do 425; and
But statute law may plaoe a very heavy obligation 
upon the employer to protect his worim on and any failure tc
87 * continued
and Darby v. Dunoan & Oo* 1861* 23 D* 5295 and Murphy v*
?hiiiip5^i876T3rir;^ » —
It has been he3.d in the 3;?eoent case of McMillan v* B*P. 
Eefinerv (Grangeeraouth) Ltd, 1961 S.L.T. (loteeT 79, that 
if there io a la'cenr defect in machinery supplied to a 
workmen's employers the onus Is upon the workman to prove 
that the makers were not reputable manufacturers upon whos< 
skill his employers v/ere entitled to rely* That is on 
extremely heavy omu| of proof# The case itself seems to 
form a oorollary"'To"”"the important case of Sullivan v# 
Gal3.agher and Craig 1959 S.G* 243« which was being heard 
by the Court of Session 6it the same time as the leading 
English case of Davie v# New Merton Board Mills Mriiited 
[1959] A#C* 604 was before the House of Lords, Indeed the 
Scottish ease was adjourned to av/ait the Lords’ decision 
in Davi.e# Their lordships in the Second Division were 
very much impressed by the English decision* as their 
observations thereon show* But the oireurnstances of the 
to cases wex'e not identical# It was held in Bullivan’a 
case that his employers were not liable in the oirom- 
stances for a latent defect in a truck supplied by the 
third-named defenders in the original action (who were 
held to be responsible to Sullivan and against whom the 
Lord Ordinary had awarded £400"damages)* The Lord Justice 
Clerk (Thomson) stresses that* as a result of Davie,*e easei 
it can no longer be said that an employer who engages an 
outsider to provide plant which his employees will use is 
automatically made vicallously liable for the outsider's 
negligence. Hia lordship had previously taken that viev;
V. pâSSSE^^ZESÏHÈioa 1953 S.O. 107 - tmt
chis case was clearly over-ruled by the House of Lords in 
Day^* Lord Patrick’s opinion (see particularly pages 
2617262 of the report) is very helpful * He liras much 
impressed by the decision in Davie and confirms his view 
that the employer is not under a wide liability (popularly 
classified as ''absolute” in former cases of this pattern) 
for any defect In plant supplied by him# The correct 
statement of the law relating to the master’s duty was - 
as the House of Lords accepted in Davie - that expressed by 
Lord Hersehell in Smith v. Baker (!a“Bons [1891] A.O* 325 a*G
r »  A "\ ## «Ai«rt»«afto<a?e*TVaei L  J
page 362* namely* - ”The duty of taking reasonable care to 
provide proper appliances and to maintain them in a proper 
condition* and so carry on his operations as not to subjeel 
those employed by him to mmecessary risk"# Lord Maokintosîi 
takes a similar line (see pages 264 and 265 of the report).
This so-called personal duty had been firmly established 
by the well-known case of Eng],ish v* Wilsons & Clyde Goal
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fulfil that obligation may make him liable beyond question# 
The statutory provision will have to be carefully studied 
to confirm whether the particular requirement is obligatory 
or VsThether it allows the employer a measiire of discrétion 
(e.g. has ha to domothing "so far as is reasonably practic­
able" or is it good enough if* say* the particular machinery 
in his factory ie safe by position?)o A reference to 
sections 12* 13 and 14 of the Factoz'ies Act * 1961^^ will 
illustrate the poi^ at which is being miade here*
Hot only may a staitute mpose a penalty upon the 
employer for breach of the safety regulations or other 
provisions designed for the benefit of employees but* in 
addition* breach of the statutory provisions may well 
enable an employee to bring an action in reparation for the 
injury which he has suffered and this breach may perhaps* 
on occasion* be more easily proved than to rely upon breach 
of a common law duty* Of course* the employer may still be 
able to plead contributory negligence by the employee* just
87* continued
Co# 1937 8#0# (H#Xi#) 46, but it had tended to be inter­
preted wrongly, as it now seems, in certain respects - as 
an "absolute" duty# Both Davie and Sullivan have nov; 
corrected that misinterpretation*
# 9 & 10 Eli8# 2 cap* 34*
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as he can do in a common law actlon^^ and apportionment of 
reBponBibility would now he made under the Law Reform 
(Oontrihutorj Negligeiaoe) Act 1945»^^
Injury cauBed by felXow-e ervant - One of the ordinary risks 
of employment is that injury will be cansed to an employe© 
by one of hia fellow-Bervants» Initially this was a limit­
ation upon the liability of the employer. It seems that 
this doctrine of fel1ow-servant or collaborateur originated 
in the ïïnited States* was then developed in England and was 
then forced upon Boots law by the House of Lords# Before 
the injured servant could have recovered damages he would 
have had to show that he was not acting within the course
of his employment at the time when the accident occurred#
92
Prior to the Bartonshill case in 1858 the general ruleeat<soaaat>friiyn  ?
in Scotland was that the mere fact that the Injury was 
suffered by X because of the negligence of Y, his fellow-
89, Caaewell r .  Wo^m, 1856, 25 L.J.Q.B. 121; Gl# T, 
,9jSlsMn£„3.875, 2 R, 886; per oontra Lord Ohëlmoford in 
. ia.son V, Merry & avmaingb.am. 1868, 6 M. (H.L.) 84| ' 
Paterson App, p. 1597; L.R, 1 Sc,App, 326; see also jCraillt 
V. Small and Boaae. 1873 11 M, 888; Holmes v. 01arke'"'(l8S^ , 
31 L.J.fe, 'JWlEltiSS T, feaO;es|er2^2toijGj3 <1872)
7 Ex# 150#
90* 8 & 9 Greoo 6 capo 28#
91# Bee famirell v# Boston and Worcester Railroad Oorporatioï 
(1842) 4 Meto. ,49; HutcMnson y, York. Hev/eastle and Ber-
wl.ek (1850T19 L.«I W  Bartons^
,S£&JLSa* Y. Reid, 1658, 3 I'Queea 286 (Bee Lord Granworth'E
references to the judgment of Shaw 0#J# in the Farwell 
oase)§ Eraser* 0^£# oit# p# 19;) .§1 Mr# Munkman’e
disagrees with the view that the origin ie American and 
Bays that S M m M m  ISH3J£ (1B37) 3 M. à ¥, 1 ie the 
foundation of the doctrine and that only some five years 
or 80 later did the Americans establleh the doctrine in 
the FaTOoll case - see his "Employers' Liability" (5th
92. Bartonahxli Coal Go# v# Reid cit# supra*
125
servant* made no differenoe to the tma tor’s liability « The
master wm ©till clearly liable an the maxim "qui faeijb par
v  eB Æ *r'K ii*tosW at:ao  tUtumtmtfS.
&SE &Ë"* then well-knovm ease of
To ISiSSl^  ^the fourt of Beeaion rejected "ooismon employ­
ment" but the Houee of Lorda was to oatabllah It as a firm 
doctrine of British law in the Bartonahill oaeea and spark 
off a oomploxlty of litigation (mioh.of it neodloss and 
illogical) which was to last.for nearly a hundred years #
In 1858 the old Bcottieh view of the master’s liabllit; 
was cast aatde*®^ ' on the authority of the House of Lords *
In this ease the defenders aafcod a direction that If they 
used due end reasonable care In the melection and appoint** 
mont of the engineman (whoso fault oaused the aocMent) end 
If he was fiAly qualified to perform his duties and wae 
furnished with proper imohinery and other necessary 
appliamees they were not liable for his fault or negligeaoo* 
Pureuera maintained that^ granted the soundnoso of defend- 
ere' plea where oommon emp3,oyn%ent was properly present, It 
did not apply .hero am both servants were not engaged In the 
same task. The court disallowed defenders’ plea or
93». 1852, 14 D. 420 (p«s? L.J.O, Ifope), 8oo ooramoata oa 
Ba:g-j;Ga@liil3. miû *’oemion employmeat" bg- jïmei’itua Frofassoa? 
A«î)* èiiiîi la "Saw from ovea? the Bosfior" at pages 58 aatl 59« 
See also ÿSSM v. M k S m  1057» 20 », 180* following M s m »
94* M l i  V, mmornMll. Ooml ..Co, 17 », 10171 rovorBed %
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95except lorn* but that decision was reversed on appeal. The
decision, drew a clear distinction between the liability of
the employer to a strahger suffering injury from a servant's
fault or negligence and the absence of liability upon the
employer where a fellow-servant suffered the injury# The
House was fiaxaly of the opinion that the law in Scotland and
in England should be the saane* on this particular point and
accordingly what had previously been the law of England now
96also became a major principle of common law in Scotland,
97At the same time as the Held case, another oase* 
arising out of the same accident* v/as being decided. In 
this other case* the Lord Chancellor (Chelmsford) said- 
" It is necessary,, in each particular case* to ascer­
tain whether the servants are fellovz-servants in the same 
work.,,. Where servants, therefore, are engaged in different 
departments of duty, an injury committed by one servant 
upon the other by carelessness or negligence in the course of 
his peculiar work is not within the exception and the 
master's liability attaches in that case,, , Lord 
Brougham put the point more succinctly by saying - "To bring
95* The House of Lords judgment being delivered by Lord 
Granworth,
96, See the comments of Professor A,D, Gibb In "Law from 
over the Border" at pages 58 and 59I see also previous 
comment herein on the preceding page.
97* Bartonahill Goal Go. v, M'Guir© (1853) 3 M'Q, 300# 
Patex^ son, App, R, 785,
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the case within the exemption* there must be this most 
material qualification, that the two servants shall be in 
the same common employment and engaged in the same eoRimon 
work under that common employment,"
Following upon the House of Lords' judgment in the 
Bartonshill case, the Oourt of Session attempted to limit 
the immunity of the employer to oases of common employ­
ment in the most strict sense - excluding oases where one 
servant was the "superior" of the other and also drawing 
distinctions in cases where the fault was committed by a 
"superior" sex'Vant.^^ Oühis view was shortly to be con­
sidered by the House of Lords, as explained in the follow­
ing paragraph, and to be quite discounted by them - again 
restoring the strength of the doctrine in the employer's 
favour.
Lord Fraser points out^^ that after the dicta 
pronounced in Wilson v. Merry and Cunningham such 
distinctions aa have been referred to are no longer sound. 
Accordingly, a foreman or manager is just as much a 
fellow-servant as the employee who is working at the next
machine or bench - or better still, the same machine oa?
i|(i| "'iTVt 'iMi' iniif |i"iT‘in^ Mrinl(iti will i'if|H"i 11,1 1 #111" MiiHnn' v w III '«T, »fi9inrri- T vmm ## -**ii irw## m i n iinn .m i m w iiiwii! 'f wi,Hiw ft T\ ; mo iw niiwiii aiiNMn.ij ,
98. Fraser - og. oit. page 197 seq.
99. 0£. Mi* 198.
1. 1867, 5 M. 807; aff. 6 M. (H.L.) 84? Jj.H. 1 Sc.App.
326; Paterson App. R. 1597 (1868).
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bench. He then goes on to consider* at some length, who
?are and who are not* fellow-aex^vanta*
The "volunteer" servant was - in relation to the old
doctrine of common employment - no better off than the
injured fellow-employee# No recourse against the tempor-
'3©,ry employers was open to him or his dependents#
It was important to ascertain whether or not the 
pursuer was a volunteer servant. If so, he was not able 
to sue^ * - but if he could establish that he was not a 
fellow-servant (whether volunteer or ordinary) he might 
well be able to recover,^
Bo long as the master took reasonable oax*e in th© 
selection of competent servants he escaped liability for 
negligence by them which caused injury to other servants.
2» fiE* M l '  Pags® 202-203.
3- 2l£g V. MidO^.Eallwajr_Oo., (1857) 1 H, and M. 773;
26 L,J,Ex, 171; Potter v. Faulkener (1861) 5 L,T, 455;
31 L.J,Q,B. 30, .
4, See Wjggett v, Fox (1856) 11 Exoh, 832; 25 L.J,Ex, 188,
5, W.vllie V# Caledonian Railway Co,, 1871, 9 M, 463
252; and Woodhead v, Cartness Mineral Oo.@ (1877) 
4 H, 480 per L,P* Inglis, Th© same test of "scop© of 
employment" and the relationship of common employees has 
been a.eceptad and continued to test lla.bility - although 
th© doctrine itself has gone - as is illustrated by the 
more recent oases of Mallev v# L#M,B, Railway Coy, 1944 
8,0* 129; 1945 S,L,T* 313 and ICelly v, Spencer & Go,
1949 8,0, 143; 1949 178~S^LeokleTroEledonian
Glass Oo. 1957 8,0, 89; 1958 S,L,T,*’“25r” See alslTAlford 
V ,  National.Ooal Board 1952 B.L.T. 204 (House of Lords 
affi riningthe a ec^ of the First Division) *
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This v/aa an accepted extension of the doctrine of
6collaborateur o%" common employment#
But if the master should interfere personally in the 
management of his work he may thereby incur a liability 
towards an injured employee. This point is illustrated in 
the case of Roberts v, Smith' where a labourer had rejected 
certain poles as unfit for use but the master ordered him 
to use them* One defective pole snapped* causing the 
collapse of a scaffold upon which plaintiff (Scottish 
"pursuer") was working. The oourt held that there was 
sufficient evidence to go to a jury of personal interfer­
ence and negligence by the master* It is further illus-
o
trated by two later Scottish oases.
If the employer goes further than the stage of inter­
fering with the work but himself acts as a fellow-servant 
then obviously he will be answerable for his negligence 
to the other employees*® The theory of liability is that 
the employee is entitled to expect from a master that care 
and attention which the superior position and presumable
6. See partioularly '(fiarreant v« Webb (1856), 25 l.J.C.P. 
261,3 Y» Cre^^^lsTs. 11 M» 626; Sneddon v» Mossend 
Iron^.; 18-76, 3 E. 868? Gallagher r r W v ^  33 LiXcrP.
329.
7. 2 H and E 2135 26 h.J.Bx, 319 (1857).
8^ Stark^T. M^ Iianen 1871. 3.0 M* 31? and .Roberteon v.
gTABhwonth'v. S-baawAx (1861), 30 b.J.Q.B. 183? and 
Mellbgs- y. Shav/lTsgT). 30 h.J.Q.B. 333.
130
seiiBe of duty of the maatex* ought to command * The ordinary
doctrine of common employment has* therefore* no applio-
ation to a oaao of this type*
An interesting legal %)olnt whioh also arises in the
field of eomman employment ie this is the employee of a
oontraetor a fellow-0 ervant with the employee of the
ooHtractox*'s employer? Although the doe trine of common
employaient has gone this question may still be important
when considering the matters of scope of employment and
the "control" test wiic^ ro an employee appears to be under
1 0the orders of two master’s* On this particular point
11the cas© of V/oodhead v* Gartness Mineral Ooo"'"* la most 
Instractiveo A miner employed by contractors upon work 
in a mine * belonging to an owning company * whose manager 
and underground manager were in charge of the mine* was 
killed because of the negligence of the underground 
manager* who was admittedly a competent person* Further- 
more* the pit duly complied with the rules and regulations 
contained In the Coal Mines Regulation Act then in force* 
The court (on a majority of seven judges) held that the
10 9 Bee the commente contained in and the more recent 
cases cited at footnote number 5 at page 128 supra* It
f l ttaJC W (.a !J jÆ 3n*ï'0 .
was again made qui’Gc clear in hindsav v« Oharles Oonnell 
^ 0 0 *  1951 8.0* 281; 1951 8 . L : ^ T 3 #
doctrine of common employment was no longer applicable* 
the law would be that prior to 1858 (the year of the 
"Beirtonshill" caaee) and employers would normally be 
liable once more for the faults of a fcllow-^servant ) *
110 1877g 4 H. 469® over-ruling Gregory v# Hill 1869 8 M* 
282o See also M ’Oredie v* Bonw® 3 %* 339*
«3IM fS ÏP*=»(»S ïtV 7W *^!C »rS KtI f to « n M * w . * ré S fc >  "
owning company was not liable. The opinion of the Lord 
President (Xnglis) ie very important and he puts the 
matter* very clearly* thus 2- ", * * the mine-ownor is free
from responsibilityÿ not because the injured and injuror 
are both his own hired and paid servants® but because he 
ie not personally in fault and has not warranted the 
injured wo3?kman against the perils of the work. On the 
other hand if there was personal fault of the mine-owner" 
in selecting for the work an incompetent person® from 
whose Inoompetency the injured worlrman suffered* the 
ownei" would be equally liable® whether the incompetent 
person selected by him were a servant or what is called 
an independent contractor. In all oases his liability 
must rest on personal fault and where there is personal 
fault it will be attended by liability.”
The Woodhead case might usefully be compared with the
12
English case of Hourke v. White M o b s  Oolllerv Co.. which
e » « iN irâ t ix t* c e *m w 3 a i w  u##. 'i i W w wmxm 'ii i  *
went to the Oourt of Appeal. Although the action was 
taken against the defendants (Beottish® "defendere") as 
colliery-oiimers they were hold not liable in the cirexvm- 
stances ae the engineer whose negligence caused the injury 
to plaintiff was® at the time of the accident® under the 
ordex*s and control of the contractors who were employed to 
do a job in the mine® although he remained the general
12. (1877) 2 G.F.D. 205,
1 3 2
Borvant of the defemianta# Horo the "control teat” was 
applied. In Woodhead*a eaae the particular oontraetor 
had m0 ,oo%xtrol over the tmdergrowid manager whoso 
neglig'eiMio oaueed the aooldemt*
Again® :1b the lAigliah oaao of Turner Great 
£È9A§IAJlëàMmJS2*f ^  oomacm omployraeat iîheOï?y was 
hot Invoked# Woamo the "collaborateur” relationship 
did not oxlatq so as to prevent the oontraotor’a employee 
from reeoverlmg damages from the omploylng company#
Lord Fraser disouases^^ the position of employeee of 
m m  railway oompany injuring employées of ©Bothor railway 
company aa illustrative of the difficult and narrow 
quéatioBo which can arise in applying thé eommon employ­
ment doqtrtoo# Hi0to:r*i©a.lly® 'these oaeee are of interest 
and they were added to quite eubetantially right up to 
the year 1940# ae ie mentioned-later on In this chapter# 
•The common employment doctrine protected the master 
only In relation to the employées thorns'elves# It did not 
do 80 whore# for example# the wife of an employee was 
injured by the negligence of a fellow-employee# In 
support of this. Lord Fraser cites an American case#"^  ^ It 
is submitted that the liability certainly exists in
13# (1875) 33 &#$# 431#
14# ,O.R*^.gM» PGkgcs 212-213 and footnotes there#
15# Gannon v# lougatonlo Railroad Oo#. (1873) 17 Am# Rep* 
82 HaHi.), '
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modem law and it doea so mder the ordinary pxdnoiplea of
delictual liability* applying in this instance the well-
known doctrine of vicarious liability.
Moreover® where a stranger was Injured by the
negligence or fault of the servante of another person it
was® in Scotland® no defence for that other person (i.e.
the employer concerned) to say that the pursuer’s fellow-
1 7servants were guilty of contributory negligence# It
] 8
seemed that the English courts took an opposite view. " 
Certain inroads into the protection afforded to 
empi.oyers by the common employment doctrine were made by 
the Employers’ Liability It ie eesential to look
briefly at this statute as it fonzm an historical linJs: in 
an arresting chain of common law and statutory law which 
was being forged against the unrestricted movement of the 
collaborât©ur doctrine*
By this statute the first statutory breach was to be 
made in the doctrine. But it gave only a partie,! remedy
16. In ¥ehb v* Inglis. (O.n.) 1958 S®L.T. (Notes) 8 Lord
Wheatley approved a claim by the wife of an employee 
(driver) against his eraployer based upon the latter'a 
vicarious responsibility for the negligence of the former. 
In this 9 his lordship took account of and approved of (but 
he was not® of course® bound to follow) the (English)
Court of Appeal in Broom v* Mq^an 1953 1 Q.B. 597.
17. Adams v. Glasgow and South Western Railway Go. 1875# 
p R. 215#
IS# Armstrong v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co. (1875 
10 Iix« 47.
19» 43 & 44 Yict. cap. 42.
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to worîcaieno To suoeeecl imdor the Aot th© pursuor woz*k<-
msii had to prove that the acoident resulted from a defeet
in "the ways® works * machinery or plant" or from the
nogligenoe of some person placed In a position of super-
visor or superintendent or whose ox^ dore the woxtean had
to obey or® in the railway oases® from the negligeneo of
POengine-driver or. signalman. The defence of eommom 
employment was pro tagto exeludod in those limited 
categories of oases coming within the Aoto The Aot 
applied to railway employees and manual vmrkers generally. 
Thera la no doubt that It provided a fruitful source of
The Aot was followed by a scheme of Workman’s 
Oompensation (statutes of 1897 and 1906 m i d a consolidât Mi; 
statute of 1925) in which the rule of common employment
200 See the opinion of Lend Watson In Smith v. Baker &
Sons 1891 A.O, 325. ------
21. An examination of the following selection of eases 
will illustrate the point made8-
W M m E. Y T ' W g m # ^ 1 8 8 6 ,  U  R. 1055 24 S.L.H. 9%.
11073 36 S.L.Ho W ? W r i & v p e s ^ r T £ m r m m l Q - f l  & Oo„ 
1902, 5 F. 208; 10 S.lTF, T07| 4()VrOfrT.T4“.“ '” 
OamTOS V. £Oto^rG0nA..SoZ* 1905, 8 F. 2755 1-3 S.L.ÎD, 
6795 43 S.L.Ro 200.
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played no part» Oompeneation (not damages) became 
automatic where there was an accident in the course of 
employment and where incapacity for work resulted® although 
this compensation award was generally much lower than a 
damages award would have been in a reparation action.
In addition to the limitation upon the employer’s 
protection brought about by the IMployers’ Liability Act 
1880® the Judges were also moving - slowly but with delib­
eration and care - towards a total abolition of the eoiiimon 
employment doctrine, Finally® in 1948 the doctrine of 
common employment was swept away by the Law Reform
op
(Personal Injuries) A o t o f  that year® but not before 
several eases had aria on in which judicial hair-splittisig 
was becoming stretched to the limit. Fortunately® the 
doctrine has gone#
22, 11 & 12 Geo, 6 cap» 41*
23* See 0alder v, Caledonian Railway® 1871* 9 M, 833 (a 
guard of one railway company and a pointsman of another 
were not in eoiaraon employment ) ; Johnson v* Lindsay & Oo, 
[1891j A*G, 371 (where two contractors were engaged in 
building the same house - a servant of one dropped a 
bucket on the servant of the other. Held that the
» » * , n mk ** esB££«»tnWMiKK» ^
injured man could recover damages from the master of vhe 
negligent man); ffhg ^ Petrel [1893] P. 320 (crews of two 
ships owned by the same company were not in common 
employment® at,least on the Thames or the high seas® 
where they were just as likely to collide with any other
ill convoy were not in common employment® at least when 
out on the streets); Hay v. Central S#M,T, Oo, Ltd, (OJi,) 
1944 8,L,T, 196g 194^ 8*1, 78 X5ollision between 'buses 
owned by same company - converging routes); Kerr v,
8,0, 335; 1946 1945
3( (v/orkman and driver employed in< drfxerent branches
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(f) To pay wages.
'  '  w A t : i  îsùWsstfCapfù: g u w t*
It is accept eel that in return for the services
rendered to him* there is - in the general case - an
obligation upon an employer to pay wageso This obligation
has been considered at some length in the second chapter
PAof this work® *' to vAioh reference should be made for 
detailed observations#
(g) Giving employee a character.
There is no legal obligation upon a master to give a 
character or certificate of service to his employee# But*
'*#%',t iii iw*f»rt?rK:#%BM»««fnccazMa5:A:zmt=2%'*KrKK*?cijmcaa*
23# (continued)
of the same Tx’ansport Department - held that they were 
f ellow-servants ) ; Hiller v# Glasgow Gorpor-ation F19471 
A# G# 368g L194 7J 1 All h# H# 1 (the drivers and conduct ora 
of different tramcars were in common employment)*
Miller's ease supra was distinguished in the case of
\B,LT% 1948 8 #Ii*T# 42;
194/ 8,0# (ii,L,) 64 (where the defence of common employ­
ment was held to be not admissa,ble unless the party 
injured had a special interest in the skill and caution 
of the other party arising from the relationship# Here 
the drivers and conductors of different motor-buses were 
held npjb to be in common employment ) ; and* in England® 
the case of Lancaster v, London Passenger Transport Board 
L1948J 2 All h,E* 796 (where a trolley-bus injured a man 
on a tower-wagon who was repairing the overhead wires,
A majority decision of the House of Lords was against 
common employment on the ground that the plaintiff might 
equally well have been injured by any other tall vehicle#)
24. Bee oiiapter 2» paragraph (3).
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if he chooses to give one, then it must he given to hona
PR
fide and it ought to be true,"
Sometimes it may be Biade a condition prior to 
commencement of eervice that a oatlafactory character 
reference from the former employer should be exhibited.
If the former employer refuses to issue a character® with 
the result that the employee does not get the new appoint­
ment (failure to fulfil the condition precedent) then
there can be no damages action taken against the former 
26employer,
Nevertheless, an employer is entitled to give a
?7character to a servant*'' lie may claim qualified 
privilege in doing this so long as the recipient has an 
interest in receiving it* The recipient may be the 
employee himself or a prospective employer or a person 
acting as intermediary or a person with whom the employee 
has entered into a contract of service,But there can 
be no publication of it without sufficient cause,^^
In the interesting English case of Gardner v, Slade,*
25, See particularly Grant v* Ramage and Ferguson, 1897 
25 k, 55 per Lord Young at page 39; Moult v* Halliday 
[1898] 1 Q,B* 125 per Hawkins J, at p:''lg9, —
26. Carrol v. Bird, 1800, 3 Sep. 201,
27.Î ^iEistian v. igmedx, 1818, 1 Mur. 4195 é - M Æ M m  y. 
Wishart 1818® 1 Mur 429I Muskets Ltd* v# MacKensle Bros,* 
1899* 1 I‘, 756,
28» P M M  V. Mmegk, 1829, 9 B. & 0, 403.
29, G h r t o M m  y . Kerned^ eto. supra, (per M.Gii.Oomr. Adam 
at p. 427;.
30, 1849» 15 Q.B, (A & E) 796 (particularly per WigJatman 
J, at page 801).
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tile former employer v/as held entitled to oormjimioate to 
the new employer faots which oame to the former's Imow- 
ledge after the grant of the oertifioate of character and 
which were inconeiotent with the tenor of the oertifieate# 
It also seems that the master is quite entitled to 
issue a certificate of character ox -proprio motu® though
« s m ^ w n tw s w a t '
this might lead a jury to suspect a malicious intention on 
his part. However* if he gives the certificate in good 
faith he is probably safeguarded from any action#"^
When a servant is dismissed for misconduct® the
master is entitled at the time of dismissal to state the 
reason and he is apparently privileged when he doea 
This privilege has been held to apply to statements made 
to the parents of a girl who had been dismissed for 
immorality, *’
An equal protection extends to the headmaster of a
55 56school or a railway inspector in making proper report©
upon junior employees. Furthermore® a member of a public
body may oritioiee the performance of duties by its
servants and any accusation of incompetence, neglect®
31. V. Jones, 1828, 8 B. & 0. 578.
32. .Rg^ ejga y , Clifton 18()3, 3 B. & P. 587 per Roolce J.
33* fieg. V. Perry 1883, 15 Oox C.O. 169? Taylor y. Hawkins 
1851, 16 Q.B. (A. & E.) 308; Manby y. Witt 1856, i F T ^ T  
544? Stuart V, Moss 1885, 13 E. 299
34. Watson v, Burnet 1862® 24 D, 494,
35. MilnÆ V, Bauoho^e 1867, 5 M. 1114.
36. Martin v. CruloksngMto 1896, 23 R. 874.
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57diaîioneetj or others is privileged* An interesting case
58was Dundas v. Livingatone & where a firm*, insured
against defalcation's stated to the insurance company that 
a oomr/iercial traveller^ who had by this time left their - 
employments had embesssled a considerable amount of money 
belonging to them. ü?hie statement was held to be privil*-
Once the privilege of the employer is established
(which is a point of law) it is for the employee to over*
come the privilege by showing malice - and this is a
question of fact. tDhe general principles of the law of
defamation will apply# including reliance upon innuendo#
5Qwhich requires a very high degree of proof* In the 
English case of Manby v. Witt.^ '^  Jervis O.J. said that
the circumstances **must be such as to induce the Court or 
any reasonable person to conclude that the occasion has 
been taken advantage of to give utterance to an unfounded 
chargera Presence of a third party when the statement is
'Î9oîrlTLTi.T?iîfioSSé v! S t I’sS ?
t i e a i r r s ^ r  474, V.
38, 1900, 3 F. 37,
39» See the old oases of leilson v. Joimstoiî 1890, 17 R.
Î S  # * 0 1 :  l :
Keonedy v. Hendeyson 1905, lO.L.'i'. go. 156.
40. 1856, 18 O.B. 544 at page 547.
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made does not necessar:U.y displace the privilege but it 
may be indicative of a malicloue intention as the element 
of bona fides now appears to be lacking.
C S4W Li? ir« tw -ta * 6 » m tfn .iw e e iW i= »  *■4* ^
There is no doubt whatsoever that where a master
fraudulently gives a servant a good character with the
intention of assisting him to procure employisent and there*
after a third party# relying upon this false character#
employe the servant and then suffers loss# the aggrieved
third party may take an action in damages for his lose
against the initial employer# basing his action upon the
ATissue of the false character which caused that loss.
Before leaving this section# there remains to bo
A pconsidered the (Servants* Characters Act# 1792# which
43
must be read along with the common law position.
Umphereton dismisses this statute very briefly by a note 
that the Act was evidently not intended to apply to# and 
had not in fact been put in force in# Scotland.
Lord Fraser summarises^’^ the penalties upon employers 
and servante imposed by the Act and then goes on to quote 
from Tait’e "Justice^ '^^  ^to the effect that the statute
41# mster V# Oharles. 1830# 6 Bing. 396# 7 Bing 1065 
M-3d?in V# Reed 1654# 15 O.B# 192? and Anderson v. Wishart# 
1818# 1 Mur# 429 per Lord 0#0# Adam 440#
42. 32 Geo. 3# c. 56#
43* Og# £M* P8,ge 184#
44. Master and Servant# 2nd édition# pages 131*^ 132#
45. V» Servant®® p. 468.
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applies to England# The learned editor of the third 
edition of Lord Fraeer’e ogua on Master and Servant goes 
somewhat further and disagrees with Mr* Tait’s view that
46the statute in question appliee to }2ngland oaily*. He says ^
that the Act is quite absolute and general and that there
is nothing in it to indicate that it was to he restricted
to England in its operation* Mr. Tait took the view that
the Scottish common law dealt with the types of offences
mentioned in the Act quite vigorously and effeetively as
47frauds. The comment upon this is ® that whilst it is quite 
true# nevertheless the statute affords a speedy and effect­
ive check, whilst the common law was somewhat vague both 
as to procedure and punishment*
The learned editors of Macdonald’s Criminal Law of 
48Scotland®® b malte no reference to the statute# hut this is 
quite understandable when it is declared in the Preface 
that the book is dealing with Indictable crimes*.
(h) ^plover’s common law obligations.
The common law imposes a three-fold obligation upon 
the master# videlicets-
(i) to x)rovide and maintain suitable materials ;
(ii) to keep premises safe and work on a safe system; 
and
(ill) to exercise care in the selection of fellow 
employees *
46* Bee 3rd edition# pages 133-134*
47. Iqc. Gil.
48. 5th edition (W. Green & Bon).
1 4 2
Fû?o Umpheraton explainsthat it used to be argued 
that a dlstlnotlon fell to be made# ae regards the employ­
er’s obligations#’ betvieen the ease where a master personal'^ - 
Ij superintended hie works and that where he did not do so# 
but delegated the task to a manager - and in the latter 
ease the obligation was limited to providing suitable 
plant and materials and to employ competent managers#
The decieionBo however# show that the liability Is as 
wide in a question \'/ith hie worlmen as with strangers 
(subject to the exception which used to apply in the case
of fault by a fellow-*employee) whether personal aupervieion
50is exorcised or not* A eeleetion of cases# at or towards 
the turn of the century# indicate quite clearly that the 
obligations attach to the employer g^im employer and it 
matters not how he chooses to carry on hie business " and 
this is true both of an obligation which aria ea at ooramoB 
law or apecifieally under statute# If his system of work*- 
ing is dangerous or if he eniployo yoimg or inexperienced 
workers on dangerous work for which they are quite imauitod# 
he could not escape liability by pleading delegation to a
49. o,P„. Ml.f pages 156 and 157.
50* Bword v# Cameron# 1839# 1 ])# 493; Paterson v* Wallace 
IBSÎTVMaeqrWrr Bartonâhill Goal CoTirr EÏÏiiî, ISBBT" 
3 Maoq. 266; mrtonmmrcSar^oTlrTM' GiclreTTsgEj, 3
Mmaqn pOO; Wallace v# Cult or Paper Mille Otu# 1892# 19 H®
+,i — *  6Va-ïfLc:în3ri.fc<7;£s,Ti*ii?TrjwW\'îi<<trT«:>#j£Vr.K<rr2îtit^ <cS'1'-‘ n ie#M nE iw *ri»>et3^"^ ”  ^
9-i.5.
k^tfiniffwS- R^^768fMaGd8nald%###oI'
O o i r ^ r T s W r a l  lio 5045 Hender0on” T6HE“Wa-bsormi., 
1892, 19 R. 854.
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52manager who was a, fallovj-workman#
(i) Suitable materialsg- , 
(Plant# machinery etc.)
The emp3.oyer’e primary duty ie to provide and maintain
suitable and fit materials for carrying on the work* Ho
does not normally - and camot be expected to - wa,rrant
his plant and maohinery against latent defect but he does
undertako that (latent defect, apart) it will be reasonably
53
fit and suitable for the purpose for which It was supplied#
Initially, of course, this applies to the condition of the
material or appliances originally provided - e.g# if a
scaffolding were constructed of wood which was in a rotting
condition# the employer would be liable if a section
collapsed under stress or strain causing injury to an
employee (or indeed to a third party, not trespassing)*
Gases involving faulty waggons# vessels or machinery are
5Aquite common# * The obligation was formerly in no way 
affected by trying to establish that the faulty appliances 
were supplied by e. third party and were not manufactured 
by the employer himself# but this view has been modified in
' I' ll"— • r '*T '" "" ‘ i'ini‘('Trr-^t[fi" ' f r  n  nr 'i mm i i i niiii'Wiiim T rit'rf*iry ii n ii ‘T|irr ftimT#~nrTr Tir-iiiw rn-#i ii rmnm m  i wm, inf iiw w r mi~(ir(>rii ii ii' ww i m i w 'i i i # ; i r i iwi ■iin'iiiirif: n  i imri i n i  ...... . i nr r m i ii & im ir  Tn~~~~ WTTi
52. V. l i S j R a U w a y Ç o ,, cit. su^aj OlgEmâ v.
B u m . 1854, 16 D. 1025; gibs on v« Himmo & Co., ,1895, 22
R. 491. *“■ - '
55' 1864, 2 M, 10561 JJeeM v.
1861, 4 Macq. 215.
54. See particularly Matthews v. M ’Bonald Grieve & Co., 
1865, 5 M. 506; Rothïï53V?THutoSîioS7i:S5^3~T635 
welsh V. mir, 1885TTV-R. 595:------
1A4
KK
the light of more recent oases*
It is also the case that an employer is obliged# as a
precautionary measure, to inspect from time to time any
machinery or plant which is liable to become defective
through ordinary wear and tear# Accordingly# in on action
against the employer in which the pursuer avers that the
defect could have been discovered by inspection (the onus
of proof here resting with pursuer)the employer may
disj>rove the alleged negligence on his part by showing
that by periodical inspection he had taken all ordinary
157
and reasonable steps to detect any defects#’"^® It is 
normally the jury’s task to say what periodic inspection 
was reasonable and whether the measures taken to that end
eq particularly Davie v. Hew Merton Board Mills [1959] 
1 All'E,H# 346, H#Xî#s now Davie over-ruled ponn.ellj v#
Glasgow Corporation 1953 B#0# 107 and was subsequently 
followed in Scotland (though technically the Scottish 
Court was not bound by Davie’s case) in Sullivan v, 
âmagWm»È._Graig 1959 I960 S.L^FTW: However,
in “Ghe fairly recent case of McMillan v# B#P. Refinery
1961 S.Ii.ï. ■^otei) 79s the view Jias 
been^expressed that where there is a latent defect in 
machinery supplied to a wortoan’s employers# the onus is 
upon the worîonan to prove that the makers were not 
reputable manufacturers upon whose skill his employers 
were entitled to rely#
56# Gavin v# Rogers# 1889* 17 R. 206#
57. SneMoa v,. ,, 1849, 11 ». 11595 Oavln v.
1876, 1 Q,B.Ï). 314| and aeo also per Ooclî'Burn O.J. 
Webb, V. Rgaaije 1865, 4 P. - & F. 608.
3.45
58 -were reasonable# looking to all the oircumstanoesç It 
will be appreciated that the duty of inspection follows on 
from the main obligation to provide and maintain suitable 
materials* Therefore, if the employer’s servante are work­
ing on occasion with defective plant belonging to a third 
party there is no special duty upon the employer to inspect 
that plant , i n  the general case* But circumstances may 
alter the employer’s responsibility for inspection# e*g* if 
plant or machinery is on loan from a third party and it is 
used in such a way as to foava part of the employer’s own
60plant and equipment then a duty of inspection will arise, 
The employer^ # after fulfilling his primary obligation 
as mentioned# cannot be held responsible for improper use 
which his employees make of the plant and machinery nor for 
such defects as subsequently arise and as ought to have 
been put right by the employees themselves, If# however#
58. Bee m r ^ v *  milllpe, 1876# 35 L.T.H.S, 477 per 
Pollock B.
(H.Ii, ) 94# where employees of a porte3?age company were 
held entitled to rely upon Inspection by a stevedoring 
firm of slings supplied by the latter,
60* See Warwick v, Caledonian Railway Co*« 1897# 24 R, 429; 
(which was distinguished in Oliver v, Saddler & Go*# supra
V. 1898, l F. 339, followed in ïhqmBoi
Wallwe (O.H.) 1933 S.I. 15.
61* li34on T. Oumilnghma. 1868, 6 M. (H.L.) 84? ,
?857, ^20®»? ^ iSf^G^do^l
F.VP0S7 1892, 20 R."117i .) gTêVp-jauahl^ v. Bunion r p o IT 
1882# 20 S»L.R* 271# Mackenfgie v* s*a* ”Tr§genna®® Go,#
31 141,
1 4 6
the employer peraonally auporintonds the work in which use 
la boring made of the particular materials #• plant or, machinery 
them# quito apart from his responsibility as employer# there 
ie mi additional responsibility arising from the superintend' 
once or oontrol of the work ami liability will accrue to him 
In respect of all defects which ought to have been ciiooovere« 
and remedied during the progress of the work# If pursuer 
can show that the resulting defect -(arising after an initial 
supply of plant which was then In good working order) was 
knovm to him and went imromedied, liability attaches to the 
era pi oyer# '*
(11) Safe Promises miû Safe Bystem of Works-
The second common law obligation upon an employer is 
to keep his promisôb in a safe condition (so far as ie 
consistent with the conduct of his work) and to conduct hie 
business on a system which does not involve unusiml or 
imnoceosary danger to those whom he employs#®^ This oblige 
atlon# taken along with the former obligation already 
discussed# may he described comprehensively as a duty to 
take précautions for the general safety of his employées# 
Naturally the responsibility will vary with the nature and
62# Btanforth v# Burnbank foundry Go. '18Bt§ 24 B#L#B# 722; 
and see also m x n m  v. @00$,$ T18991 1 Q.B. 986 por aigbmm
J. at page 992.
63
avoid î?sspo,nsiî)i3,itÿ*) •
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the conditions of the work carried on hy the employer 
but the degree of precaution required 1b no higher than 
what la reasonable and ordinarily to be oxpeoted In the 
0i r e u m e ? t o n e T h e  common law does not place the
employer in the position of a guarantor or insurer* It 
±B not oseential to use the very latest and aafeet 
appllaneea - eo long ae he doea make xme of those which
p'
are reasonably safe and in general uae. Should it 
happen that the employer ie propoelng to carry out an 
operation which is very difficult - and this requires 
special precautions or unusual mcaeuros for the safety of 
the employees - then these precautions must he taken 
Â. good example of one of the highest prcoautiono 
which am employer must take for the safety of hirj ai^ ploy- 
eaa Is the fencing of machinery# Apart from the statutory 
obligations Imposed by the Factor!eo Act# 1961# or other 
relevant statutes @ the common law clearly impoeaa euoh a 
duty upon the employer# When fencing of machinery la an 
ordinary and reasonable precaution for safety then it
7.
66» St|g| V. 1871, 10 M. 31? Hmgergga v.
Oo », 1809 $ 16 ii D ' b :? *
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67Billet be done* If the maehlmery le to be need by young
and/or Inexperienoed poreone then, obviouely# in deciding
the question ae to fencing or no fencing, serione regard
68will have to be paid to the quality of the oBiployeee, 
Fencing will reraain a e ont inning obligation so long b.b thc: 
machine is in Any failure in the statutory oblig­
ation or common law duty to fence will raise an immediate
preaujnption of liability on the employer’s part where
70injury results to the employee. Unless the statutory
obligation is an absolute one (upon a correct oonatruotioy.
of the particular section) then the presumption raentioned
may be rebutted by the employer if he can show that the
accident was attributable to a cause other than lack of
fencing# e,g, some carelessness or negligence on the pa,rt
71of the employee himself - subject# however# to this 
plea by the defender (i,e, the employer) being incompet­
ent in cirouBistanoee where a statute Is obviously designed
6 7 .  l â E ^ s  V .  p t c | ^  1 8 8 9 ,  1 6  E .  6 9 4 ?  R o s e  v .
&  6 0 . ,  1 8 8 2 ,  2 0  b . I . E .  4 6 ?  V .  « e r r x „ , ^ Ç r a . n in ^ a m
s a S E S Î V .  J M E » & , 0 £ . 9  3 .8 9 1 , 1 9  E . 1 8 ;
£ ™ e r o n  v .  3 .8 9 8 ,  2 5  R .  4 4 9 .
S S J M U  V .  M E Z g o K  R o E g w g ^ c  , 1 8 6 1 ,  2 3  » ,  4 2 5 .  
6 9 .  I S â U . .  V .  & ! § l l . g m l . # . # e ,  3 .8 7 3 , 1 1  M .
V. b m ^ l & E q a M  Kel^ÜLZî_Jle^e.„iasar
1893, 20 E. 833? v. m m s k ^
ËmMSàh 3.893, 20 H. 727.
71. I» Œ l S î m L A G o ., 1891, 19 E. 21? 2 0 #  V .
3892, 19 E. 971? G ^ ^ o n  v. teliev
1898# 23 H* 449#
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to protect a certain class of persons (e«g. yonng or
f V  f
inexparienoed eraployeee) against this particular happeningv 
Exactly the earn© prineiplee apply to the employment 
of young and/or inexperienced pereono at dangerous and 
imsultahle work# The ground of liability may he either 
(a) that a dangeroue system of work is in operation where 
such persona are employed or (b) the employeee of this 
type cannot be held to have undertaken the risk of employ­
ment as ordinary# competent# qualified or experienced 
employees do in the general ease* The cases support the 
rule that such employment amounts to negligence on the part
of the employer# Again# a presumption of liability
7 Aarises when an injury occurs#' but this may also be 
rebutted by the employer if he can show a wilful disobed­
ience to orders or some misconduct by the employee which 
caused the injury#
Escamples of breaches of the obligation to keep 
premises in a safe condition are very nUDierousp but the 
following will illustrate the type of failure v/hioh ie 
under considérations-
pitfalls in unlighted p l a c e s o r  defective gates whoso
72. Prtogle v. Grogvenor, 1894, 21 H. 532.
7^ . OÆl§Ê aj£S. 1854, 16 ». 1025; Rofeertson v, 'Bvpjni,
IBfbf 5 E* 652.
74. Stop. 1885, 12 H, 574; 011)80%
75. MorrM v. Boaao. Bolimlng Go.. 1895, 22 H. 336.
76. JamiesQ» v. Rusaoil & Co.. 1892, 19 R, 898; Maclooa v.
„ ^ | â S B l S L M a i E 3 ô r î B B ,  23 s.b.r. 6s. — -
//' -tfoMson V. MlDchell & Co.. 1885, 22 S.B.R. 698.
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imaafe condition is kn.ovm or ought to have been Imotm to
the employer* ’ Another example might be an unaa.fc^  pit 
shafte
The allegation of carrying on work upon a dangerous
or defective system means that pursuer is saying that the
employer has been guilty of some failure in giving
instructions or some failure in taking precautions to
ensure that the worlmen are reasonably safely protected
whilst carrying out a dangerous operation# There are
80numerous eases on this point# A"good example of this 
type of failure might arise where a gang of railway 
platelayers was working on a section of main line track# 
without adequate look-outs being posted to warn the v;ork^ - 
men of approaching trains* The allegation mentioned 
would apply equally to a negligent method of utilising 
machinery which la perfectly sound in i t s e l f O f  
course, the exceptional or casual operation does not fo3?m
A9
part of a "system mf working"#
issâga^oj.
79* Dry don or Marshall v# Stewart, cit* supra#
OU
i^CqirTegO, 17“lTj40?£qqfe V. 188677rrm
1885g 10 1159o
81. See Wgl^. v. # 1 %  1885? 12 R. 590.
82. Marpe£ V. BmilaE.A£9.‘♦ 1902, 5 F. 208.
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(ill) Selection of Oompetent Staff5-
The final obligation.undertaken by the employer
towards each individual employee is that he (the employer)
will exercise reasonable skill in the selection of other
employees* l^ his obligation is no longer so important
today as it ivas prior to the passing of the Law Reform
(Personal Injuries) Act* 1946,^ "^  when the doctrine of
common employment was applicable - because the employer’s
failure in selecting competent staff precluded him from
aq
relying upon the doctrine*
' Since the passing of the 1948 Act just mentioned and 
the ooneeciuential abolition of the common employment 
doctrine, the three common law obligations discussed 
above have ceased to be quite so important as they once 
were, but it remains perfectly relevant in any reparation 
claim based upon the common law to plead any one or more 
of the said obligations• The tendency in modern industr­
ial law is for the legislature to impose more and more 
duties and liabilities upon employers, e#g* recent legis­
lation on factories (consolidated in 1961)® mine© and 
quarries (consolidated in 1954) and offices, shops and
83* Bartonshill Goal Co* v* Reid* 1858, 3 Macq* 266; 
Bartonshill Goal Co* y. M’Guire 1858 3 Macq* 300; Wilson
V* Merry and Cunningham 1867* @ M* (H.L*) 84; and "
T a g m l  Webb 1856, 18 O.B* 797*
84# 11 & 12 Geo* 6 cap* 41,
85* MJAnlay: v. Brownlie 1360, 22 D# 975#
railway premises (the new Aet of 1963)*
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(3) Employer’s remedie© upon the employee’e breach 
of oontracto
Basieally, the general law of oontract applies where 
there ie at breach* The aggrieved pairty may claim damages 
in the normal case, but he may also be entitled to termin­
ate the relationship and regard the initial obligation as 
no longer binding upon him. The situation involving 
breach may arise before the actual commencement of service 
(e.g. either side may indicate an imwillingness to perform 
as from the commencement date). To the English lawyer 
this ie "anticipatory breach". The party not at fault may 
sue on the breach at once, if he electa to do so, rather 
than await the effective commencement date of the agree­
ment . ^ ^
The more difficult question is whether there can be 
a breach of contract after the service relationship has 
been terminated (apart from the "restraint of trade" 
cases). This Biatter came up in the case of Liverpool
ïi£Î2ElS-Z$lSMl£-£oSiâM V. Houston^^ wlxere the court
. .. .
86. The Offices, Shops and Railway Premises Act, 1963 (1962 
cap. 41) received the Royal Assent on 31st July, 1963 and 
came into operation on various dettes from 18th February 
1964 onwards, although the main operative date is regard­
ed as being 1st August,1964.
87. Bee Hoohster v. De la Tour. 1853, 2 E. & B. 678 per 
Lord Campbell O.J. at p. 669; also Frost v. Khi^t, 1872, 
7 Itu Ills Johnstone v. Millin,^ :. 168g7"l6 Q.b37’T60.
88. 1900, 3 F. 42. —
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granted an interdict against defender (who was a former 
employee of the puraiiere), prohibiting the oiroulation of 
information, obtained during the employment, to third 
parties ooncerning the pursuers’ business affairs and 
where a nominal sum of damages was awarded as the pursuers 
could not prove loss# The decision was based upon breach 
of faith BMà loyalty (the main obligation of any employee) 
and therefore breach of contract* English law is the same 
on this question of faith and loyalty*^^ The principle of
post-aervioe breach is, therefore, fully recognised and it
is not just restricted to the restraint of trade oases*
The rights and remedies available to a master, upon 
breach of the service contract, may be surmnarised as 
follows, videlicet ?-
(1) A claim of damages*
(2) A right to withhold or refuse to pay wages*
(3) Specific Implement.
(4) Interdict.
(5) Personal chastisement*
Each must be examined briefly to assess its useful­
ness and, more particular3.y, its place in modern law and 
practice*
(1) Master’s claim of damages:- The claim may rest upon 
breach of an express term or of an implied obligation.
89. Merryiveather v# Moore, [18921 2 Ch. 518§ Lamb v. Evans.
[l89WT-0hT^8; Legal 1895] 2 Q.bTX" 3 1 5 7 ~
Barr v. Craven 1.903» 20 Ï.L.E, 51.
90» Clerk v. Murclilaon» 1799 Mor. 9186s Cameron v. GiBb, 
1867» 3 S.L.H. 282} Murray v. Maofarlane» 1886, 2 Sb.Ct. 
Hep. 6} Cooper v. M ’Bwan. 1893, 9 Sk.Ct.Rep, 311} Gunn v, 
loodall, 1835, 13 S. 1142. '
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Generally, the master wll.l have to prove his loss and the
usual principles of contract law relating to assessment of
damages will apply - even although the basis of the claim
is pitched no higher than that of trouble and ineonveniencc
0*1
caused to the master*
(2) Withholding or refusing to pay wa^ess- The servant 
who breaks his contract is generally held to have forfeit­
ed his claim to wages for the period after termination and 
perhaps also, in certain oases, for the prior period.
The early view of the common law was that the servant 
ought to he punished for desertion or misconduct (with 
resultant forfeiture of \mges) hut this is certainly not 
80 today in the sense of punishment geared to breach of 
contraot* If the misconduct is, in fact, criminal then 
it is punished separately (not by the employer) in the 
criminal courts as an offence or attempted offence of a 
particular kind.
Earlier statute law^ "^  had fortified the employer’s 
position by enabling him to have proceedings taken against 
an offending or deserting employee* Meanwhile the common 
law was quite clearly moving towards the "freedom of 
contract" theory*
91- V, O r g ^ M J l o ^ o .  1875, 2 R. 752.
92* Umpherston, o^ . ort. page 131 and footnote number 1 
thereof*
93# Bee particularly the old Master and Servant Acte and 
the Employers and V/orîemen Act, 1875 ^  defaulting apprent*- 
ices.
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The question of aeoreuaX a M  apport!onmont of v/agoa 
has already W o n  oonaidered at eome l e n g t h . It is noo<»
08Gary to remember that the eerveat will normally be
titled to claim all wages due prior to termination#that 
is to say those wages which have accrued and which are out­
standing at the termination date#. If an employoo is paid 
monthly# quarterly or half-yearly and is properly dlesiased 
within the month# quarter or half-year then the wages for 
the whole payment period would be regarded ae forfeited. 
Bnglish law follows the same rule#^^
An interesting feature of the iSmployere and Workmen 
Act# 18t5 is that# in determining what la an equitable 
amoiuit in all the oiroumstaBCos# the court has power to 
adjust ami set-off all claims for wages# damages and 
otherwise and irrespective of whether those claims are 
liquidated or unliquidated.
(3) © M  Soottish eooffloa law
permitted a summary petition In the Sheriff Court (either
of defender^a domicile or of the actual place of work^^) 
for the apprehonaion of a servant or apprentice who had
94. See chapter S» esotioB (5) siwra,
I s Æ ^ Æ ^ i  "
«0.
9/. 'i>ù à 39 Vlot. 0» 90(, aeetloa 3» (Shariff 0oîMr<; la 
Sfâotlaaâ),
98. rnwrnmmm v, 1833, ii s. 799.
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deserted his service and this might be enforced, if 
necessary, by imprisonment*^^ Before iiaiprisonraent was 
competent there had to be desertion of the service, other­
wise the court might have ordered the servant to enter 
upon the service (i.e. by a decree ad factum praestandum)•I t /  ;g ^Tit.atj<3ift*eaga:tg&teWg*gg.u*mcwai-atTt5iw><.»
Puni aliment was at the discretion of the court* The master 
might still have his action of damages in breach of
p
contract or he might attempt to enforce a penalty clause
in the agreement* As Mr* Umphereton points out,there is 
no legal principle which sanctions the enforcement of a 
purely civil contract in this way and the procedure was 
threrfore quite contrary to the recognised rule that a 
civil obligation cannot be enforced by summary imprison­
ment # Hot surprisingly, this particular procedure was 
limited to the humbler classes of serva.nts, such as 
labourers and artisans*
But it la to statute law that resort must be had to 
trace the improvement in the status of the employee and 
the development of the modem view that both parties are 
essentially free and equal in the service relationship, 
that their duties under the service contract are reciprocal 
and, moreover, that their rights are virtually identical*^'
99» Uinpii^ rston »• ow.olt. - pages 152-136 aad In particular 
the list of oases eited in footnote nura'ber 4 to p. 132. 
p  1845, 5 D. 1096.
2* Anderson v. Moon 1856, 14 S. 863.
3. Op.oit» page 154 and footnote number 5 thereof.
4» See particularly - 4 Geo. IV, 0,34? I'he Master end 
Servant Act, 186? (30 and 51 Viot. c.l41)| ®he ïïmployers 
and Workmen Act, 1875 (38 and 39 Viet. e.90) and She 
Oonspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875 (38 and 39 
Vrot. 0.85).
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(4) Interdlot#- A court of law will not grant interdict
^  *««ars?«Jir=>CtoKfiSSa*w^^
against an employee or employer ao aa to order performanoe 
or implement of the aoaxtraet* The usual remedy is damages* 
The general rule above-stated applies to ordinary 
performance, but nevertheless there may be, on occasion, 
some special term or condition in the oontract which can 
be enforced by interdict* A good example would be the 
breach or possible repeated breach of a clause in a?estrain1 
of trade or of the loyalty and good faith owed by the 
servant* The English oases also illustrate the modern 
attitude of the courts to breach of faith, but it seems 
that the îOnglish equivalent (injunction) of the Scottish 
interdict is limited to cases involving the enforcement of 
an obligation of a negative character» It is suggested 
that the Scottish oowts would take the broader view of 
what is more reasonable and equitable in the ciroimstanoos, 
looking to the restriction sought to be imposed upon one 
party and the particular interest of the other party in 
having that restx’iction enforced# Scottish authority upon 
this topic of difficulty is virtually non-existent*
(5) Seavlng aside the special
oase of the disciplinary poivers of the ship’s master, the
5» »4ZGrpgol_Vlctg^a_g^^ v. 1900,
5 I• 42 *
6. Ses MaedonPell «- Master and Servant p. 199; Smith - 
Master and Servant p. 126; Fraser, op.oit. p. 112? and 
ÏÏmpiierston op.oit, pages 137 and 138 and relevant foot­
notes »
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older autiioritieB considered that a master or employer had
7
a power of moderate chaatisement over hie servants# Later
Bauthorities consider that this power could no longer he
accorded recognition, except perhaps where the master stood
in loco parentis to a very young servant* There seems no
t trc a c jt»  tJsmf'ïWBîtwEffJûïa* WCaeç: i iji i#  f f, ^
douht that the master may reprimand and rebuke an employee 
but he cannot resort to personal physical chastisement# In 
any case the existing remedies permitted by law are more 
than sufficient to protect the employer without his resort­
ing to archaic methods more suitable to the feudal era#
One could reasonably assime that any attempt to enforce 
this old-fashioned remedy would bo met lmmedla,tely by a 
criminal charge of assault# The reaction of fellow^ 
employees would doubtless be an immediate sympathetic" 
strike and a request for a public apology* Ho master
would be so arrogant or so stupid as to resort to this
remedy today*
There was never, of course, any question of one 
servant being permitted by the lav; to chastise his fellow- 
Bervant•
(4) Emgl9zee28_rmnMie8_m^ the,,employer_*si b r e a #  pf
contract
The remedies available to an employee ares-
7. See particularly Erslilne I, 7, 62*
8. Fraser - p. 125; Smith ~ op.eit. p. 106;
Macdonnell - p^*pit* p* 32*
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(i) Si claim of damages ; and 
(11) a lien or right of retention*.
The damages olsiim is allowed upon the same principles 
as those which apply in the master’s easoo Usually the 
claim will be based upon wrongous dismissal and the eiim 
payable will be a swa representing the wages for the 
unexpired period of the oontraot or, where the contractual 
period is indefinite, a sum representing an amount which 
the employee was prevented from earning* The usual con­
tractual principle of "minimisation of loss" by the 
aggrieved party (i*e. the employee) applies,® but he is 
not obliged to take up any nondescript type of employaient 
which is available - as this might prejudicially affect 
his position*^^ The oaurt may award a eum larger than
mere wages if sa/bisfied that the circumstances justify
11such an increase* Should the amount of the claim 
represent compensation in lieu of notice then, strictly 
speaking, the action is not one of damages but of eompen-
1 9sation*
As regards lien or the right of retention, the gen­
eral principles of contract law again apply# All that
ï î S ' a f i î S . ^ " ”
li- Sa«|OB T. 1872, 10 ». 301, Ha» T. Jo o o t,
1890, 25 Q*B*D* 107»
12. ferijon V. Atone thy.. „S.Ph0 01 Board. 1876, 3 R. 945.
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need be said here is that whilst the master has a right 
of lien over his employee’s wages for non-Implement of the 
eontraotual obligations, the employee may, in certain 
eireumstances# have a right of retention over his employ­
er’s property which is in his (the employee’s) possession* 
Beamon, of course, were in a special position at common 
law as regards a lien for v/agee* The Merchant Bhipping 
Acts create a statutory lien in favour of the ship’s
master as regards (a) hie wages and (b) dlsbwsements
n %
incurred by him on account of the ship* '
Part (ii)
♦ tscsaawJL-ÏÏ» FùTViLBÇKïtfw e*» jt*H
(5) Liability of Emp].oyer for employee’e contractss- 
Basically, each employee is the general agent of his 
master and the test of the master’s liability is that the 
servant must be acting within the scope of his employment* 
If the servant Is a special agent it is the scope of hie 
authority which is the test of liability* The liability 
is usually much wider in the case of the general agent 
whilst it la, or should be, more clearly defined in the 
case of the special agent*^^ The "holding-out'® eases
13* Bee the Merchant Shipping Act 1894# aeetion 157*
14* The ease of Morrison v* Statter* 1885@ 12 H* 1152, 
illustrates that any acting, outifith the general scope of 
employment raises the question of special agency and the 
agent’s capacity to bind his employer is tested by refer­
ence to the pz'ivate ins true ti one given by the employer - 
as it is upon these that the agent’s authority reste*
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r’eqiiire that the master’s eonduot be carefully examined 
to establish whether there was created in the mind of the 
third party an imderatanding that the employee was indeed 
a general agent*
The principle of Hatifioation and the rules relating 
thereto apply equally within the master and servant
.ationehip and references should be made to the leading
3 5textbooks on the law of Agency*
Termination of the master and servant relationship 
does not necessarily prevent the third party from proceed­
ing against the meter* It is a question of circumstances 
whether the third party had notice of a withdrawal of 
authority or ought to have been on guard against the 
possibility of eæioellation of authority (e*g« by the 
master’s death or insolvency), as facts which ought to 
have been Imov/n to the ordinary prudent businosaman. The 
effect of termination seems to be that the onue rests 
cl early upon the master of showing that the third party 
eonoerned had no reasonable cause for supposing that the 
servant’s authority still continued.
If the servant contracts without any authority v/hat- 
soever from his master - then he is personally liable upon 
the oontract, unless it were to be (and could be) ratified 
eubsequently by hia master6
15. See, in particular. Gloag on Oontract 2nd Edition 
chapter 8, section (2); Bowstoad on Agency (l2th Edition) 
chapter 2, section 4; Pov/éll on Agency (2nd Edition) 
chapter 3.
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(6) Ma-Mlity of employer for employee's delicfsi"»
•  '  tifrs *n * flw i^ /ïA W Jito ix iTJartaR efiK ^ .'Foy i5 ‘»4Fr»i«ta5Aawtrïçto'R i.»*»juiï;i=*<i-#):<s*4!*e<iipïieB^
The ground of liability is based on the maxim £jjl 
faeit per all urn facit pe:c se* The master is responsible 
for any loss or, injury to a third pa3?ty which is caused by 
the negligent or wrongful act of his employees, provided 
that they were acting within the scope of employment* The 
master escapes 3,lability if he can show that the servant 
was not, in fact, a servant at,the time when the loss or 
injury occurred or alternatively, that the partiou3,ar act 
complained of was not within the scope of the particulair 
employment*
Where the claim against the master ia rested upon the 
master and servant relationship, the pursuer is generally 
required to establish the following three points, vis g-
(i) that the aot of the employee was the proximate cause 
of the loss or injury;
(ii) that the xfx'ongdoor (i#e* employee) was at the partic­
ular time acting on behalf of and in furtherance of his 
master’s interests; and
(ill) that the master and servant relationship did apply 
between the actual wrongdoer and the defender (1* e* the 
master)*
The eervant himself always remains liable for his own 
wrongful acts and may be made a joint defender along with 
his employer.
1 6 3
The liability of a master to a third party for the 
negligence of hi© servants is greater than that of am 
employer who engagea contractors to do work for him » In 
the second case the master’s liability ie not strictly thai 
of an employer but Is Indeed a vicarious liability as^ sayi 
the owner or occupier of heritable property ore rle a 
liability baaed upon an express statutory authority* In 
the oases where there is a true relationship of master 
and servant the employer is the pe.rson who directs perfor­
mance of the work and he exereiSGs a complete control
over the employee. This "control test" has been popular
16for many years as the test of liability.
The question of "proximate cause" Is part of the
general law of delict and the principles thereof apply
1 7with equal force hero."' ' Any defeneee which would have 
been available to the employer under the general law of 
delict may be pleaded relevantly here also Cog© contribut*^ ''* 
ory negligence of the pursuer (prior to 194B# of course# 
such a plea if successful would have excused the master 
completely from liability).
"Scope of employment" Is# in several Instances# 
regarded more as a defence available to the employer
16* Bee infra pages 169-172 Inclusive and the footnotes 
thcreto'T'^"^
17* See Glegg on Reparation (4th Edition) chapter 2# page 
37 etc eodo and the new work on the Law of Delict by 
Processor"'David M# Walker# Q.C®# Ph.D. # LL.3). o to be 
published imder the auspices of The Scottish Universitles 
Law Institute.
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rather tham a primary ground of liability# The question
is really one of fact and the answer to it determines^ as
18a matter of law^ the masterliability or non^^^’liability# 
Nevertheless^ a reasonable latitude must be allowed to the 
employee# His duties ought not to be serutinised with 
metieulouB exactitude to discover whether or not the 
partiGulaz* act was properly undertaken. There will be 
occasions upon which a servant will do more than is 
reasonably required of him# The attitude of the law 
seems to be this ^ that if the servant’s actings are in 
the general line of duty and for the benefit and interest 
of his Blaster, the responsibility for such actings must 
rest with the master#^^
18. See par'bioiilarljr Gallagher v, Burrell & Son 1883. 11 H. 
53: Martixi v. Ward, iWfTlTR. Sl'fTB5iH“v"rTlondon
] S! ( ) , con*»
duetor who drove the ’bus when his driver was ill - no 
part of his duties and no implied or other authority the 
employing company held not liable to an injured passenger)i 
and, more recently, PeebTes v# Cov/an & Co# (0#H#) 1915p 1 
S#L#T* 363 (driver gxving ^^ lifte*^  - employers not liable) 
powd V. llej^Jier 1936 S.îf. 118 (similar faots)? fo^^er v.
(o*h .) 1962 s .l .®, dotes) 31.
(Employers not liable for injury when unauthorised lifts 
given.); mid in England, particularly the eases of Twine v,
ISiaa...SffiE£iS [1 9 4 6] 1 Ali B.R. 2025 62 $.1 ,11.^ 4 5 8s, C.Â
fm. 0^ A y  * * l #  * -  IÏS 3e.'t»t<»t»i4rnsï«jE*rKy9rT jn i»^ L  *
fB9p C.Â. (foreman’s "ostensible*’ authority),
rr^—  Ji9Msa»®eae™iL0™|fc 1862, 1 H. &
0* ^26; Waxd v. Gengraj^iMMf,,00.^573. 42 L.J.O.P. 265: 
]LQJLjSrlcJcJiooOo*H.l 1949 S.I.T. (lo-fees) 7; 
_mi#!«sm_09æm r a m æ L ,(0.a,) 1950 S.L.T. 
Uotes) 635 1949 S.L.
Ï. dotes) 105 and Boll v, Blaeîïwood Morton & Sons Ltd.. 
-960 S#C# 11; I960 8#li,T. 143
If the particular act ia domo i>y the employee for liia 
OWK& (K&dkGi* i;%ie V7li(>]L(5 sressifOztojlTbjLjLjlibTr 3^03? I&l&cs (3C)2%Gi(3(3i%(3%i(3<323 ]L3Lo 
upon him emê not upon the employero It aometimea happima^ 
±n the transport eaaee, that an employee deviates from the 
route which ho normally takesp “viiilet driving for his 
employerD for tome purpose which la purely personal or he 
takes out hie employer’s van or lorry or motor«*oar, after 
oMpletlng his ordinary delivery tasks for the day^ on a 
ploy of his own# Who is responsiblo In these two cases if 
a third party le injured the employee- alone or the 
employer also? It•eecme that if the employee la on the 
master’s WslmoBB though he deviate for personal ruasoBB - 
the maater will ha liable* In the second oesoj, the employe 
Ifô taking tho vehicle for liis own purposes^ usually without 
any authority-from the master, bo that no liability will 
attach to the master# The claim against the master le a 
good one even although tho particular act complained of io
0Û
merely incidental to the employment#^
The ma&olke3? may expreeely forbid the doing of a partie*"
ular aot or forbid Its performance in a 'particular manner# 
Does dlBObcdlonae by the servant to these Inetruetlons 
enable the master to escape liability?' The answer la
&0* See Hucldiman v# Smith, 1889, 60 708#
21, Sse iWaS ,.)#pre88,,I,ta, [1946] 1 All .&,E, 2Q2t
7189 3)213?1%3.<)l&]L6%3rdl.3r ]pe3? ']&#ük# l&(3 ibhiSB W%%B )
at po 794o
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that it does not neoesaariXy exouae the master# The
servant, as a general agent, is presumed to be vested
op
with all the powers proper to his tasks# ” However, a 
master is entitled to lay down limits v/lthin whioh the 
servant is to perform his duties and if the prohibitions 
applied by the master extend to things outwith the noxmial 
scope of such duties then there is no liability upon the 
maeter#^^
It is sometimee argued that the master is not liable 
for any wilful and illegal act (in the sense of an unlaw­
ful aot but not necessarily a criminal act) done by the 
aervant#^^' It has already been observed that the master 
may be liable for the v/ilful act of hie servant he may 
also be liable, in a civil action, if the offence is a 
criminal one, so long as it was committed in the course of 
his ©Tiployment# Bailway and omnibus company eRiployeee
22# Bee Iiimpue v. London General Omnibus Go#, 1862, 1 H. &
0. 526 peFfïTles j r V T p V s M r ™ ™ "  -
25. &  Rozburghe v. feldle. 1822, 1 S. 344; 1825, 1 W.S.l;
iL V, GlaBiECOT Ærajaway Oo.. 1894, 32 S.L.R. 353.
V. Iionaon General Omnibus Co., cit, supra ; and 
Stevens v. Woodward. 1881. 6 Q.B.B. 318 per Grove J. at
p. 320.
24. isOon V .  ,  1 R .  559; ^
W.ardroPQ V. R. Hamilton. 1876. :> R. 876; ami D. Rossburahs 
V. Waldie, Pit, supra.
25. V. Manchester S. and I.. Rly Co.. 1873, 8 G.R.
148; S M M  V. m MgpW-_g_^mway..Oo. 1898, 6 S.l.ïï. p. 49;
f. l-,.l,..,,Railway Oo., 1899, 1 R, 562; hut contrast 
Mll.eapi.Q V. Hunter 1898. 25 R. 916 (the barman arguing 
politics with a oustoaer and forcibly ejecting him - no 
action against the proprietor).
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(whether British Transport Commission employees or other­
wise) have a presumed authority to use force against any 
persons who misconduct themselves upon railway property 
or who, for example, attempt to travel without a ticket#
If unnecessary violence is used or if the employees use 
force improperly, then the company, as employers, will he 
liable.®®
Statutory power to apprehend may he conferred 
(usually upon railway companies and the like) &md any 
misuse of that power hy the employees would render the
P*7
employer liable# In the absence of a statutoiy power or 
an implied common law power to make the particular arrest, 
the employer cannot he made liable#
Another case illustrating the unusual act falling
26. Highlmd Ely, Go. v. Mengl.ea 1878, 5 R. 087? Aptliorpe 
V. lO R» 5#; lowe T. Ggeaj
Uortiiern Ely. Co., 1893, 62 L.J.Q.B, 524 (the eompany 
held liable v/here a station-master and porter forcibly 
end quite wrongly ejected a passenger who had the correct 
ticket); Seymour v. Greenwood 1861, 6 H. & E# 359g (a *bue 
proprietor held liable where a conductor thrust an intoxi­
cated passenger off the ’bus v/ith such violence that he 
was thrown down in the roadway and run over by another 
vehicle); Hanlon v# Glasgow and South Western Ely# Go#a 
Pit, supras and BayleF v# Manchester S» and L# Ely# Go.,
Ï873,^^P. 1487"^"^      '
27. See Lundie v. MaoBrayne, 1894, 21 R. 1085 following 
earlier English authority on the point (see Moore t . 
Metropolitan Railway Oo,, (1872) 8 Q.B. 36)."
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within the scope of employment is Poland v.
v/here a carter employed by defendants v;ae walking
home after work, behind a lorry driven by one of his
employers# Seeing a youth climbing upon the lorry and 
thinîcing that he was stealing sugar, the carter struck 
him, so that the youth fell and v/as injured. The employ­
ers were held liable - but they would not have bean liable
if the'carter’s act had been so excessive as to take it 
quite outwith the scope of authorised acts. Here the 
emergency justified the particular act. Whether there is 
an emergency or not is a question of
The employer is liable for any fraud or embe^ialement 
committed by the employee in the course of the employment, 
just as he is for any other wrongful a,ct. The ground of 
liability is that the employee is acting in a particular 
capacity t?ith reference to certain kinds of acte and 
accordingly the master must be liable for the v/ay in v/hioh 
those acts are carried out by the employee.
The third and final requirement, if the master is to
.. m -f , ,Y|, imrnm r i f m m M n - i Y r r T - i - - i n w r r r i i r i n  i ii-iTTTri«in' niimimi ifn»iiiir .iiii«n)iiniii.iniiii rji i.iC i m i ,,
28, [1927] 1 K.B, 236.
29. See Gwllliam v. fwlst [1895]_2 Q.B. 84} Beard v
London General Omnibus Go. [I900] 2 Q.B. 330; but contrast 
M£E^|S. y* Ltd. [1915] 1 K.B, 644 (a oompansf
was held liable for the negligence of a driver in allowing 
an unauthorised person to drive the vehicle).
30. See the leading English case of Lloyd v. Grace Smith & 
£Q*9 [I912J A.C. 7165 also Uxbridge Permanent Benefit 
Building Sdolety v. ae|:agd~Tl939l 2 K.E. 248; " % T # W  2
All E.E. 344, G.A.
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be held responeible, la that the relationship of master 
and servant must, apply. The exietence of a contract of 
service is, auffioient proof, but if this is denied then 
the pursuer has the onus of proving that the relationship 
does in fact exist.
Borne difficulties might be apparent where two persons 
are entitled to give orders to a servant at the time of 
the wrongful or negligent aot. We are here envisaging the 
case of the servant who has virtually two masters# The 
question to be answered is - who was the mastaae at the 
particular time when the wrongful or negligent act took 
place? He is the person who is responsible. Two differ­
ent tests have been suggested in answer to this question, 
videlicet
(a) Who selected the servant, who pays him and who can 
dismiss him? ^
(b) Who has the right to control the servant as to the way
in which he must perform his duties?
The former test is certainly important as regards 
determining such questions as breach of contract or lawful 
and unlawful dismissal. However, as regards liability in 
negligence, there is little doubt that the "control test" 
is accepted ae being the primary one. This view has
-jH 1T' TTf ixMi. i > rtii ~mi iwr r i ni niiTif(ii i .fi rw>H' P*#<i nwiniMniTMf 'if f innè*n..'#wmi. i i .i>iw — i ?i u'Win[ii#r~i# wt##rrfifrTi* * ^ ‘T n iiir.T.Tfiwi .Tit » irji
51* See the earlier eases viss- Gairns; v* Clyde lavimtion
Tf8. 1898, 23 R* 1021g Connelly v. Clyde Navigation Tra.\ 
1902, 5 P. 8; Anderson v# Glasgow Tramway Oo. 18937" 21 E. 
53-85 l Ü S U  V. Aaams. & OQJ. 1907''S.'cV 567?"T4 S.L.Ï. 625 
(Ghe essential test is "control"). Johnson v* Lindaay 
1891 A.C* 571# Donovan v# Lalng#_ VJhàFEon & Down Construe" 
e, [1893] 1 Q.B. 629? also Murray v. Currie,
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obtained support from the judges of the earlier part of
the nineteenth oentury^^ right down to the present time*
It has been tested again in the leading IKnglieh eaee of
Mereey looks^ and Harbour Board v. Ooggine à Griffiths
(Liverpool) L t d # a  ease in which Donovan v. Laing,
3ÂWharton à Down Oonstruotlon Syndicate was carefully 
Gonaidered and diatlnguished*
The general principles 3?elating to the transference
or loan of employees from and by one master to another
'55were discussed at some length in Ghowdhary v. Gillot#
Mr# Justice Btreatfield’s five propositions in that case 
are moat helpful and are as follows, vijss- ,
(i) Where transfer is in issue, the presumption is always 
against it#
(il) The ,gn^ of proof is on the general employer that 
control has paesed from him#
51# continued
1870, 6 0#P# 24 and Eourke v# White Moss Colliery Go.#
" I  *“7 r7 . . . .  r\f\r“ < m « ïM n B a to « i» ir s ^ a »  « itfe m M ia a w M W jm T iT jMTi im w  rJi.o ( (ÿ & 0#i. »D# 205#
32. See Dalyell v. g.vrer 1858, El.Bl. & EL., 899; and
V- m j l|L.MgaiI_P^ket_Oo., 1838, 8 A. & E. 835; 
and, in particular, the following well—Imown English cases 
Quarmaa v. Burnett 1840, 6 M. & W. 499: Jones v. Liverpool 
Gorporation^L8§5r'l4 Q.B.R. 890; and JoSSTT. S c H l S d  
[1898j 2 Q.B. 565, where the "control" test was clearly 
applied. ï'or an interesting article hy Professor Otto 
Kahn-lreund, criticising the "control" test, see 14 M.L.E. 
505.
33. [1947] A.O. 1; [1946] 2 All E.R. 345; 115 L.J. (K.B.)
AAR . AO m _ T. T) K%R, 62 Ï.L.E. 533.
34. Oit. 0U£^.
35. [1947]2 All E.R. 541
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(ill) The general employer must prove that there ie ou oh 
a trensforeneo as paaaes the right to control the 
servant la the of execution of the aot In
question#
Civ) V/33,ether aiioa b treansf0:eonce has takoB place la a 
question of fact#
(v) There ommot be suoh a trsmoferenee without the 
servant’s oonsent#
The "control test" haa come up for consideratIon time 
and again in the %oopltal eaees"#*^  ^ It may be thouglit$ 
perhaps with reasonable juetlfloatlono that the control 
test has been pushed too far and that it has obscured the 
real test of the basic oontraotual relationship between 
the partiesp to be determined by the first^ m^ontioned tost, 
rather than by attempting to identify the element of 
control# From the atrietly logical standpoint it ie em 
exaggeration or, more correctly, am ovar^ -^eimplifioation to 
aayo for example^  that a Hospital Board of Management 
^©oatrole" its qualified senior medical staff in the senao
560 See pa’.rfileula2?3.y the ease of a- Foote v, Rireatoro q£ 
Gveenoûk Hpepital 19IS S,G, 69; 191lTT^,I,,^T3G?: "
M M m a m s m m  1952 Q,o. 2«; iros e.E.a^nm. m g m #
AgragsW&ssaajæaj^ 1953 s,c. 276? 1933 s.l.s. 155.
' .............  “ ( O f d  1990V# Miîmbu:e,i>& Emrai 
i.mrrmary Board and
ilpâ9j4t.M ?' 19&4 s.l.s.
22b#
fCl J «  r  >fïA
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that It will tell them how to perform a Emjor o:e even a 
minor operation# Mevertheleae, within the broad field of 
Industrial operations it seems el ear from JBlBSlBSJji ease 
and the Maraev Booke oase, above mentioned, that where 
there is some actual meehanieal or physical operation 
Involved the oourta will apply the "control" test®
(7) How far employee liable. fo:e acts ...done in the
employer ’ s aervree 3
When the servant has committed eome wrongful act or
is guilty of aome megligenee this makes him liable ae a
wrongdoer to the third party who has suffered the injury
or lose# The fact that the employer has had to meet the
claim by the third party or la by the existing law, under
the doctrine of vicarious liability, required - gim
employer to meet the lose doee not excuse the offending
employee from hie primary responsibility# If the wrongful
act is the prroduct of both master and. servaxit them each
ie a contributing party with a shared primary reaponeibil^^
ity# The master may have hie legal claim to a contrlbut"'-^
ion" from the employee or ho may have a right of 
3Bindemnity^ against the servant# Whether it is good 
policy to enforce either of these rights is quite another 
matter# There are two main reasons for this, via8-
57# Bee the Lav; Reform (MiaceUanoouo Provisions ) 
(Sootiasid) Aot, 1940? anû footnote 38 followingo
Lister V# Romiord Xoe and Gold StorcMo Oo# Ltd® [195?] 
1 All B.R. 125? A.Oq 555 Ch ,L«J»
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(a) it ie bad for industrial relations in any partiaulas? 
trade or eetabllahment if emploiera are conetantly 
enforoing their right© of oontribution or indemnity 
(the simple s?emedy la to get rid of the oareloee or 
iBoompetent servant, for whose vagaries the Inauranoe 
ûompBfütoB will normally pay, in mvy event)I and
(b) if it 'beaomoB widespread local knowledge that a 
particular employer Is in the habit of enforcing his 
rights of indemnity or oontrlbutlon against all of 
those employees who Involve him in a damages claim# 
that employer in question ia going to find that 
recruitment of a suitable labour force will become a 
very difficult task indeed and# moreover# hie 
Shyloeklan Insistence on his legal "pound of flesh" 
may do hi© business infinitely more harm than one or 
two damages claims #
Procedurally# the pursuer might raise his action of 
damage© against both master and servant# jointly and 
severally# enforcing his decree against one or other or 
both# Should he take an action against the master alone 
and thereafter attempt unsuccessfully to enforce the 
decree he oannot then initiate a fresh action in respect 
of the same wrong against the employee* In practice the 
pursuer will almost always go against the employer end 
that will bo an end of the matter#
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The indemnity prinoiple in Boota law seems to he 
founded, upon the authority of the old ease of toderjKm 
Bromilee^^ upon the reasoning that as the master is hound 
at oormnon law to relieve and indemnify the servant for 
any loss to him from conformation with orders, so the 
servant has a reeiprooal obligation to indemnify the 
master - whether the loss he a direct loss to the master 
or a payment of damages or compensation to a third party* 
The I(h.glish lawyers seem to have taken a very long time 
indeed to reach the same conclusion as is now evidenced 
by the Msj^er case«^’^
(8) ISmployer and Itolojee in the Criminal, law
Any instruction by a master to his servant to do 
something which amounts to a criminal offence involves 
both parties in criminal liability* They are liable in 
Scotland, as "art and pax*t" in the offenooo If the 
servant ia mfrely an "innocent agent" then he escapes 
liability and it ie the master alone who has to answer 
for the crime* In the case of a common law offence, the 
prosecution will require to prove the master’s particip­
ation in the offence before a conviction will be obtained 
against him* The nature of the offence will be a very
390 1822, IS* 442 ; see also 01ydeadale Bank v* Beataon.
1882, 10 E# Oo*
[1957 ri All E.H. 125; A.O. 555 (H.L.T.
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important matter to be eonsidored in the first plaoe»
For example, an indictment for reckleae driving or driving
whilst mider the influence of drink or drugs would not
noinnallj involve the employer, q^ua employer, in any
criminal liability, although it would most certainly
usually involve him in a civil liability*
The liability under statute law may be quite differ-^ »
©nt and so far as the employer is concerned he may be made
absolutely liable employer (and that liability may
attach to him as a principal or it may also attach to him
vioarioxialv aa the employer of S, the particular employee
or agent who actually committed the statutory breach) or
as owner or occupier or proprietor of particular premises
occupied and used for a particular purpose and governed by
41special statutes. There may be a "saving clause" to the 
master in certa,in statutes which enables him to report that
41* See, for example, the Factories Act, 1961g the Mines 
and Quarries Act, 19545 the Offices, Shops and Railway 
Premises Act, l9o3 and the statutes relating to Licensing 
and Weights and Measures5 and, for example, the eases of
1889, iB B. ( JTTTBTLindeay v. Dempster* 1912 S.O.(J.) IIO5 
MiSZËâSS V. Grax 1945 J.C. 113"Vveights and maasurea); 
ZSESmsa V. GampRell 1946 J.G. 28; 1946 S.L.l'» 58 (Licens­
ing Acts) and Shields v. Little 1954 S.L.Î. 146; 1954 J.G. 
25 (tnaffiokinl^ in exciseahle liquor) and also, from the 
aspect of vicarious criminality under statute the older 
cases of - V. MaoKemga 1917 J.G. 20; 1916, 2 S.L.DÎ,
295; A.uld V. Devlin 1918 J.G. 41; 1918, 1 S.L.Ï. 33;
I M S  1928 J.G* 29; 1928 S.L.l'. 336.
•J. f V
the particular breach was caused by a definite and 
identifiable person and that he (the master) had no 
knowledge of the breach and had done his best to see that 
the Act’s requirements were fully met@ On the othere hand# 
the liability may be absolute*
In each case of statutory liability the primary task 
is one of construction of the particular statutory provis­
ion in order to ascertain (a) the reason for the obliga­
tion and (b) the capacity in whioh that obligation is 
bei?ig imposed by the legislature. Knowledge on the part 
of an employer may be vital in fixing an additional 
liability or even the primary liability upon him, as the 
prosecution would require, in the ordinary ease, to prove
AQ
this knowledge by the employer. If, on the other hand, 
the wording of the statute is clearly absolute, giving; 
knowledge or acquiescence no place in the offence, the 
test of. liability is the factual ooimnisslon of the
particular act which is escpreasly forbidden by the Act
itself*
The oommon-law doctrine of vicarious liability, so 
well-lmown in the field of civil wrongs or delict has no 
similar application in the field of common-law crime.
42. See particularly "Mens rea in statutory offences" by
J.Iil. Edwards, where the question of statutory liability
is very exhaustively examined*
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(9) Bights and remediee arlBin,g: to the employer (in 
respect"of the Contract of Service) against
w»Tmi*raittv7F'37»mu-xVs»a*.rar>w»?i:r»ir.ThrHis*»ie't»*rrtitis9».'»wft*!<Hi<z’MrBisa6»4rttitonwr#wx'*<»hiwMi)»fr
thlrd partles g-
The remedies are as followBg-^ ’
(a) An action for inducing a breach of contract.
(b) All action for harbouring a servant.
There ie not available in Scotland (as there 
is in England)
(o) An action for injury to the servant.
There remains to be considered, in somewhat broad 
compass, the basic question of the grounds of action 
against third parties.
(a) Action for inducing a breach of contract.
There is a long tradition in Scottieh common Ibm 
that if any person, Imov;lngly and intentionally. Induces 
a servant to commit a breach of his contract (e.g. by 
deserting the service), so that the master Buffers loss, 
such person becomes liable to an action of damages at the 
instance of the master. It seems that the third pa,rty’»s 
act, by which he induces the breach, may be an act of any 
kind whioh results in a breach causing loss, for example,
revealing trade secrets or some confidential information Ai*
The third party who is to be made liable must have 
had notice of the contract infringed, otherwise he cannot
45. See M o k p «  v. faylpr. 1816, 1 Mur, 141; Rutherfoord
V. Boak, 18567^14 bTT32J Gower & Sons v. Macfarlano•n ■* »  r  i#p,?!yyyaCTA«r.^qsasv.r»a'«frry4tt*.v<a»j^rt?tite<i^
18/9, 6 R. 68p*
44* V, |oafc, su2|a; Kera y, D ± _ E o ^ r ^ ,  1822,
i Mur, l l F n o x t a M h  v. MUrtgur, 1841, 3 D. 556
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be eaid to have committed any wrongful act* Even Imow- 
ledge of the existing relationehip between the master and 
hie employee will not be enough if such Imowledge does 
not justify an inference of wilfully and intentionally 
inducing the breach* Obviously, a mere giving of advice, 
without injurious motive or wilful intention against the 
master, will not involve liability, on the part of the 
third party, to the master*
The particular contract whose breach has been alleged 
must be one which is enforceable5 if, for example, it is 
void there can be no contractual right arising to the 
master and there ia no question of his having a remedy 
for breach - because the contract itself is a nullity.^ "'^
(b) Action for harbouring a servant.
It is equally established at common law that if any 
person harbours or continues to employ a deserting servant, 
after notice of the facts, then he becomes liable to the 
master whose servant has deserted hiai*^  ^ The test of
twtwatfKLiwii r m i'.' Miiw>ij i i»jt!Kt*v.mvisi8>*t><ir.wtf5it3a>titsTt.a:aagwag.'jeajg.a*g«.'i^?a»
45. âJÏga V. 1839, 9 Ai & E. 693; Hartley, v.
iMiaÆïïSa.» 1847, 5 O.B. (M.G-, & S.) 247; D e J l M M Ü o a  
Barnmii. 1890 45 Oh.I). 430.
46»“îpc|son Y. ïajteî y* Mzon; totles v, (R®raia£e?
and D | 4 ! ^ e ^ e o  Y. Ba^num, eit. au^raj emâ also Rose
, v. Lewis„^ono 1917 8.0. 341; 1917, 
i S.ïi.ï, 153; other examples are Blair v. Robertson 31 8h. 
Ct.Repts. p. 193; Park &'0o. v. LuWgell &"1o¥SHi5'n o p .
'Ë%ER%;t@r§!4ô
0c.Repto# p. 56 s and Holmes v. Johnstone Co-operative
40.sS:Gt;Repts7Tri9T™~^‘^ - ~ -
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liability is the third party’s continuation of the employ­
ment of the aercvent after his Imowledge of the faots that 
the servant ie in deeertion from his previous employment* 
Sueh an action would he a deliberate interference with 
the primary relationship and accordingly some protection 
must he given to the master. Although this action is 
perfectly possible, in theory, it ie submitted that it is 
most unlikely to be met with in modern practice. If any 
remedy is to be available it will generally be found that 
an action for inducing a breach of contract is the most 
satisfactory one. If professional malpractice by a third 
party employer is involved, then a formal complaint should 
be lodged with the disciplinary body of the particular 
profession#
(e) Action for injury to the servant (?)
Soots law does not permit any action at the instance ' 
of a master against a third party who has caused injury to 
the servant (thereby, of course, resulting in loss and 
inconvenience to the master). English law tends to allow 
such an action because there is a deprivation of services, 
in which the master is said to have a quasi right of 
property.
This type of action v/as tried in Scotland in the case 
of Allan V. Bai'olay,^ht the Lord Ordinary held it to be’
47. 1864a 2 M. 873.
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incompetent upon the ground of remoteness of damage* The 
Inner House of the Court of Session also expressed serious 
doubts as to its oompetenoy* The same type of action was 
again tried many years later in Eeavie v* Clan Line 
Btearnersobut xfas again regarded as incompétent*
English law seems to be the same in principle but it 
allows an exception in the case of menial servants, employ- 
i ae part of the domestic staff, basing damages on the
action per quod servitiusi amisit*^’^
tfttKjHvrexET» la flW tw iM ie itT t»  '
This whole question was recently examined exhaustively
by the Law Reform Committee for Scotland* Their Report"
concludes unafiimously that any possible alterations in the
law would produce worse results than any supposed defect
or imfairness and therefore, for the reasons explained by 
*33them"*^  ", they recommended that no legislation was necessary. 
That is how matters stand at present.
Grounds of action against third parties <,
There remains to be considered the development of the 
ground of action against third parties v/ho interfere with 
the master and servant relationship. This ia a matter of 
considerable interest and not a little complexity.
48. 1925 8,0. 725.
154.
50* Eleventh Report of the Law Reform Oommittee for Boot- 
land, presented to Parliament in July 1963 and published by 
H.M. Stationery Office (Command Paper No. 1997).
1MÉ) pages 4 and 5.
1 3 1
The grounds seem to fall into two definite and 
agreed categoriesg-
(a) where the acta in question are unlawful acta; and
(b) where the sa.id acta are lawful, but are procured 
by unlawful meane*
The authorities are mainly drawn from English law 
but, nevertheless, there are several Scottish authorities 
of extreme importance. The early leading oases on this 
topic are the follov/inga™
Lumley v. Bowen v. liall;^  ^&^ul S.S. Oo. v.
M’Grregorn Gow & Oo§^^ Temperton v* Eueee^J.;^^ Flood v.
66JaokBon . appealed to the House of Lords as Allen v.
57 58Flood; G.nd Quinn v. Leatham.—      f      1...   u,--------------------—■#C»ri«T!CTP3»*<e09£3 ^
In Lumley v* Gye the ground of action was that 
defendant had "malieiously intending to injure plaintiff, 
enticed and procured (Miss) Wagner to break her contract". 
The action was held to be competent. However, Coleridge 
J. dissented, taking the following points - (l) the dama.ge 
\me too remote (ii) the motive was too elusive in character 
to be a test of legal action and (ill) the action of 
damages for enticing a sea?væit was an exception to the 
general rule and applied only to labourers in husbandry
52. 1853, 2 E. & B, 216.
53. 1881, 6 Q.B.». 333.
54. 3-889,,23 Q.B.D. 598; 1892 A.C. 25.
55.
56.
57.
58.
ul893
1895
. 1901
2 I.E. 667.
1 Q.B. 715
2 Q.B. 21,
A.O. 1.
A.O* 495 (reported as Leatham v. Craig [3.899]
 ^ ^  '  euriieroww*»aitfc-i-4e;w*»w-W-» U   ^j
182
anxl menial servants*
Lumley*© oaae was considered and approved in Bowden v# 
gall* Again the ground of action was "knowingly inducing
a b r e a c h " T h e  three conditione necessary to found an 
action were set out clearly by Brett L.J* (aa he then was), 
Vi 133- (i) the defendant’s aot must be wrongful in law and
in factp (ii) the breach of contract should be a natural 
and probable consequence of the act of persuasion and (iii) 
the breach of contract should be the cause of the injury to 
the plaintiff - but such injury must not be too remote*
In Mogul 8*8* Oo* v* M’Gregprt, Oow & no
allegation of procuring a breach was made* The position 
was that certain traders in the china tea trade had com­
bined to keep their competitors out of the market by offer­
ing rebates to customers who dealt exclusively with them 
and by reducing freights, ae well as by threatening to 
cease employing their own agents who also acted for other 
traders outside the combination. The action was in damages, 
founded upon an illegal combination 03? alternatively^ 
standing the combination, that it made use of unlawful means 
The action was imsuoeeeeful - the Court holding that, in 
spite of any loss to the plaintiff, the object of the 
combination was to secure and protect the trade of the 
defendants* No violence, intimidation, fraud, misrepresem-
59* oit. aupra#
60, See per Brett L*J* (later Lord Esher) at p* 331^  
delivering the majority #udgment of the Court*
61o cit* supra*
tat ion or procurement of breach of contract had ooourrod,
ÇO
lo right of the plaintiffs had been violated« Both the 
Court of Appeal and the House of Lords held that the 
defendants had not exceeded the legal limita of competition 
in the course of trade#
63
Temperton v* Russell is interesting as it was an 
action taken by a manufacturer against the members of a 
joint committee of three trade unions* Two groimds of 
action were relied upon, n a m e l y ( i )  that defendants 
had, unlawfully and rnalieiously, procured certain persons 
to break contracts with plaintiff and (11) that they did 
maliciously conspire to induce certain persons not to 
enter into contracts with plaintiff* The court held that 
defendants were actuated in what they did, not by any 
spite or malice against plaintiff personally# but by a 
desire to injure him in his business by forcing him not 
to do something which he had a legal right to do and to 
compe3. him to comply with the unions* requirements ; 
accordingly, they had then induced certain persons to 
break their contracts with plaintiff and they knew about 
the existence of these contracts; and, moreover# the 
plaintiff had suffered loss from the breaches of contracte 
On the second ground of action# the facts proved to the 
court’s satisfaction were - the same desire of defendants
62* See dictum of Bowen L.J. in the Court of Appe©.l - 23 
Q.B.D. at* p. S’l3 (criticised by Lord Herschell in Allen v. 
mo§,, [1898] A.C. 1 at p, 139).
3. oit. supra.
ateiWPt'J «
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as before# an acting in combination# suooese in inducing 
bx’eaches of contract end consequent loss to the plaintiff* 
Accordingly, the malioioue purpose, the successful induce­
ment of breaches of contract and the consequent loss,
taken together, were held to found a good ground of action
64against those persons acting in combination*
The foregoing oases indicate that two basic con­
ditions must be fulfilled before the action in damages 
for procuring a breach will succeed, vis5- (a) the loss
must be caused to the party who io claiming the damages; 
and (b) the procuring of the breach must be "malicious"* 
The very important question of the meaning and effect 
of "malice" v/as discussed, at great length, in Allen v«
65Flood. Briefly, the facts were that two shipwrights, 
Flood and Taylor, were employed by Glengall Iron Company 
to repa.ir a ship. The bo 11 er-makers employed by the 
company objected to Flood and Taylor being employed 
claiming that the two men had invaded their province by 
carrying out iron-work in another yard ("demarcation" at 
an early stage). Allen, the trade union delegate of the 
boilermakers, persuaded the company to dismiss Flood and 
Taylor, threatening that if it did not do so the boiler­
makers would be called out on strike or would come out on
64* Bee per Lopes J.J. at p. 731 of the report.
65. Originating as Flood v. Jackson and reported [1895] 
2 Q.B. 21 and movingTo“"the House of Lords as Allen v. 
Flood and reported [1898] A.C. 1.
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strike# There v/aa no breach of contract, as the company 
could discharge Flood and Taylor at any time. The jury- 
found that Allen had "maliciously induced" the company to 
dispense with the services of pla,intiffs and had "malic­
iously induced"the company not to engage plaintiffs* 
("Maliciously", as used here# meant an intention to punish 
the plaintiffs or injure them in their trade or obtain 
some benefit to the boilermaker© at the shipwrights’ 
expense). But# the House of Lords held that there was no 
ground upon which an action could be maintained. The 
company had committed no legal v;rong against plaintiffs . 
and presumably it was not a wrongful aot for Allen to 
persuade or induce the company to do that which it had,a 
perfect legal right to do at any time# A strong argument 
was put forward that a special right existed in every 
person to exercise his trade or dispose of his labour# free 
from molestation or interference and that any eueh inter­
ference was actionable unless done with just cause or 
excuse, This view was rejected# Before any action could 
be taken there had to be a wrongful act - and, moreover# 
an act which was otherwise lawful could not be made 
unlawful (1,G, wrongful) because it wo<s prompted by a bad 
motive# Malice by itself is not actionable#
M l m  Y. Leathern”" took the development a stage 
further* I'hie ease involved the elements of (i) threats
w  I ^  y/D.ufci ' . i iL i i  i  . j   ....... ..
66. [1901] A.C. 495 (reported as Leathem v. O r ^  In [1899 
2 I.E. 667)#
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and (ii) coMpiraoy. The court made no attempt to
distinguish or define "legal threats" and "illegal (i.e.
unlawful) threats"# It was found, in fact# that defendants
had acted in combination and with a common purpose to
injure plaintiff in his business by preventing the free
action of those customers dealing with him and that actual
lose had resulted to plaintiff and that defendants had no
just cause or lawful excuse, because their acts were not
legitimately done to protect or advance their omi
interests. The particular acts here done were not
proved to have resulted in any breach of contract through
which plaintiff suffered loss, but nevertheless they
caused others to refuse to deal with plaintiff and in
this way pecuniary damage was caused. Based upon these
67facts, the action was sustained. Quinn’s ease ie 
clearly based on an unlawful combination which resulted 
in loss and with no justification in law for the pax^ tic- 
ular acts. It was suggested that the means employed - 
namely coercion by threats - were themselves sufficient to 
attach liability to defendants. This very point was to 
occur again many years later, aa we shall see shortly.
It seems, therefore, that two main types or patterns 
of case could be encountered3-
(i) IVhere the action ia baaed upon a wrongfiîX act
67# Thereby approving the second ground of action in 
Temperton v. Russell.
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done by one or more person©# but without any aicting in 
oonoert; and . .
(ii) where the. aotion is based upon a lawful or un­
lawful act done by unlawful means# including therein an 
illegal combination.
68Lumley’a case, Bowen’s caae and Allœ v* Flood all
III' m iiw  Hif I lit nm II' I f i n  Tm' w m m n m i#  r i i
fall into category (i) above, whilst Momil 8.B# Oo. and 
Quinn V* Leathern^ ® fa,ll into category (ii) above* It 
v/ould appear that Temperton v# Russell overlaps both 
categories,. Glass (i) requires a violation of some right 
(contractual or otherwise), done knowingly and intention­
ally and resulting in some loss. Glass (ii)# being bsised 
upon illegal conspiracy requires a combination of persons 
with the object of causing injury to .another, some act or 
acts done in furtherance of that purpose and loss arising 
therefrom.
Soots law has not, however, developed the law of 
"conspiracy" to the same extent as English law, but has 
chosen instead to regard conspiracy as a form of "attempt" 
in the criminal sense or ae a form of "fraud" in the civil 
sense, leaving the common law remedies to be applied* 
Nevertheless, an early case of "conspiracy" in Scotland 
which must be noticed is that of Scottish Go-operative 
Society V# Glasgow Fleohers’ Association.'^  ^ Here It was 
alleged that defenders had entered into an illegal
68. .0.1 ejt. supra. 69,Both o:lt. supra.
70. 1898735 645. ““ “
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combination to induo©, and had induced, the salesmen at 
Xorkiiill Quay to insert in their conditions of sale 
provisions under which bide from pursuers were not to be 
received; that such conditions were illegal and that 
pursuers had sustained injury through the refusal of 
salesmen to accept bids from them- It was held that the 
conditions excluding pursuers’ bids were not illegal and, 
as regarde a conspiracy to induce salesmen to insert 
conditions refusing bids, defenders had merely done what 
was legitimate for their own protection, under conditions 
of trade competition. The case was said to be clearly 
governed by the precedent of Mogul S.8# Co. v. MTGreggr,
73Gqw. à Oo. The point about legitimate trade protection 
was to be raised again in the leading Scottish ease of 
Orofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Oo. v* Yeitch"^ .^
"Conspiracy" in English law is, (throughout moot 
reporte and textbooks) referred to, but perhaps not truly 
defined, thus - "that which is lawful when done by one 
person or several persons acting individua.lly may be 
imlawful when done by a numbox^  of persons acting in 
combination"♦ Moreover, conspiracy was an offence punish­
able in the Jhiglish criminal courts'^  ^and at the same
 ..... i ,ii#«#1 w.: i 'w l ''1':#,1 iw w # n    .
71. 1889. 23 Q.B.B, 598; [1892] A.O. 25.
72. [1942] A.C. 435.1; 1942 S.a*(H.L.) 1; [1942] 1 All 
E.E, 142, H.Ii.
73. Bee Russell on Crime (12th Ecln. by J.W, Cecil Surner) 
and Kenny "Outlines of Criminal Law" (18th Edn. by J.W. 
Cecil Turner).
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time g it ooiilâ give rl£îe to a eivll action in damages (now 
the ’*tort of conepiraey**) * It is important to realise 
that an illegal oonspiraoy has two hranohes (a) the 
whole ohjeet may he unlawful or (h) the object maj be 
quite lav/ful;, but the method of attaining the object may 
he unlawful (e.g. violencethx^eats or intimidation^ 
fraud etc.).
Bo far as Scotland is concerned it has been said that
’’where an act would not he unlawful if done by one person
it does not become unlawful or criminal when two or more
74persons combine to do it’’.' The conspiracy may he 
charged as a criminal act in Scotland . as well as charg­
ing the criminal acta themeelves as specific crimes » hut
this type of procedure never seems to have been popular in 
76Scotland. It would seem that civil liability in Scotland 
arising from a combination which le not by itself crimina,! 
could only be attached where the acts done or the methods 
used by the combination would he wrongful if done by a 
single individual. However, the House of Lords over-ruled 
that view in Quinn v# Leathern. T h e  law was amended« in 
regard to trade disputesjby section one of the Trade 
Disputes Act, 1906
7f* V* laofarlane. 1879, 6 R. 683 per Lord
aifford at p. 697*
79. See Alison i 969; Hume 1 170; but see Macdonald on The 
Orimina'i Law of Scotland sub. nom. ’’Oonepiracy’’.
76. Alison; Hume; and Macdonald loc. eft.
77. 01$,
fb. Which added the following new paragraph after the first 
paragraph of section 3 of the Conspiracy à Protection of
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Intimidation la osipreealy forbidden by section 7 of
7Qthe Oomapiracy cmd Protection of Property Act# 1875# The
aaae of All cm v# Flood» referred to above& aoemo to 
Indicate that molestation, amd/or obetructlom are met 
actionable UBleos either :la of footed by unlawful meanot» 
Trade unions have been involved to a oons id orablq 
extent in.these matters of oombinationg ooerelon, intimid*" 
etion and the like# Prior to 1906 it seemed that the 
deoifiicmo correctly Interpreted watlov the law as it them
stood were mostly unfavourable to the milons# The Tr.aâe
friDisputes Act of 1906# section 4@ gave general immunity In 
the trade unions themeelves against actions In delict (or 
tort)$ 80 that their fimde could no longer be legally 
attached in aatiafaction of a damageo decree or judgment 
and furthermore# In the special ease of a trade dispute 
existing# the trade union itself (and its funds) wae 
apparently protected from any proooodlngo arioing out of
pi o
that dispute or so It aeemod until fairly recently^ '
78# continued
Property Act# 1875# vtsn^ ’’An act done in pursuance of an 
agreement; or combination by two or more persons shall# if 
clone Im eon.tem,plation or furtherance of a trade dispute# 
not be actionable unless the act# if done without any such 
agreement or combination# vmuld be actionable#"
79# 38 & 39 Viot## cap# 86#
00. Riee also til® ©»« SSSSIt^«SSœ^l&Kg
apoAety oases above-snsntioascl aiid abovs eltofi.
81#, b Mw# 7# cap# 47#
82# 8ee the note on Rookw v# Barnard and Others infra 
ai; page 194*
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The employer amy eiio any third party who IndueeB his 
servant to dlBoloso confidentiel Information or he may 
obtain interdict against a rival firm employing M s  work** 
men and obtaining an advantage from their specialised
PJÎîlllS.®^
"Unjustifiable encouragement to break contraots must 
be dietinguiahed clearly from (a) oases where X Is in** 
ducted to atop working# without a broach of contract and 
where no unlawful moans are used^^ and from (1>) cases 
where defendants neither knew nor ought to have known 
about the alleged wrongful act#
In British Industrial Plasties Ltd* # v* Per mm cm 
plaintiff’s employoe made a leaving agreement with them 
and promised not to Interest himself in manufacture or 
Bale of certain chemicals used in plaintiff’s secret 
prooeases# before a certain date* Some three montha later
the employee went to defendants and offered them a procoae
for which their patent agent made application for a patent 
Plaintiffs began an action of breach of contract against 
their former employee and against defendants for inducing 
the breach* It was held that there was no ground of 
action against the company as they had no îmov/lodge of the 
breach ( either actual Imov/ledge or constructive knowledge]
8|. See v. Hojan [1945] 2 All Ü.S.
5Y0.
[1946T 1 üh. 1695 [1946] 1 All iî.E. 350.
85, |.,Q. ^len V. 3?looû [18981 A.C, 1.
86. [ 1940'] 1  "ai jCT.'' '479.
Wrongful iatorforenco was also lacking Im 
Thomson & Oo. Ltd# v# ©eakim» ' where plaintiffs required 
their employees to sign an iwdertaklng that they would not 
join a trade tmion# Several omployeoG had broken tliie 
obligation ami one ouoh employee vma dlamiaoed* Ho 
appealed to. the union for help# The union called out its 
members on strike and asked other unions for aeoiatanoe# 
Certain cmployooc of a'company tmpplying paper to plain­
tiffs said they were unwilling to handle papex* destined fen 
plaintiffs # The supplying company them told plaintiffs 
they would not be able to make deliveries of paper as 
3?equired by the contract# Plaintiffs then took Injumctiom 
proceedings (Bcottioh ”Interdict’’ ) against the imiom 
offiaiala to restrain them from causing or procuring teeael: 
BB of contract between the supplying company and the 
plaint if fe# The court vmo of opinion, that had defemdamto 
had actual Imoivledge of the contract and had they at tempt «« 
0d by wrongful acts to make it impossible to perform# an 
action would have lain# The evidence did not show this 
and therefore the 'imjtimetiom was refused# Jenkins L#J#
A A
gave the opinion that actionable imtorferemoe with con*- 
traetual relations should be confined to oases where it is 
clearly ahmm
87. 1952 Ch. 6465 [1952 } 2 All S.R. 361.
88* ï'bld» pp. 690 md 379 ise&pQGtivelfe,
(a) that the per a cm charged with aetlormh3.e Inter** 
fere#ee Mim of the ezlatemoe of the eomtraet and Imtended 
to procure Itm breaoh;
(h) that that person did définit oly and miequivooally 
parauade# iraduoe or procure the mployoBB to break their 
ooirlrraet# with intent §
(o) that the employees so persuaded# #.#did break 
their oontraote of omploymemt; and
(a) that breach of contract forming the alleged 
subject of toterrforenoe reoultod as a coneocpuenoe of the 
breaches of the oontraeta of employment#
The employee will toe entitled to damages against any 
person who unjustifiably induee© his employer to break a 
aubeleting oontraot of aorvico#®® But there must bo 
breach of a autosistlng oontract there Is no offence# b o  
long a© no unlawful means are
The Trade Disputes Act 3 . 9 0 6 section throe# 
provide© that any act done by a poreon in, contemplation or 
furtherance of a trade dispute shall not toe actionable on 
the grouM only lhat it Induces acme other pereon to break 
a e cm tract of omploymont or that It la an interfcrono© 
with the trade# bwimeee or employ)%ent of ooiue other 
person to dispose of his capital or M s  labour as he 
wills# This suction was ouooeeafully invoked in the
89# Bee Head. v# Pvlendly Boolety of Oporatlve BWnomaspns
D 9 0 2  ] a k .b . 73a.
90. m m  V. A g M  r i 8 # n m .  1.
9,1. 6 l(iw. 7, eap, 47.
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Court of Appeal ia the rocent oaae of Hookes v. Earmarû 
and othersbut .the Houee of Lords r e v e r e t h e  Court
of Appeal daoialoB by placing great reliance upon the 
delict or tort of Intimidation and# being eatlefled that 
the aotinge by the trade union o.ffieials ooncerned did 
amount to intimidation# found in favour of Mr* liookea (ioO* 
by upholding his appeal against the Court of Appeal 
decision) on the question of lav/ but remitted the case to 
the lower court for purepoBos of fixing the amount of 
damage© (the original award of £7#500 was felt to be much 
too high)* This case has caused considérable disquiet in 
trade union oirclaa as it aeem© to suggOBt that the 
px’ovlBioras of 8 act ions 1 and 3 of the Trade Meputee Act# 
1906 cmi always be got round if the pursuer (or plaintiff) 
can base hie case upon Intimidation as a separate delict 
or This will enable him to eiiooeed against any
trade union official In an Individual oapaioity and# 
indirectly# he (pursuer) may be able to strike at the 
union’s funds to satisfy the sum of damages and expense© 
contained in the decree* It seems reasonable to prophesy 
that kookeo v* Barnard and others will become as big a 
landmark in the field of trade union law and history as 
the Taff Vale case did sixty*-three years ago* A case 
subséquent to Hookes and raising other difficulties from 
the viev/polnt of the unions is that of JoT® Stratford &
92o [ 1962] 2 All BoE* 579 (at first instance [1961] 2 All 
825)*
93* [1964] 2 W.L.H® 269§ and [1964] 1 All 367. H.L.
Bee commente on the Trade Bieputes Bill(Ohapter Sjtafia).
195
Son V, Madley,^  although the eaes itself Is aot so 
momentous m  Hookes « In Stratford’s ease# wherein Inter*» 
looutory injunctions were sought toy the plaintiff oompony# 
the House of Lord© has now rover©od the Court of Appeal 
holding (i) defendants guilty of proe^ iring hreaehea of 
contract and (11) that oootions 1 and 3 of the Trade 
Maputo© Act# 1906 did not apply m  the aotings of 
defendants wore not In contomplatiori or furtherance of a 
trade diopute. The Houae applied I*miley v* Gyo supra and 
considerod hut d 1 etIngulshad Hoolcea v® Barnard and others* 
It ©till me erne poaeltole to put forward# with reaeon*^  
able oonfidenoe, the plea of protection of legitimate 
trade Interoota* It would meem that if 11? ean too shown 
to the court’e satlofaction that the true motive fore the 
particular acting was protection of legitimate trade 
interesta then the court v^ lll toe reluctant to find against 
defenders so acting**^  It would appear from a eloae read*" 
lag of the Crofter Harris case that the aotinga of Veitch 
and MaoKonaiOÿ the trade union offlolala ooncernod# 
amounted to a oomtolnation or acting together tout these 
actings did not amount to the delict or tort of ’conspir*^  
acy®’ toeoa.uso there was created In favour of Veitch and 
MaoKonsie# upon the factual cirounistanoee# the legal and
800
MïKSU. V. Smijîh [1025] 1.0. 700. The legal ps?inciple 
in the «Or of ter Harris’’ oaee wae approved and applied in
V. ' # a m  1 w .s .e; 5215 [i?5?] l . m  R.n.
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protective buffer or cushion of «legitimate trade 
interest«« This etill loaves open the very important 
question as to what daeleion the court would take today 
were they faced with the aarno facte as before in the 
Crofter Harris case but X'/ith the addition of intimidation# 
threats or coercion by union officials practised against 
competitors under the guise of «legitimate trade Interest 
One is forced to conclude that «* looking to the Hookes v. 
Barnard and Others deoxBion - the scales of justice would 
now be v/eighted against the trade union officials
95# continued
not a trade dispute in existence, for the defendants 
v/ere not asserting a trade right nor were any interests 
of trade involved*
96* See noxf commenta upon the Tirade Disputes Bill (1965) 
in chapter 5 hereof (pages 260'--261 infra) #
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Oiiapto'i? 4
Temmlmatlom of the ütmtmet of Servie©
Hotioe a M  Tacit Eelooatioa
The requlrofiicmt of not lee m  a preliminary step in
the termination of every relationship of employer and
employee la often over^atatacl and mlGunderotood * Indeed
it ia never an oaaeirtial part of every eervie© oontraot#
Nevertheless# It is widely imml and then it toeeomes a
* 1mutual obligation* Ae soon as there is a desire on both 
slclea to bring the employment relationship to am omi# 
this can be done at mxm without lirrvolting any formal 
notioo procedure#
The roqulromeiit as to notice may bo either exprooe 
or implied* The former involves a question of oonotruot^- 
ion of the contraat# whilst the latter ia deaided by 
roferenoe to either local custom^ or trade custom#'^  but 
not to ouetom in a particular ootabllohment*
1 9 8
The jmwpooù of giving notice is acoeptod ae being a 
twofold one firatly# it prevent a the operation of the 
prrUneiple of ta c it  reloQation# which might otherv/iae be 
inferred from a eontimatioa of- the ro3.atio£mhip and# 
aeaoMly# It mete up a fixed tormlmatlom date for a 
aoBtraot of eervloe which Baa boom, imtil them# a oomtraot 
during the pleaouro of partiee#^
If.melthor part of the said purpome ie to be brought 
into use# then any reqiiiromont as to motioo is probably 
valueless#"
iBstoai of giving notie©# appropriate in the olroum- 
stances# end permitting the employee to work out his 
notice period# the master may oleot to pay him the wages 
(imoIMing any board wages) duo in lieu of notice and 
dismiss M m  Instantly# This action of the master does
K
not amount to a breach of comtract Im the ordinary oaoo# 
There is# of esourse# no convorao right ia favour of am 
employee whereby he may buy himsolf out of hla oontraot of 
employment by paying to hie employer a ama of money
■ift,^'Oïîa«îrf«itrrfi£eïi«^A¥!ï!J4*-wi»ififïrij»WiMi!i»siirttï*wi(»ï,VK«WîiVsW¥æ-‘«t;virirAiS»=:ïia.'**tf«*iMîiit^^^
4" V* âMasJM^tsM94-Js^^ w e ,  5 r. 9455
m s s & v .  S S ^ s m  w e »  6 ». in-^ .
MUiySÊ W 0 »  Hurae, 3B3| Bpaii y,
g S B 6$y£SLJte»*898, 45 ». 4251 000 aloo the opinions oat 
L*d#G. Monorelff and Lord Young in Lennox v# Allan and Son 
1880# 8 H# 38 for jUpta which eeem noT~%o 
twofold purpose o f  m^^ree#
6, See T*
,W_. „ C ïü e fe a * u . y i^ ^ w iv . , « » : iw t»  *  « iftaw w iS U »  _  r
iio|®ss„V. immrna, # E T a n a  Mstio v. m Z s m m ,
"'^9, J.0 R» 715»
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Z'Ggree ea'ülmg tbo xiaoxpireû position of the oontsjaetual
7
period*
TM) actual -method of the .giving of the mot loo need 
not be formal it may be in writing or verbal or it may 
even be inferred from the actinga of the parties them»* 
©elvo©# Ro matter how it 1© given there arc two point© 
which are moat important firstly# the giving should he 
timeoiaa and# seoonCly# it miiot not loc vihloh ia quite 
definite* The reason for these roeuirementa Is that any 
notice provision ie never lightly inferred*If the 
giving of notice ia to he inferred from partioo’ actings 
then this ia a question of fact (and if a Jury io sitting* 
it la the Jury’s task to anewor the question)
The length of notice required to bo given ie usually 
cxproBBcd In the oontraet of servlee Iteolf* If thle is 
not 80 then an equitable deololon of the matter ia called
for and in any event# the notice given m m t  be reason
11
10able# It ie amid that the employeeright to roeeivc
warning ie rested upon ’equity and. eustom’%
It appears# however# that agricultural and domestic 
aervanta In Bootland# hired by the year or half**year# are
7# TMfâ principle la accepted in H#M* Poroca, but service 
In ArmedJPoreea of the Grown ie not service under a 
contract of employmont*
®« # # m  V. teg, 4th |efe. 3.819 P.O. , ,
9* âBÉmâSB V. mehe#. 1010, 1 mr. 489 P©s? 3».C.e* Mom  
at page 45S*
”®%U®etSelP 1998 8.1,.$. <Sh.Ot.) 19# (1957)
•.reiSi
Bv page
entitled to forty days oloar notice end this period ia 
also applicable in. the oaae of other servant a who are 
hired by the yearly or by the halfearly terme e»g« 
gamekeopero # foresters # farm managero and the like*'"'^
The forty days period wae to be eotmtecl# at one time# 
from the date at which do faato the term of service wao
OcssfcsT
to ead#^^ but the Removal Terme- (Scotland) Act 1886
1 /I
(amended in .1690) impliedly altered the common law by
requiring the warning to be given forty days before 15th 
May or 11th IJovambor even although the actual caseation 
date of tenancy or service was 26th May or 28th November 
(those dates being accepted in modern practice am tenants♦ 
removal days) # ' It doom aoem# howeverthat the older 
common law was restored by a subséquent caae"*"^  which 
provided that forty days notice before 28th May or 28th 
November was good enough# The Bent Act# 1957# has (in 
addition to other statutes) made further chcmgeo with 
special regard to the giving of notice in respect of 
rented property# but it has made no change in the custom**» 
ary notice period referred to above# which applies to the
12. lilJeaa V. A M s m m  T* MSteSt* ea^.SgSS, T* , 
|li* m m m s  ^is© a a s m m s  v. j a ^ M â e g »  i84?,
V. SSSM» 1070, 9 M. 2)58 8 S,3,,R. 181
(applying the analogy of the ordinary leasehold tenant)# 
14# As stated in Gamergn v# Smirk# swra#
IS. m m m v .  i o s t o *. w t i q ?? 465.
16# So© particularly section 16 and paragraphs 28# 29 and 
30 of the sixth sohodule#
agricultural and domeatlo servant#
In Bngliah law@ judicial notice io taken of a custom 
that where domestic servants are engaged on yearly wages 
(which is not usual in modern praetioe), either party is 
entitled to terminate the oontraet at the end of the 
first month and upon giving notice during the first 
fortnight of the intention to terminate# The servant is 
then entitled to hi© or her month’s wago©#^ *  ^ It ©aem© to 
be very doubtful whether auoh a custom waa ever accepted 
as being applicable in 800timid also#
In other oases# the length of notice may be settled
by local custom or by usage of trade or perhaps also by
1 Aregulation© within a particular sotabliohment* Where
cuetom ia pleaded It must be p r o v e d Quite often# 
particular© aa to the length of notice required and other 
general condition© and regulation© affecting the employa- 
ment may bo exhibited in the factory or works premloeo or 
they may be contained In a written or printed form which 
the workman must elgm or which must be brought to the 
attention of the employee© in aomo other way#^® This 
practice is Indeed allowed for in the first United 
Kingdom statute which provides for a statutory notice
i, 1855, 17 B. 798 per L.J»0, Uope
at page a01«
19. m m ' r *  m w m ,  [iGSQ] 1 q.®. m .
20. m g a m  V. pp.. 1850, 13 ». 201 g
period# namely the Oontraote of %nployment Aot# 1963#
Palling determination of the length of notice toy any 
of the methoda toofor© mentioned# the rule ie that the 
length of notice mmet toe reasonable in the olroumatanocG* 
fhio really meamo that am employee le to too permitted am 
adequate apace of time In which to aeok another appoint*» 
mont or the master am opportunity of rccruitimg a replace*»
pp
meat employee#"'
The modern oaeea still raaimtain the same prime 1 pie of 
the teat of reaaonatolemeaa - for example# In Wjjjjgn v. 
Anthony a " a period of four week© wa© considered roa©on«* 
able in the oeoe of the assistant manages?©©© of an hotel# 
Of eouracç tlieee illuatratioEB from the oommon law casoa 
will mow loeo much of their value as guides to employer© 
and employees when the statutory provisions introduced toy
0/Î
the Oontraot© of IMployment Act® 1963# toeoomo operative#^ '''
.English caooa have also followed a pattern which
is very similar to the Boottiah case© for example#
three months was reaaonatol© motio© for a olerk^^ or
21* See eootioa 1# This Act came Into operation on 6th 
July# 1964#
22# Borne of the older caoee give ©omie helpful guidancG on
(lb days not auffioxent for a nmmpaper editor) $ Mq^ *riBon 
V, Ab@me*w ,.8oHool.,Jii>aM. 1876, 3 », 945 (3 raoBtlia i'or a
V# Baillie, 1885 22 8#&#R# 59S (3 months for an estate 
ï,ao1;o£>)5 Xifeat ■w'. XfJ l â S â J M œ S S à . Ja»t ^83, j 0. is £,
17 (one month xor a telegraph company olerk on £135 p#a;
V. nmms3&,SmWL8$giœ.,Mâ., i905, 13 sag
(and the aarno princriple of reaemmbleneae as a test wae 
a d p p 1 s e a _ iB  W l i a o n  V ,  â a tlœ . W J  8 . 1 , . ® .  (Sh.Ot.) 13; (1957) 
/3 fcà.Uxj.Eep. 2Q8 ag ia saeatloàcd Imfra).
23. 1950 8,1,.$. (sa.ot.) 138 <19S7TTf"Sii.0t.Bep. 298.
o A
commeroial travellerg ' twelve moBth© for the editor of
07
a major nowapaper;"" three month© for the editor of a
O K\ f) fV
minor newspaperg eix months for a euh-odltor^ and
'am
foreign oorreopoMTOtji whilst an ordinary jouruaiist 
might reaoonahly expect one month’s notice* The chief 
officer of an oo©an^*goteg passenger might# however, 
require twelve months ’ notice*
Where IneufficieEt notice ia given this oaamot 
operate to avoid the principle of tacit relooètlonp 
hecEiiso such notice ie completely worthless and might ae 
well not have boon glvm at all#"''
Again# whore oervice is during mutual pleasure and 
inauffioiont notice ia given# the employee’s al.aim ia 
for wage© (and board wages# if appropriate) In lieu of 
notice# not a claim for damages* If a claim is made on 
the basis of damages it ie relevant to aver what the 
©arising© were in the pre\^ ‘iouo employment in order to 
assist the Ooiirt In reaching a proper assessment of 
ûmrngm^^'^
24« The statute became operative from 6th July# 1964#
25, fo||Il V. , (1067), 16
2 6 f » ® â S  V. m m  (1854) 9 m. 518: 23 D.J, & ,  130»
,/r& ^  ^  .. . .. h. _!*J   ^  ^  ^ A  fV . _ 4 . ... . . . .  •j*’^  f *"* »-*i fc**i ^  ^  f  f  X  t  W
(igilTT'M T . w i r f K
28. V. m a â g U U â  (1896), , 13 S.E.H. 71.
iMite4ii-a ?. Ifjaaoj,! (isga) » t.l.r. 29430. lem  V. m $ m  O-egs), 0 t m , 35a
42.
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It has been argued that a eoirvimt who aocopts wage© 
miâ departs quietly upon his dlamiaeel without notice at
the termination of the oontraot waives any claim which
‘34may be open to him baaed upon the inadéquats notice® ‘
Buck waiver la never to he readily inferred» Although an 
employed is obliged to leave quietly (though he lo un*» 
justifiably dismioaed) he ia under no duty to intimate a 
claim for damagee or oompeneatioB* It is quite us; cl os B to 
plead acqui080once and then to attempt to support it by 
saying that the employee left without protest or intima*» 
tlon of a claim*
Tacit H..0loeatioB8^
By reference to the law of Loaaea# the Institutional 
writ era define"^ tacit relocation ao a presumption In the 
HKlnda of both parties to continue the leaae# by mutual 
coneont# upon the aarno terme and condltiona as prevlouely# 
This same principle io adopted and applied within the 
Blaster and servant relationship and it eeta up am implied 
contract to continu© that relationship* If either party 
relies upon a different agreement then the implied
34* lêisâ V. Dorn 17?9„ 5 B.S. 514; and 1779, H. 9182.
35. m m  T. M i s s »  W 4 ,  1 a. 352.
56. Sfje Stai?/ 2,9,22; Bankton 2»9,33!! Erskiae 2,6,350 
Bell's prlnoiples 0* 1265» see also Reilsoa v, Hosaoafl
13 (H.®.) erpsr&ra m^Sn-at
page 54«
aontraot would ho inapplicable# whi3.at a roferonoe to 
mow torae# mot oomtaimod im the orlgimal agreement# would 
mean that the party who ollegee the existence of these new 
terms would have to prove thm#^^
This preoumptlon of tacit rolooatlon may also he 
based upon a lack of due notice or timeoue warning of tho 
telimination of the contract feeing given# That io to eay# 
the operative date for the giving of effective notice has 
paeeed and partiee still continue to stand in the relation* 
ship of master and servant#^® However# the principle of 
tacit relocation cannot fee applied to those contracta 
which do not require any form of notice or other warning 
to bring them to a oonoluelon$
The Lennox oaoe apooara to indicate that there are 
three important elements in relation to the probable 
application of the principle of tacit relocation# where 
there has feeen a lack of notice# These elements ares*»
(a) a written contract# (b) a servant of the artisan olaoo 
and (e) an unusual duration*
As regards element (a)# the fcrxa of the original
3p y* loae, le »• lo.
30. m m  V. jOiajggft, laa. 13 soot.jm% geo.
,v9o See Ersk« S*6«36t Bell'© Brlnoinles s. 173» Mirâ v.
Tl'7 38?
Honoreill In Lennox’0 case (see particularly nage 40 of 
the reporv) being most instructive*
41* Bee footnote number 40«
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Qontr©.ot may bo iai writing or toe made oradlyi the 
ular form’dooe mot affect tacit rolooation*
In the case of element (to)# the rale eomm to toe 
that the dootrine applies only'In those eases where a 
wamlBg is neooeeary*
So far SB element (n) is ooBoerned# it would appear 
that tacit relocation may follow upon a' ooatraet for any' 
length of time# tout not when either the duration or any 
of the other conditions are of am 'unusual character In 
the class of employment# In which case' the contract will 
oomeluêe at the time mentioned# without need for any
â 9notice whataoovoro
The legal effect of tacit relocation is that all the 
Btipulations and oonclitions of the original coniecaet 
remain in force# so far as those are not inoonBiatCTt
ê ’3with any implied tom of the renewed contract $ ' But 
where oorvioo is continued at different wages# or in a 
different charaotor, it eaamot too ascribed to tacit ro‘- 
location*Such 1© iMeecl the creation of am entirely
new contract*
The duration of the renewod contract may differ from 
that of the original one# though generally It will toe the
4th I-'efe, 1013,
43. leiltan V. • J|?0|l Jo,., 8 # .  smSÊ.0 58%" 'LOKÏ
'rfataon, J10.C. oil;.»
44. Bssa: V. aigllshs&sl, 1863, 4- Iry. 461.
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oame fox* oxomplo# am agricuî/uirral ox* domoetio employer 
omgagad for a year or for six moatha will# by taoit 
relooation# oontinuo for a further year or for six months#
ê 0a© the case may be*
Tacit roXoeation can omXy apply where the parties to 
the mew Implied eomtraot are the same as those who eritereci
into the original agreement* There can be no tacit
46location with a n m  master*
ÈmMâ.
We have already considerod the question of the 
normal duration of the oontraot of service and the 
normal method by which it is terminated* However# it 
may well happen (ami indeed it very often does happen) 
that the relationship is terminated in a manner other 
then that contemplated originally by the parties o#g* 
death# illness or some other unforeseen event* Sometimes 
the happening may amount to a breach of contract by one 
or other party# Sometimes neither may be at fault* It
8 :  f i ^ ' ' 2 ® | S i É f S ô i f f ' s ! S ’p. J7S, 1902.10
Bail*!’* p* 195f end Houston v* Calico Printers’ Association 
190^0 10 B*L*T* p* 5j^ 2; and see also the oWerva%ons of
doctrine of tacit relocation.
lo mecoaaary to examine oortain of tiaooo methods which 
a%*o moot commonly mot with* Aooordingly# we muat look at 
termination fey death# inaolvonoy# dissolution of firm or 
company# diamlBoal of employee# lllncoo# marriage of 
employee# Impriaonme^ it of the employee ami ttmnlnatlon fey 
the Court* Before examining each of these in turn# it ia 
eaaeiitial to ©one id or# very briefly# termination fey lapse 
of time and fey eoaaont*
Expiry of time 3*^ Where partie® have agreed exnreeely 
that the contractual relationship of master and servant 
ie to Gxiet for a definite period of time there i© no 
doubt that the relationship continues in feeing for that 
time end the contract expires at the conclueion of the 
agreed period* The contract may fee replaced fey s. new 
agreement oxproaaly miulo or fey an implied contract eet 
up fey tacit relocation* Where the contract la not in 
express terms# the Court will consider the presumed 
Intention of partice and as aids to ascertaining this 
intention they will consider custom of the particular 
trade or of the particular locality* Where notice has 
to fee given to.terminate a particular contract then this 
should always fee done# otherwise (as tee boon explained 
in the preceding paragraph) tacit relocation may apply 
to continue the contract for a further period correspond'" 
Ing with tho original contract*
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Goneoaiss-» Sixa coatx'ao't; raa.y allao lie •bei'fflinated, to the
fôOBBont of pavtlee# whether axpreasily or alternatively
impliedly from tho modes In which they behave towards eaali
é 7Other*' Where an employer la told that hie servant 
intends to leave and thereupon he acte Ira smoh manner ae 
to indioate an aaeent to the servant*b departure then he 
is held to have given an Implied oonsoat*^^
One© the servant intimates M a  reeignation and this 
is acciopted by his employer# ho may be dismiaaed (and he 
has no claim for damages)# oven although he attempted to 
retract his resignation shortly after making
Beatl:u^ »* Death of either party dissolves the eoHtraatual 
relationship of master and servant* Death never operatoe 
a© a breach of contraot. It is a factual oireumstanoe 
which prevemte the due performance of the eontraoto^^ The 
executors of a deeeased servant are able to recover from 
Ilia employers the proportion of ivagea for the time he had 
served from the last payment of wages until the date of 
death* Where the servant had boen employed on piece*» 
V/ork$ the master’s liability la to pay for so muoli of the
47. .ligrgugga V. ElMmÊM.0 ttHfle’s 2)aeia, 21 (1015);
M M m m  V» ÎMM^Ê l SSj  ^Biîsne's Beois, 20 (1800).
48* Bee Boyle v. Barker# quoted by the learned editor of,, tf5»rrtrïi4sWrvvi-<3i*® fS-it-aa^^Strtaiiciy^n-irkrA^ts» ^  * 1 X  t  ^
Fraser on «Master mxl Servant” (5rd Mn# ) at p. 316«
# .  m s s .  V. • o & n )  127.
30. m m  V. B i M m h  5 «. eu.
bit, ,ur8kim@ 3,3,16» Bell's J-rineiplos, 0, 179<>
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work ao has been done * With the developing popularity of 
peneion-eoiiemea in the paot twenty yeare or ao# It should 
not be forgotten that there may be also be payable (not 
only to office staff but also to word-tmen on the maohino- 
shop floor) a lump sum payment lato the estate repreaeat­
ing the proceeds of a life aeauranoe policy on the 
employee®© life# ae well as a refund of contributions 
made to the fund during life* If the partiouiar peaeion 
sohome is approved by the Inland île venue Authorities# 
these payments would normally be free from liability for 
estate duty*
Where an employee was In oooupatlon of a dwelling- 
house (Imown In modem parlance as a «tied” house) by 
virtue of his employment # them upon his death the right
Kp
Of acoupaney terminate©*"^ " and the employer may re^-pooeoB© 
the house# '
Upon the master’s death the liability to pay wages 
does not neoeaaarily cease and any wages incurred become
a competent charge against the estate# e*g# if a domeotio 
or other servant la hired for a term ho or she continues 
in the service of the family imtll the following term or 
perhaps the next term after that if death occurred within 
the notice period and no notice of termination had
32« Boe particularly Bmibar^e fro# v# Bruce# I9OO 3 F*
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aotually toe cm glvem* Any prior diomiosal of the employ*^  
00 would give him a right to claim wagee from the eotate 
(and alee board wage©# if appropriate)* However# the 
employee cannot sit toaok thereafter and do nothing «• he 
muot seek another ©itiMtion# ao bb to minimise tho loos* 
Wages earned in hie new situation are taken into aooount 
in computing the liability ot his late employer’s estate 
for outatamliBg wages and maintenanoe#
Where a domoatio employee haa been hired for a year# 
instead of a half**yoarly terra# it would appear that aha io 
able to claim maintenance until tho end of that year
Ç . j f î
should her master die within the yearly period*
la all other eaoes# provided the hiring period io 
definite* the earns prineiplo ia applied* When wages 
acsorue periodically the employee become© entitled to 
wages for. the whole period current at death#
It 8seme that if the repreocmtativee of the deooaoed 
employer make an offer to employ tho servant until the 
completion of the term at the earn© work and at the same 
rate of wages this would be a good defence to a claim for
wages for the toalaBce of tho term# This is simply
54» Ms.g: IlllEflâ*! 1867, 5 M, 814 per Lord Deas at page
Bid*
55« Boll’s Pz-inoipleB s# 186; ’Fraser Master end Servant 
(3rd Edition) page 145$ and Shcnherd v# Maldrum* 1612*
limne #
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another applioation of the general rule that the employoo 
caniiDt sit back and do nothing#
In those oases where tho eervloo ie during ploaaure# 
it would appear that the employer’s death la equivalent to 
notice and accordingly if the eervant continues to eerva 
hie late employer^a ropresentativoa or ouacosBora then it 
may well fee that a new contract of aerviea ia implied^
The terms of this new contract of eervlee will fall to be 
deduced from the actings of tho parties themselves*
Gommoii law gave to certain oIbbsoo of aervant# on the 
master’s death* a certain preference for wages# 
the executor was entitled to pay them within the six 
months period after death* without oorietitutlon of tho 
debt* Aocïording to Boll# tho effect of this was that 
If the master died insolvent the servant’s wages are 
privileged am upon his bankruptey, the date of death being 
Bubatrltuteci for that of bemkru,ptoy*.
iMaMm!.!j3,'Iagc^§M2^ Basiteuptey of the
employer terminates the contract of service with each 
employee# even although it is Involuntary*. She ground of 
termination is that; the bankruptcy hue constituted a bread 
of contract* - Clorisaqucmtly# the employee ie now entitled
60* Bee Ump-heratou - Master and Servant at page #2$
61* Stair 5#B#64&72| Brmkine 3*9*43§ Bell’s Prinoiplee
So 14041 Coiflmeatariea il 149#
6fe Principles -'-a# 186*
65a Ball’s BrinoipXea a# 165; v# -790,
M# 15# 990g V# 1667* 5 M, 814 p w  Lord Presld»"
m t  IngliB; 'v# glCgir'T^ bO# 3 8*L#T# page 40#
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to a claim in daiaagea for the breach - it is not a claim 
for mxgm in respect of the balance period of the
contract
In the ease of the limited oompany there ia authority 
for the principle that am order for it© winding-up or 
liquidation (1*0, a oompuloory order) amount© to eon«- 
Btruotlve notioe to all employeee# with the rcoult that 
they may leave at once# they meed mot remain after notioe* 
BEleeo the employer io able to pay full wage© during the 
period of notice,
Where the liquidation or ^vlndimg-up ia vg^untarg it 
seeme that the Résolut Ion to wlnd'-up has a olmllor effect 
1,0. it operates m  a eonatruotlvo n o t l o o , A a  regard© 
the operative data* the better opinion seeme to too that 
thl© is the date of publication of the "Gagatte” (London 
or Bdlalmrgh) notice and not the date of the %'eeolutlom 
iteelf^
The mum which the employee rooeivee ie an amount 
representing vmgm in lieu of notice. It sooms that the 
Englieh lawyer© regard the payment ae damage© aa for a
oaae 1866# L.R, 1 
3¥6; toimg v,
m a m  u w r m - E T u f T j :  # i /  —
66, The authority cm this lo mainly Jkigliali ^ vide
1872 14 %. 417J ex parte nsHbmsm 1887 
19 I,.E* 240 io also helpful,
67. via@ ~ iQGs, i sq.
wrongful dlomlGGAl# It io always open to the liquidator 
and the employees to waive the notice, b o long as it io 
quite clear what their intentions are, l#o# there must be
a clear and unmiotakeable oonooiisiia to v/aive the notice
file liquidator may convert the eonstruotive notioo
Into actual notice « and it eeeme that ho might then he
entitled to obtain from the employee his normal aervloe
imtll the îiotiee period expires, so long as he can pay the
oorreot rate of wages and Biake available the right typo of
work to the employ
It will bo appreciated that the decisions point
towards the aseertalmaemt ao a question of fact, in eases
whore the liquidator aontinueo the buslnoso and employoea
ooBtimie to serve, whether there haa bean a novation (so
that the omployees are working under a new eontraot) or
whether the employees are continuing to complete the
period under the original ooatraot, whloh la now defined
VOby the applicatlorn of the eonstractive notioo.
When bankruptcy or liquidation arises the employees 
have certain privileges or preferenoco, both at common
lav; and by statute* It Is noooaeary to pay a word or two 
about each*
69, Per Lord StoriBOttt& »ajpl-ia« in Day vTlSaiVolt. ounna,
70. » M  V, 5#t a M  MaoDowa3:l»^d5Volt,8^b"^e aIao“ 
MsM. V* Mfil2S|2MJ!a*JE!H* 3-8Q7» 19 Q.B.D. 264; and m
i ^ i a s  loêï» 3 %. 34i.
At ooiiimoH law, a preferenoo or privilege la given
71for the termie wages (but not inolutiing board)* This
relates to wages for the term current.at.the maoter
death or bankruptcy irreepeotive of whether the .
7Pbe a year or half*»year or aome other pariocl*^ " Mow, the
important point io that this privilege ariaeg only to the
7'4domestic and agricultural ecrvaat* Perhaps the most 
interesting feature about it, however Is that it io not 
simply applicable to oorvants token on at Whitsunday or 
Martinmas or to those engaged in regular employment * It 
also covers casual servants (of the classes stipulated), 
taken on at irregular times end for short periods, so long 
BB they are in employment at the date of death or bank^ « 
ruptey*
It may9 of course, be a very difficult point to 
decide as to who le a domestic and who Is an agricultural 
eervant* (There io no hard and faat rule or preoioo legal 
formula for rarriving at a deaiaion* Bomo of the older 
cases give some help in this m a t t e r , T h e  Oourt may 
71* Belize Principles a, 186*
72* Belize Principles d b* IBS, 1404g Brokino 3,9,45; Btair 
3,B,64,72§ Bell’e Gommentaries il 149; B^mkton 1,2,55*
7 !5 ,  3383L3L * %; 3>a»dLnc:l%)3LG%) S ), i f .  3>%i3L3L]p SLESSZB (5 E%,
1515 ; l^ areises? «. Mhaibea? Gincl "
'M' Mell&SSi '»"• lâJüSâSa 1604 Mor. vool "Pi?lvat8 Debt*,
Appencli:^ x 11,
75o See Mglvlg. v. 1779 Mor, 11, 853 ("oGTV^^ta
k@pt ios? the poxpoe&B of tJao"fmm" were privileged); White 
V» Ghz'âEitle 1761, Mor» 11, 893 (sorvsatEp ’ on the farm 
en^ yrtied vo privilege; othoœ employed in the trade of
_ g . ,  •  jff tk ^  t grçT'JFî.TAWi.-W^ïTiTariJ^lfr-. *4
n m # % *  « W »  pasa (tewar’B miastoenj; v.
1637, 19 B, lOSTBlryealter * o olerl
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tend to take a liberal view where the servant performe a 
76dual task,
The term for which the wages are preferred is that 
current at the date of death or hcmlcruptoy aa the oaae may 
be. It haa been held (in the Sheriff Court} that the term 
^^ bankruptoy" as used here does mot necessarily mean or 
refer to either séquestration -or notour bankruptcy but may
77mean insolvency and stoppage of payment,'^ Aecordimgly, 
the privilege arising at that date ie mrb loot by expiry 
of the term of service before ooquoQtratiom,
It mow remain© to conaldar, briefly, the position by 
statute law,
The matter warn initially dealt with by the Bankruptcy
(Scotland) Act 1B56, section 122 and thereafter by the
Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1875# section 3# talcen in oon^
junction with tho Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Act#
1888, This la©i;»«mentiomad statute oeem© to have been
basically an English statute# but there io quite a ©tz'ongla
hold view that it may also have bean applicable to 
7CiScotland# fhe statutory position In modern law la to be
r i  '  * - U U t . î , l A  V #  _________   , . . . . _ ..........
Cî*fll#«iiWrwii,4fi4y43<>^r45*i?76. .2i.g. 4a M l M m . M M m M M  1832» 10 S. 817, where an 
employee waa engaged as .a gardener but also did some agrm^ 
oulture&l dutlaa the privilege wao extended to him# The 
question of whether a gardener was a domestic servant or 
not was reserved# On this point the lord Proaident (Hope) 
was men-^oommital #.
%  99.
/9# bee umpheraton Master and Servant pp# 100^101 and# ix 
particular# the cas00 cited at footnotes numborQ 5 and 6 tc 
page 100#
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found Im the Bamkmiptcy (Seotland) âot© 1913 and tho 
Oompanieo Act# 1948# The relevant prevision© of these 
statutes may be eummarloed, teiefly# thmn^
In the Banteuptey (Bootlanâ) Act# 1913# eeotion 118 
doale opeoifioally with proferemtlal payments * A priority 
1b created over all other debts in respect of %«*
(a) All poor or other local ratee and land tax 
property tax inaome tax for a period of 
twelve monthe prior to the oegueetratlon date#
(b) All wage© or ©alary of any clerk or oorvant in 
roapect of aarvloe remdared to tho bankrupt 
during four months before the data of the
Boqueetration award, not oxooeding a sum of £50 
to any one clerk or servant#
(o) All wages of any workman or labourer not oxooed^ 
Img £25 to any one wortoen or labourer# whether 
payable for time or pl6ee*"Work, in respect of 
servi#es rendered to the bankrupt during two 
month© before tho said date of sequestration#
In addition to the above, national Insurance (Indus 
rial Injuries) employer*© aoiitributiono for a twelve 
months* period, as well us eontrilmtiono as am employer 
or employe0 under the Mational Inouremoe Acts, v;ore to b© 
regarded ae preferential# All of the foregoing were to 
rank equally among themeelveo and were to be paid in full, 
unless the asaete were insufficient to moot thorn, in which
HX6
BOûBBQ thay were to abate In equal proportion©*
In the 00.00 of tho company employer going into • 
liquidation, the rolcmmt eootlon io a action 319 of the 
Oompaniee lot# 1948* This aection follow© broadly the 
pattern of eeotion 118 of the Banteuptcy (Bootland) Aot, 
1913, Briefly# section 319 oroat08 a priority for pay« 
meat of the following debtos#*
(a) Bate© amd taxoe (e#g* local rates, land tax, 
imoome tax, profits tax# purchase tax)#
(b) All wages or salary of any cleric or servant 
during the 4 months prior to the relevant date 
(appolntment of provisional liquidator or of 
winding^^up order in a compulsory wiadlng^up; 
otherwise the date of paealng of the résolution 
for the wiMing^^up) and all wages of any work^ 
man or labourer in reepaot of oorviooo rendered 
for a like period#
In addition, any aim ordered to be paid under the 
Boimat&rbememt in Civil Employmmit Aet 1944 or aoorued 
holiday pay# national health inouranoe end .Industrial 
Injuries oomtributions. of the employer (for tho twelve
80* Section 1X8 was amemdod gemerally by tho Batioital 
8orVice Act# 194B (11 & 12 Geo, 6, cap, 64 a, 56(b)) cm 
a question of compensation; and s, 118(l) was oxtended 
by# ilMlSS the Reinstatement in Civil %nploymcmt
Act#"X§44 Vi à 8 Ocoo 6 0, 15 o,21)# again cm the 
question of a compensation payment,
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month© prior period), workmen*8 oompenaation-payments and
81the like mueit aleo be given a preferential treatment #
All of the foregoing debto are again to rank equally 
amongst thornselves and to be paid in full# unless the 
asaete are imeuff1elont# In which eaee they are to abate 
in equal proportions* There la a special exception under 
sub^aeotlon (9) of section 319 where the relevant date 
defined :ln mib*^BGotion (7) of. aeotlon 264 of the 
Oompaniee Aot* 1929.ocourred before the oommenoemont of 
the 1940 Aot*®®
The definitions of the terms "clerks and shopmen 
and servants" end "workmon" contained in the aforemention­
ed 3.875 Act and of the terms "olorlc or servant ",
"laboi%ror or workman" and "labourer in husbandry" eon*"' 
tain at in the 1888 Act# beforoBiontioned# Imci oooasioiied - 
pa37tlcularly in the case of the later statute some 
oonoidemtion and 3.1tigàtlon,^ *^^  This matter became of 
little or no importance with the passing of the BaïÆ:ruptoj 
(Scotland) Act 1913, as section 118(6) makes It clear
61# But the limit applied le £200 for each claimant under 
paras * (a) to (g) of aoetion 319(1) -> see particularly 
section 319(2) on tMa point,
824 Section 219 vms amended by the finance Act, 1952 (15 
à 16 Geo# 6 and 1 2 a#33) section 30, \^Moh added
the employer*8 tax liability for a twelve months period
as a prior debt; end also by the OoBipanieo (floating 
Charges) (Scotland) Act# 1961*
83# Boo ÏÏmphoMtOB, op# cit.# pages 3.01-102 and cases
a A »  .  a7r*6Stfÿ **C2iOti@Ete9
'#ere cinod*
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that the frefarential Paymomts i n  Baakruptoy Act# 1880 
was mot to apply to Scotland and, moreover, referonaoB to 
that Act or to oaetlOB 3 of the Damkrmptoy (Sootland) Act 
1875 wore to to© read and oomotrued# a© regarda Scotland, 
aa referomcee to aeotlom 118 of the 1913 Act#
There ia authority in am old caaa^^ that the prefer-^  
enee of tho f © r v a n t *8 wagoe prevailed over the land** 
lord*8 hypothec for ven t* The textwritera tend to favour
QK AK
this View# Hr* Umpharaton oxplaine that th o decisions 
in the Sheriff Oourt are contradictory and Court of 
Seaalorn authority io lacking, tout nevertheleso there wa© 
a teadomoy to prefer Bucli a type of debt ae aervamt * o 
wage©# This tendency aeema to have prevailed into modern 
lav/# ao the writer hao toeon imatole to find any authority 
which go©8 directly against it*
Dissolution of firms** Hr# IMpheraton ©ays^^ that where a 
contraot of service Is entered Into tootweem a person and a 
firm, in the firm name# the contract is v/ith the firm and 
mot with the individual partners * A dissolution of the 
firm Involves the employees In no otollgatione towards the 
partners as such* The foregoing statement must Immediate];
%» 99th Jufee 1819 P.O.
B9* Praser# og* .SlJl»» pp#. 148*^ .30§ see also Coudy on 
r up toy; Hanlclne on^easce; and Burnt er ** landlord and Tenen 
86# tomphoraton ** o^# page 103 ami footnote (6)
thereto o  '
87" âE« Sit» 98»
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toe qualified by the eommemt tliat it cannot bo aooeptod in 
absolute temm^
If dissolution odours booause of the death of one 
partner the oontraot does not oubeiet against the re*-
maiming There lo no breach of contraat - and
tho parties^  right© are doterminod in the eame way as 
upon the masterdeath#
The firm may be diaeolvocl for other reasons e.g. 
retirai of old partners a M  the aoausaptlOE of mew omea # 
But’ this i© mot quite the same situation as tho death of 
a partner# Cortaimly eaoli oaso does involve the disaol-^  
utlom of am ©Kiatimg firm and the creation of a mew firm 
Cio0  ^Bubotltutlmg one persona for another) # If# however, 
the alteration doeo not prevent the partioe to the oon^ - 
tract of service from performing their respective duties 
to one another then the ,â©ljpgtuB .pergonae element is not 
affected to any etppreeiable extent# Toolmlcally and 
theoretically, there may well be a oomtraetual breach but 
there will bo no real foundation for anyone leaving the 
service and claiming damages# although in certain 
cirousiBtamoes the employe© might lie able to claim from
80» m m  y* ise?. s m . ei4j & s s e  v .
â t m U & s â  AÔ61, 6 a. & a. b75>.
89. m m  V» sM» s m â »  „ ,
90, Bee v. iZSÜfâ-âJES.» » 3.785» 3 fat.âpp. 42 (mi 
apprentlooGhip IMomture) ; but oompare Brace v# Calder# 
[1895] 2 Q#B# 253; ef* Hobson v# DrummomZriagl# W'Wr & A# 
3Uj>S and aoo also iiord ÊPmronHi remarks in BovIIJb
M s M s L M J ^ m m s m .  m # m s »  3.903 e p. isi;
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retiring partners a giiarautae ox* indemnity against any 
lO0© arising from the ehaageâ situation. In one oaoo 
two new partners ware taken on by defender (Smith), whom 
the pursuer (Harkins) had agreed to serve for a period o: 
five y oar a as wo3?ke manager# during the subs 1st one e of the 
eontraot of aervioe. Pursuer left the serviee and claimed 
the balance of salary for the remainder of the term, 
baaing hie claim upon the ground that tho Introduction of 
tv/o new partner© constituted a breach of contract# The 
Court held that defender had not committed any broach 
which would have allowed pursuer to leave and claim 
damages# Had defender left the business altogether or 
transferred this to the two new partners themselves then 
this would have boon quite a different matter®"^  because# 
the defender would then have boon unable to perform the 
obligations which he had undertaken towards the pursuer# 
Tho point decided by the Harkins v. Biiiith ease was
^  lr'î^«PS:*?jw£îr'»CT.*>
that an artisan employee Is not able to sue his master in 
breach of contract upon the ground that his master had 
assumed partners into the business#®^ Mr# ümphereton 
suggests®*^ that probably the more correct ground for the
QoBo 255,
i: l i Æ S i  Ss4,”S t . “ S:
94* Bée tho Bord Ordinary^a opinions "##♦artisan servants 
$*#arc not warranted by law in holding that their masters 
violate their contract#•#by the mere act of introducing a 
n o w  p a r t n e r " «
95. M *  sââ»» pas® 94.
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decision would have been that, allowing that a technical
breach had occurred# the servant was not. entitled to leave 
the sorviceami claim damages# A great deal will depend, 
of course, upon the personal relationship between the 
particular employées aztd their employers#
Employee's cllsmisüaJ,g-- Here the contractual relationship
M ixy™ fcTika«»c7*b iKm *rr;*scirjiiW M tt-»»ew uw »i4.™ <Ka->IBK '« l»rW icsi * '
is being terminated by the master before It has rum its 
full course* It is accepted# of course# that the master 
ie entitled to dismiss the employee at any time, upon 
payment of wages to the end of the particular term (and a 
sum will be included for board wages# If appropriate)*
Mr* Umpheraton takes the view that the servant has a 
correlative right to leave at any time upon payment of
Û7
damages'^ ' and it seems that these rights on either aid© 
distinguish the master and servant relationship from one 
which la purely that of slave labour*
It has been the guiding principle of Scottish (and • 
English) law for many many years that the courts will not 
order or enforce the specific Implement of a personal 
contract between■froe parties«
Dismissal becomes unjustifiable when it occurs with­
out payment of wages and without good cauoe*^^
It Is necessary, therefore# to look at the quality
tr7!Mw'7fitaw^«<.7M!aw«vstTTw«îvc!rnîW!Tÿ7Èamifc‘.c^cîT!«w.«»^ïW fii«eM**H£!*st™ irjï!if)!«ss.sw!«.-*w«!Ji"fcSiwc>«-n«aarf7,wï*^
% , j s i M s  V. m g m m  xagg, i s. as?; m m r n  v. M l M s
1885, 22 595»
97* &m» JM* peg® 104. 
g* herd Kinncar*s observations on "malice" In tho case of
  .        ,.   ,^... ...       B
action was diamisoed ae irrelevant *.
and character of the dlamlBoal to decide whether it is
lawful or not*
It la aaaential to remember that In all those oasea 
lAileh are being aoneIdored under this heading the wages 
will not have been paid for the tmexplred portion of the 
term (Woaimo, obvioualy, If wages in lieu of notice had 
boon paid mo question could arise aa to the legality or 
otherwise of tho dlemieaal)^
Where the parti ©a have 'been involved In aome heated 
argument (or indeed even without this) it may be clifficult 
to determine whether the employee was dlemleeed or whether 
he departed Vûlmtarily* The question ie one of 
The master may# by M a  actings# allow a vservant to stay cm 
and sometime thereafter attempt to cilemieB him or replaoo 
him# but he (the master) may then be quite imjustified im 
00 doing*
If the oontraot Itself oomtalno speciflo oonditiono 
as to its terminâtloa thorn the sole test la eompliamee
o
with the aoaditloK contalBed ia the agroesjeat.'' Ho
(pestion of jlustifishllity ean a,rise sad no roaoon aeefls
%
to be given for the dismissalIo motion im damages 
for wrongous diamlasal will lie in euoh a oaec* But the
ooncllticma stipulated ira tlio agreement of parties do not
99* Bee ‘Umphereton# page 100 and caoos cited at
footnote mmber one *
428;
i8a9;'Tiu'¥"'rr'4506 MTiiiir*?;"'siitE"i78f6» 14 s. 5505
______
Smith oit«
ia»^j£ï:#v®/A^îïvi:h-3ïïfe« Uly-'W'.jj-crcW'
conflict iîi ai3j roapoot with the master^a ordlaary right 
of (llamiSBal for loisoonduct^ or other cause (which is
hereinafter examined)
Although diamisBal may too Justified it need not 
operate Immediately* It may ©uit the master (and perhaps 
also tho servant) to allow tho servant to work to a time 
notice (which ia quite apart from and should not toe 
oonfusod with the length of notice which would have 
operated had the contract been fully performed) and the 
servant will reçoive wages for the period during which lie 
has worked*" There ia# of course# no duty or obligation 
on either side to make or accept this arrangement#
When dismissal operates (whether Justifiai)!© or not) 
the servant is obliged 'to leave quietly# He has no right 
to say that he can stay on# placing this plea upon an 
alleged illegal dismissalAt the same time# if he is in 
Oücupatlon of a dwollinghouso ||ua servant then ho must 
give this up too, aa has been pointed out earlier on In 
this chapter toy reforence to the ailed "tied" house*
He must also hand back or assign (where appropriate) to the
3# continued#
QiiPiSS «S.p4iSll V. 1805, 28 S.L.H, 595( &2KLg% V.
,xs96, 15 sh,o-e.Bop. 71» m m a x  v, 
#mLA&3rm..aMM&K.â9.AWjE xsoi, 4 y* 34.
4. fee m m â  r> m m m  a s, 1010.
b# Thomson ¥♦ Stewax'*t IBBS^ 15 H« 806; Soott v# M^Murdo 
1B09# 6 S#h#R# 301#
6# Boss V# Pender 1874 1 lU 352| First IMinburgh etc## .
-jUâtoL-Saslœ V. # # m  xa84, .2% s.ït.b,' 291.
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master any property or rights therein# aoqulrod during tho 
7service*
Whom a 8ervent ia illegally iiemiesed he does not
have to make a reservation of lale claim or intimate to the
8master that he does not aoquioBoe* ' Hie claim against the 
maetar ie reserved by the law, where he departs quietly in 
eompllemee with that obligation ao to do#
Tho Important question now to be ooBBidored is 
whether the diemioeal ie Juatified or not# The master can 
dismiss the employee (that is-to aay, without paying wages 
for an unexpired period) only when the latter Ime committed 
a breach of contract and then, of course, the dismissal is 
legal# If the dismissal ia illegal# the master himself is 
in breach of ocmtraot#
Those actings which Involve dlemlaaal of an employeo
have been classified aa "moral misconduct, either pecuniar;
o
or otherwise# wilful dleobodlonce or habitual neglect"#'^
It ia perhaps more convenient to oxamino them (ae Hr#
1 (1lîiüphQrston does"* ) imdar tho foXXov/ing divisions^ vl0s 
P  V. xa?? 4 s. 462; see also
^«&lLJiL¥lmWi,gaaxiSt^ V. insgiii 1902, 9 ?. r?.
a« jiaiifi ..@11» m e m ;  ÈMEÉ '^» M s  3-779, s b .s .
10» page 3.08,'
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(i) MaobedieBOô and want of respect;
(il) Dlahoneoty, drunke%me$B, immbordInatIon and
other mis conduct; cmd 
(111) înoompotenoe, general negleot m d  atoeenoc from 
work*
(1) «ae beat @%ampl@
of diootoedlcnoc ie t,te wilful and direct, refusai by the
servant to obey a peremptory and lawful order from tlie
master (or hiB authorised agent) or, alternatively, the
deliberate perfor^maneo by tho aorTOUt of some act MliXoli
tho esBployer (or his authorised agent) has oxpresely
forbiddoii* Oonduot of this partioular type revere ee the
rôle©- of employee and employer# Therefore# ■ it justifies
11the employee * s immediate diomissal#"'"
The Bngllah court© take the view that wilful dia«- 
obedience Justifies dlamlBsal provided that the particular 
order or command given by tho master :la a reasonable one#*^  
In cases other than wilful refusal or deliberate 
dlBObodieaee, the general oiroumatanoea require to be 
looked at rather oar©fully# It may well be that immediate 
dismlaeal wae too harsh a step, to take and that some form 
of reprimand or warning from the master would have met tho 
situation perfectly However# the courte seem to
6 I), 1256 (per L.J,0, Hope at p
3
„ l^ iÆ w r fx > , ( î4 ïp i> w t fc i . .  _  . . . .       
Moa<?s?oiff ) 5 üea also Thomson v. I
prefer not to Interfere with the dioorotion which the
employer has- to disinioB the eorvant - unlees# of course#
the servant was entitled to refuse to obey the particular
order or unless the court was satisfied that the plea of
dioobedienoe was merely used ae a pretext for getting rid
of the servant or unless the master*s act was too harsh
1 Aand oppressive in the circumstances*" ' The modem approaek 
seams to be that if the employer has acted in any manner 
or way which ia contrary to tho oonoopt of "natural 
Justice" then the courts will protect the employee (that
.  1 K
ie# generally, by am award, of damages to the ©mployee)
A master cannot lawfully dismiss a servant for 
refusing to obey an order which the master himself had no 
lawful right to give or an order which the servant was 
entitled to refuse to comply with in the olroumetanoea 
(e*go if the servant were being exposed to personal 
physical danger# quite unlooked for in relation to his
'Interesting# Here his lordship Is dealing with the 
question of "maiioe" (in the sense of ill-will against an 
employee or in the "legal" sense of a wrongful act done 
intentionally without Just cause or excuse - and his 
lordship considers that since Allen v# Flood Infra there 
is no dxlxerenoe) and ©'Grosses vhat an evil motive or 
intention cannot make unlawful that which is otherwise 
lawful and he quotes Lord Watson*e opinion (see p# 27 
in Allen v# Flood L#R# 1898 A#0# at p# 100 in, support*
15# Bee Palmer v# The Inverness Hospitals Board (OoH*)
3 S,L.$, 124.
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normal daily task)* Again# the master may give the order
in Bufih a v/ay that iie displays .little# if any# oonelder*^ **
at ion for the servant# who ia them proTOkecI into refueiiigi
Im a oaae of this latter type the maateze la Imrred from
fomidlmg upon the diaotoedieBoe to the œtesat of imatant
diamlaaaljj^^ though It will ho appreciated that this type
of ease ia œoeptiomal*
The eubaidiary duty upon the employee ia that of
treating hie maetor (either paraomally or through hio
authorised rapreaentativoa) with defo3?emoe rniâ roapeet*
The ideal situation la to have mutual trust and mutual
reapect between maotor and servant* Tho degree of
doferomae ov;csd by servante v/ill vary aeaorclimg to their
olaeso e*g* there io a world of differem.ee botween the
domeatio aorvamt and# eay# tho highly qualified worka
manager of a large shipbuilding or engineering ostabliah-'*
ment* Aooordimgly# tho want of reapoot which vxlll
Justify tho employer in ualng M s  remedy of dieraiaaal
will be a question of olroumetanoeo and dogreo* The
mere ae.nior the employee (i#o# in relation to status mot
time eerved# xiriiinarily) the more ear loua the diBreapoat-
fuX oonduet neecîB to be* Yet# no raaater need tolerate
1 7groae zbmolemoe* Any eomblmatiom of diaobedlenoe ami
3.6. Msi£ T. I P M  1092» 9 SH,Ct« Hop. 341,
17. MfiUM T. OJOM 1895, 12 Sh.Gt.lîepo 246.
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âls»esp8e1;fnl ooBCluot tîouîd be efficient to juotlfy
1 8instant diamisaal*""
It eçeme to be aooepteâ that a maeter will mot ho 
Justified in cliemiBeing a ©erv&mt for ono simple act of 
cliareapoat# eo long as it does not amount to gross insc?!'^- 
once (the teat of this ie always a question of oiroum*^ 
atamees)*^'^
OoBtimied diareepeot x^ ill oertalmly allow the master,# 
In the exsreiae of hie dleoretlon, to dismiss the servant#
Miacondiurl; 3*^-
Miaooncluct justifying dismissal (tho type and degree 
being diffrloult to Judge a M  the oonclusion toeing a very 
marrow one indeed) need not involve actual moral wrongs 
doing# so long as there is a failure in duty toy the 
employee# If the mlsoonduot io prior to the oontraot of 
servi00 coming into existenoe or operation them dlsmlaeal 
is not justified,upon two perfectly good grounds 
(firstly) toooauae the duty eaanot arise until the oontraot 
itself ie made and (secondly) there Is no general duty of
i o 5 o f « 7 i o 6 f x 4 i f î !  i S o l S ’i ü f î  ï;
V. GrloMon» 1847 9 D, I0l2i Spjxl V. EllaMa
1869# b bfihoHo jOio
19, Soe S M Ê m L  V. tefiS£|eM..„EaMS.e|.Jo» 3.835» 3 A„ & ;s.
l.J.Q.B. p ,  T. 3l'T:3T0,P. 15,
i’v, M ê U 9 M m lë78, 38 Ï,»». '3S.
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disclosure om the prospeotlve servant apart from apeeifio 
inquiries*
Whenever the oontraot has been completed end aerviee
has "been entered upon, the misconduct may take place
either during working hours or outwlth them* " In tho
ease of domestic and personal (l*e* family# rather than
business) servante# the accepted principle would seem to
be that dismissal Is Justified by any misconduct which
interferes with the proper dlaoharge of duties or which
disturbs the harmony of the family home or v/hioh adversely
affects the morals of the household•
In the ease of the servant who Is engaged in business
or profession, tho mis conduct necessary to justify dia--
missal would be, again# such as would interfere with the
proper porformamce of duties or rauoh aa would be calculate
0d to injure the business of the maator* It ie most
important to nota that it Is quite enough for the eorw-
duct to be prejudicial or be likely to be prejudicial to
the buslnaes rêputa-tion or bueinase interests of the 
o 0
master#
Any act of dishonesty (for example# theft or 
destruction of the master*© property) Justifies dismissal,
21© liSêâ ,2BHâSS^ lâ 1840# 9 Ors 6; F, 508*
1,0 DOS Ile J&
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whether or not the employee h m  been oonvioted toy the
pq
appropriate criminal court*
fha Bumtoer of oaaoa involving miscoriduot of a minor 
nature but nevertheleaa euffiolent to Justify diamlBsal 
:W almoet legion# a© one might expeet* A selection of 
earlies? oases of this typo ie noted below* "
lùvimMionnBBB is quite a oommon ground for dismissal 
and particularly if it ia an a/jgravated case (both ub to 
degree of dnmkmmoaa and the oocaolon upon which it 
occurred or either of these)# whom there :le no real 
difficulty In juatifyinp; dlsmleaal*'^ '"^  It seems to be 
doubtful whether the master can dismiss a servant for a 
single occasion of drunkenness which Is not aggravated by 
the occasion upon which it takes place*
23« Bhaxo) ¥• 1664, 11 E# 745 (avosmemte of dammgo
to ship’s maohzncry caused by engineer * s neglect ox duvy)*
m
boolra); Afior v. 3.839, i P. 5: Ï). 398 (empXosfoe
Claiming to be a partner) ç Bggy v# Oh^||©r, 1856, 18 CUB* 
718 (agent receiving money# Gontrary"''texp:eoBa ordersi 
|l2£t® V, I ’Muil.©:» I860, 5 H. & E, 667 (false statemeats
Î» .®>»3.oye2?h '^;^JMESLlS^jMMUâ£Z.JL9ArMâ» , .,
1867# 16 |j*T« 608 (traveller supplying goods to a married
woman who kept a brothel, and from whom payment could mot
fae yecoves-ea), M§Jl0£h v, mtffsr 1882, Ig S.l.H. 697
«
fUng)^ v. M m M .  S-Sbb, 39 eh.n. 339
(suo5!?et oommzBBloas;.
25
_  .......», 1845 s. 1 C% & K,
bo^
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Habitual druiakennesri la most certa.inly a good groitntl 
for (ilemisaing the personal domoatio or fairlly)
servant and also for diamiesing the biiBineae or profeesion* 
al employee when it ocoiira during working hours or if it 
oau8 0 8 irrogularity in attendance or otherwise interferes 
with the proper performanoo of duties by the servant*
Any insubordination caused by an employee creating a 
diatirrbauae or arguing heatedly with other employees
ptj
would also seom to justify that employee's dismissal*
But the oiroiMStanees would rocmire to be looked at very 
carefully, in oaeoa of this type, becauso the propriety 
of the act itself is certainly a matter for the oxerciso 
of tho master’0 cliocretioB©
There appears to be no doubt that Immorality ia a 
valid ground for dismissing the personal aervant^^ and it 
may w©ll be bo In the ease of other servants also* It 
should be noted perhaps at this Jmietiire that if mi 
employer suspects that one of his unmarried female 
employees is pregnant he Beams to have no legal right to
fj> ^897» 5 s.luî, p. 17; ?»
Süamb^, I8GO9 H f. & h\ 229.
2*3. V. Ao;fcon 1830, 4 C. & P. 208 (the ole:ok who
assauitei'i M s  master*8 mtald “• servant, with iiitsrit to 
ravish her); Hatheson v« Maelfljmoji 1832, 10 S, 825; Coaxio»? 
V. Justice X8&27Trir.0%r:HT"T§r’(an immarrlea raaicf vHk T
tf fllaiçlBBOip? Grgig T. Sætoso£ 1864» 2
m» 12/8 (a ioreman guiiry ox gross misconduct tovmrds 
female v;orkers constant quarreelo with liia wife inter-- 
r up ting hia dut lea as foreinan held to be Justifiably 
dismiaaed)*
inolet upon that employee toeing medioally examiiiocU'^ ®
(1 1 1 ) .
There ia alvmjB am impXiod term im the aomtraet that
the employee io (a) reasonably compétent to diaoharge the
duties which he umdertalcea and (b) ready emd willimg to
render the aervloea required by the ommtraat* Should it
transpire that tho aermmt be Incompétent or be guilty
Of eoBo wilful rofueal or omleaiam to serve them the
master may dismiss him, because there has boom a breach of
contract by the oervant#^^ On tho other hand, if the
employer Imowimg tlœt the particular servmit and
potential eraployee does not have the requisite capacity
for the job nevertheXoas engages him, then the employer io
'•32debarred from dlamioslng him on the ground of Inoompotencw#
It will be appreciated that the servant must show 
reasonable skill and reaeonable diligence* His akill 
need not be that of the expert nor is he required to 
guarantee auocees to the master in every facet of hie
tt
Habitual neglect will eerteinly justify dismissal, ae 
will a single case of grooa neglect* It haa# for
89. See Latter v. Braddell (1881) 50 li.J.(Q.Bo) 448.
X 85ar? l7&  t r iH s  Haîmeik!" c IS h ll? f l|8 l * 5"“S ÎT O .8 .
236) ËÊSSM. V . m m e f i m r  28 L i f r i i i T
31. Oi«3B V, RamüjFlBol. Hume 384»
32» m a m  V. E m m æ  le # ,  3 .7.1 , 921.
33. M m m m r n  V. m B M  3.031, 9 s. 264,
example, been held in England that a single act of forget'^ * 
fmlness or aeglcct# causing aorlow damage to valuable 
maoMnsrjr# was a auffioient reason to justify Immediate
Atosmcc from work ctoing recognised hours of aervioe, 
without leave er good .exauae, also forms a good ground for 
diamlssal# It may-be neoesaary to decide what io meant by 
"rooognleed hours of service"* In the case of the personal 
servant me particular heure may bo epeolfled and# there-* 
fore, any umparmitted aboemoe will roqxiire a sufficient 
reaoon# Im other cases, the hours may be stipulated in 
the paarîîiauXar coatract or agreement between the parties or 
mmy ho decided by x*oference to trade custom or local 
CUB tom*
■tll.hae# for example, been held im the mining industry, 
that dismissal for absence may take place where a workman
has imdertaken to work b o  many days per fortnight and 
-fails to complete the required number#
35. ?• isai® a-QQ^ » 3 mi.ot.nep. 3;
060 aiao m m & m m  ?? MteEtiLâJiâ» 1090, 7 sfa.ct,Hop. es
(v&ere mlaere agreed to take an "Idle" da-y aad this oora» 
'binatioa by thesi waa bold to be a broaoli of good fal'bli
miners refusing to gc’""lTôxm th¥”'‘pî¥ Im a cage with a non^ 
union employee ^ hgM to have committed a breach of 
tract by absenting themselves from work} .
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VHxat particular abaeaee justifies diemlaaal of tho 
employee is ontirely a matter of the oireoiimatancea e#g* if 
a head gardener absents himself for four days then hie 
dlsmiaeal. ia Birailarly, the apprentloe
tradesman who attende Irregularly, la habitually late and 
wastes time whilst engaged upon some simple errand for 
M b  master may also justifiably be dismissed»"^' The 
oiroumetanooB, to which reference has been made in this 
paragraph, ares«* (a) the nature of the servie es to bo 
given to the master and (b) tho trouble and inconvenience 
likely to be occaaionod to the master by the abaence*
The master is not, however, entitled to dismiss an 
employee because a member of the latter*s family is 
suffering from an infectious disease*^® lor can he 
dismiss an employee merely because he is lll#^® It may be 
thought, and this view soems to be a perfectly reasonable 
one, that the master is quite entitled to refuse to allow 
an employee to work where there ie a danger of the spread 
of the disease*'^® Mr# Dmpheroton says*^ that If It can be
56. Orauligâ I g M  1822, 1 Sh.App, 124, reveralng K o M  
V# MMHM.P 1816 Hum© 398.
3 7 V# .g^LgMm 3.847, 9 D# 1042# Reference 
should always be made, when dealing with the question of
failure by an apprentice to perform the services required 
of him, to the iMployers and Workmen Act 1875 and the 
special provlsibn© therein contained which enable the 
master to have recourse to a Court of Summary jurisdiction 
38* V# Hold 1870, 2 Guthrie's Bh.Ot.Oasos 356#
}f*ÈSSâ& V. iWm m, 1844, 6 », 6848 B m M x  V. M m k t  39 
Sh.Ot.Hepts. p# 342; see also Westwood v. Scottish Motor
m m r n . s s u  <o.h.)- 193s s.», m    —
40, S'raear, ©p.oit,» page 350*
41, page 120,
shown that the ©ervant was imdor a chity to ah©tain them 
tho ea©e is equated with the situation where the aervamt 
cannot work beeauae of- M e  own illnesBo From the master*0 
viewpoint, it should also he romomhered that there ia w. 
obligation upon him to look to the general welfare of his 
Other employees and therefore, as a praotioal step in a 
situation of this latter type which is under ■ diBOUDeioai# 
it would be a sound suggestIon for the employer to liaise 
with the medical officer of health for the particular area 
or, failing Mm, with the family doctor (ae the:ce ia an 
obligation to report any oaae of Infectious dlaease to the 
Public Health Authorities)*
Another very interesting point is raised by the old 
oaao of Momile v* Blair , which seems to suggest that am 
employer ie mot entitled to dismles a woxicman beoauae ho 
refueeato Join the trade union to which hie other employ­
ees belong* Aecordlngly, if the tread© union should 
threaten to call out the other employees in the cstablieh^ 
mcmt unless the particular employee is sacked this aoes 
not form any Justification for dismissing the eorrvanto 
But there have been many instances where this typo of 
occurrence has taken place and tho n0n«--»mion employee has 
been dismiaaed* This particular point is more fully dealt 
with in chapter three of this work, particularly fxrom the
42. 1642, 14 Bi 359*
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aspect of the poseiblo remecliee available to (i) the 
non-union employee himself fwÂ (11) the employer# who is 
or has been threatened v/lth the withdrawal, of his remain*" 
ing employées*
A further qiieation sometimes arioee for ooneider- 
ation# Tls3S“ \^ hethez^  a master is Juotlflecl in diemiBsing 
an employee upon facte not known to him at the time of the
AV)
dlBjïiiaaal# Mr* Umphoreton die agrees v/ith the older 
authorities and takes the that the real gx^ omid of
diasiiieeal ie breach of contract by the servant and# 
accordingly, as soon as this breach comae to the knowledge 
of the maetor ho may determine the contract or elect to 
hold it at an encU Termination from any other cause in 
the meantime doea not bar the master from his election* 
However# if the employer had been aware of his 
servent'a breach of contract and had continued to employ 
him# although subsccjiiently dismissing him for some other 
cause, he has condoned the earlier breach but he must be 
able to Justify the dismissal by the subsequent events 
which led up to
43. Bee Bentinek v* Maonherson 1869# 6 SûL.H* 376; and 
also lord Ohiei OommrsBxoner Adam’s charge to Vüb Jury In 
îlîgîil "v# /Miss. 182E)g 4 Mor* 584 at page §92, which support 
the'^iew thcTF he is not ao justified*
44. Op.oit, page 121}
45. HorWn v. M’Murtry 1860, 5 H. â H* 667 per Bramwell B« 
at pTTTtol" ,9ugso^"lF% "Bkinnox* 1843# 11 M. & V/« 161 per 
Lord Abinger at pZ lS*9T^Boston Pishing Go# v« Ans ell
1883, 39 Oh.D. 339 per O0ttonT;:3TaTprF^r —
Upon this main point uadere eliaeiiBBiono raoet help ia
obtained tz^ om 3%igllah oaaee, Por e%ample@ Coleridge è\
ha© ©alâ^ '^  *%hea?o the eervent has been dismissed ami the
master is sued for wages^ the master raay avail himself of
the misooBduot of the aorvmit a© a defence^ although he
may not have dlemisaed him for that oauee^ ** Alderson B#
â 7has also oalâ» If an employer diaalmrgo his servant
and at the time of the die charge a good oause of dia*^-
charge ia fact existe, the employer ia jiiatifled in
diacharging the servant although at the time of the dia^
charge the employer did not know of the mclstenoe of that
aaii®0*^% SMs rule was affirmed in the leading ease of
48
Where the aauao of dismissal ie obviono^ the 
master need give no reason or explanation for Ito In 
other eases, where a aervant asks the cause of dismlaaal, 
the older authorities tend to mipport the view that the 
master ia under a moral obligation to state i t#Mow^- 
over, this moral right of the servant is not founded 
upon the contract itaelf and indeed it le quite unen- 
fore cable against the employer# ll?he master may r^ efueo tc 
assign a roaaon and if the servant subsequently eueo
46, An HMjwajr v. Hmn£mrfordJMe$^o., 1835, 3 A, & E,
47. ia Wiljete. v, feeen» 1850, 3 Oer & K, 59
49» See Vfettson v, gugngt 1862, %  B« 494 pes? &0M  I>eae 
at pag© 497*
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hlm, then it ie always open to the master to Justify the 
diemiaaalp in defenae or partial defence to that action#
It ie perhaps a])prapriatep at this Jimeture, to 
eonslAer very briefly the question of DiiSIOTIOI by an 
employee*
!Eiere ie no doubt that if a eoCTan.t leaves his work 
Dine anlmo revert end! p without lawfiVl eauae or excmee, he 
ha© committed a breach of his contract of employment# fh© 
position of merchant aeamen la a very ©pedal one, which 
ia dealt with by stati^ ta law and v/hich ie not pertinent 
to the general, field of thl© study*
Desertion, in the eensQ in which it 1© being used 
here, mean© aomethlmg more then a mere tem|)orarey aboeiice 
(v;hiah may, by itself, Justify diemlBBal in certain 
oaeos) 03? absence through illnoas or other ncoessary 
cause, which may terminate the contract because of 
fal3.uro of performance*
fho existence or absence of the animus rofertendi
50* Bell"^8 ^Principles a# 1821 so© also Tay3,or v# Smith, 
1909 CO#H#) 1 455* (Dhe Intereotlng^eatuM"^ out
lîijJîâEfii came ie that, by the terms of the contract itself, 
thf master was made the judge of that conduct which would 
justify dicmloeal# In other caeea, the master would 
I'equlre to satisfy the court, in answer to an action baaed 
upon wrongous dismiBoal, that the diamissal was justified,
51. but see particularly the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, 
acctlone 221-224g'and O^Eell v. Rankin 1873, 11 M# 538*
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will, require to be deduced from the facte theme elves# 
Perhaps the absenoe may only be euch ae to justify a 
diamiaaal (which ia serious enough from the employee*© 
point of view) without aiimmting to a complete deeertion# 
One or two of the older eases illustrate the dividing 
line between, deeertion miû non-d ea e3?t lorn g for example, 
in Cooper v# M’Bwan, the contract was for three years 
and the employers alone had power to terminate it at.any 
time by notice* After two years * oorvioe the servant 
gave a month’s notice and loft* He was held to be in the 
position of a deserter#
Again, in Dumbarton Class Oq# v# Ooatsv/ortli a 
servant, who had entered Into a seven years * contract, 
left before the completion of the term but he was held 
not to be a deserter because a reduction In his wages had
ended the old oontmot and substituted a new contract,
during pleBBurw*
ViThere an employee ia entitled to leave his employ-* 
ment after giving notice of a certain length, it is 
desertion if he loaves upon shorter notice, because the 
latter is really equivalent to no notice at all#
Should the master himself commit a breach of 
oontraot v/hich entitles the servant to hold the oontraot • 
terminated, it Is then no désertion for the servant to
52. 1893, 9 Sh.Ot.Rep. 311.
53. 1647, 9 D. 732.
54. a m m  V. 1861, 23 D. 3
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quit the eervlou* i'xampXos of aiioh breach would be8«" 
the master ^ 8 auperveriiaig bankruptcy r a transfer by 
the maetor of his busiueaa and employées to another 
person, without the consent of the employeoe;^ * harsh 
treatment' of employees and gaueraXly making their position
K7
unbearable;"^ or failing to pay the wages etipulatcd or 
agreed upon between the p a r t i e s A n o t h e r  good example 
would be where, by the act of the master, the oerevice 
became dangerous beyond the degree contemplated when it 
was entered into and this would not amount to deeerticm 
by the aerrant if he left the employment
Where a servant is diemiaaed Illegally, he is not 
bound to return if a continuation of eervioe ie offered 
and indeed he ie not liable aa a deec;ctGr If he refuaoa 
to return#
'^Desertion’* has (except In 1;he oaee of certain 
public undertaking© ) ceaBocl to be of Importance in modern 
tlmea » principal roaeon for thle ie that the old
rcBiedlee which the law allowed to the master and 
Impi'laonment was one of the main ones have long ainoe
55. m %  V. tail 1900, 8 S.i.». p. 40,
56. lioae V. 1894, 21 R. 596.
5/. ‘»eoJl|§iS|.|,X* MRSMS. 1842, 5 D. 360§ Ouga v, gooAell
18 jPÿ Ij) b# 1142#
SB# Dumbarton Glaee Oo* v# Ooatoworth, c:lt# aunra# 
(iooinote 34/#
59. 0’|el| V, ^S:kBa&UI##ai_â_go., [1695] 2 Q.B.
70, 4185 jMtga ▼. m & m a m  fôev. s &(. 54o.
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disappearedo
IXluèBSâ--
CÛ5Ï.-C lA%%>r*[TrLCA,^
The baaio principle which applioe hero is that mere
illnesa of the employer or employee cioao not terminate the
60oontraot of eervieo# Mevertheleee, this principle which
has been enunoiatoci must be qualified iJiModiatoXy by Bay«-
ing that If the iilneae ahoulcl prevent either party from
properly fulfilling hi© dutlea and obllgatlona under the
oontraot then the contract itaelf may be ended, booauee of
failure in the performance thereof  ^without (except as
hereinafter mentioned) involving the ooiiaoqiiemoeo of a
61broach of contract «
If the unforeseen ilXneoe on the servant’© part
bo protracted or result in a situation which prevent© the
relationship being continued then the contractual relation'
ship will oeaBfô# Where the iXlnooo %b lengthy and serious
there ie imually little doubt that performance will bo
impossible and the employer would be Justified in engage
ing a replacement employee# Where, however, the Illness
i© of a short temporary natua?e there is no Jmatifieatioii
6Pfor the employer terminating the relationohlpc
60# The aame principle le preeorvedq by statute, under 
the recent Contract© of Employment Act 1963#
6:1. I&MSII V. DfMilS» 1865, 12 H. 1103# but a reaaonaKle 
allowance of time must be made before termination 
looking to all the cirGumstances see Woatwood v# ScottifJ:
(O.H.) 1938 8.N. a.—  -----
62, fei/i V» i s t o  1844, 6 D, 684
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Where the questlorn of impoeaibility of performcmoe 
does axdse the whole oiroumatancas of the eaee will have 
to he looked at ^ and particularly the following (a) 
duration of the contract, (b) nature of the bueinaas and 
(o) the aervlooa to bo given# Obviously if the employer 
had to Mr© a substitute employee this could be a very 
important factor*
Should it happen that the employee’s iXlnese was 
caueed by M b  own mlBConduet or fault then hi© disability 
amounts to a breach of contract for which he ie liable* 
Lord fraaer eaye^^ (and here he is relying upon American 
authox\ity) that the law is the earn© when the disability  ^
due to a cause preceding the contract  ^might have been 
foreseen but was in fact concealed, upon the reasoning 
that the servant had broken the condition that on© who 
vmdertake© to give poreonal services must not render 
Mmeelf physically incapable of performing these 
services# This seems to be a reasonable view#
But in a oaso v/hero an employee booamo unable to 
perform his service through Illness contracted prior to 
but only deve3j)ping after the contract was made, which 
he could not be expected to foresee and did not ennceal 
when he made the contract, the court held that it could 
not go behind the occurrence of the illness and consider
63. M m # m  V. âÈà» m æ ; '  see partleuXax'ly
62,
65. Maotes? aswl Bervamt <- pages 318/319»
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whether it waa due to the servant’© mlBoomduet* ^ ^
la the ease where the oontraet does eome to an end 
beo&use of the employee’s lllneaa, and for which lie xb Im 
no way to hlmme, his righta in relation to wages are 
similar to those right© which would have arisen upon hie 
death, The position under statute law must mow be kept 
in viov;, by spécial x*efe:eenoe to the OontractB of Employ- 
ment Act, 1963#^^
Mr, ïïmphereton states *’ that if a female employee la 
married during the term her husband has a claim upon her 
society and aervioes which is preferential to that of her 
employer, Mevertholess, should she leave the service on 
that account she commits a breach of contract* The 
general rule of law is that the marriage of an employee 
hae no effect upon the service relationehip between the 
employer and that employee and it cannot liberate or 
excuao the employee from any of the obligations .under the 
eontraot of service#
It may well be that an employer Is somowlmt reluctant 
to employ married woman, because their home Interests are 
general3»y In oonfliot with their obligations i-mclorr their
meabrn 3e h,T# (M*©#) 38,
67. Applying the safeguard© to the employee under section 
1 and Schedule 1 of the Act#
68. <)£. cit. page 124.
69. See pa.rtlcularly Watraon v. lgga^,eea 1848, 10 D. 370.
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contracts of Borvloe* It ie permleaible to inolude a 
clause in the agreement which requiree a female employee’o 
resignation upon her marriage*, However, this would be 
unusual in Biodern times when large numbers of marx^ ied 
women take up paid employment, either full-'tlme or ’port--^» 
time #
Am interesting point might arieo where a female 
employee gets married, returns to work and In due eouroa 
Tbecomee pregnant#, It ie submitted that her abeeaoe from 
work prior to the birth of her child (perhaps for, ©ay, 
two momtha) and for a short period thereafter falls to be 
considered on the earn© basis ae abeanoe through Illness# 
If, of OQursQ, the absonoo ie likely to ho lengthy - 
during the infancy of the child then there ia an 
inability on the employee’s part to Implement her 
tract, iflth the result that the employer would be quite 
Justified in dismissing her# A situation of this typo 
should not requix^ e litigation as a mode of eettlemomt#
Both employer and employee should be able to negotiate a 
reasonable basis for a settlement, bearing in mind their 
obligations arising out of the contractual relationship of 
master and eervant#
Obviously, imprisonment of an employee results in hie 
inability to perform hie part of the contractual obllg**- 
ation# It is important to aeoertain v/hothor or not the 
imprisonmont la due to the fault of the employee ^ and
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here the position seems to he the same as an inability to 
perform the contract hecause of illness# Therefore, when 
the imprisonment is lawful and the actual fault of the 
employee himself he has disabled himself from performance 
and ia guilty of a breach of contract* Conve3?sely, if 
the imprisonment is wrongful - termination of the con­
tractual relationship may take place, hut it is not 
followed by the usual consequences which arise from a 
breach of contract.
70Hr. Umpherston correctly points out that under the 
old law relating to imprisonment of servants for deeertioi 
such imprisonment did not terminate the contract, hut the 
reason for this was that the master had elected to punish 
the servant and had retained him in service rather than 
terminate the relationship on the ground of breach of 
contract. This form of imprisonment is now of course 
abolished, although the courts retain certain powers, 
particularly in relation to the imprisonment of apprent­
ices and employees in certain essential supply under-- 
takings (water, gas, e3_ectricity etc.) under the Employ­
ers and Workmen Act, 1875 and subsequent statutes, but 
this is a development of the theory of’^contempt of Court"
Termination by the Courts-
In terms of the Employers and Workmen Act 1875,
70* page 125
4 8
© e o t i o n  5 #  w h e r e  t h e r e  i e  e a y  p r o e e o d l n g  b e f o r e  t h e  
Sheriff Court'in relation to any dispute-between an - 
employer end e workmen arlelng out of or Inoldental to
thl8 relationship as eueh, the court may rcaolad the 
contract* This may be dome upon auoh terms a© to the 
apportIcmment of wages or other aurns due under the 
contract* and ae to the payment of wages or damages or 
other auma due, as the Oourt thinke juet* The Court has 
elmllar powera in the case of the indentured apprentice* 
imder aectioa 6 of the Act*
Effect of termination of adviceg*"-
Whom the employee la dlamlaaed* whether lawfully or 
otherwise, he le obliged to leave quietly and 
hla alienee le not regarded am acquleeoence in the breach
71of contract by hie employer* He must alao hand over to 
the employer all property which belongs to the latter and 
which was held by him (l*c# the employee) during the
79
eubaimtence of the relationship*
If the employer had tmdertalcen to provide clothe© 
for the employee (whether plain clothee or livery - there 
la no dlBtlnotlon these remain* In the abeence of any 
epeclal agreement to the contrary* the meator’a property#
71. Bobs v. Penfler <1874) 1 H. 352.
]2« p M i  V. (1877) 4 K. 462. _
(delivery of a licence# Intereetlng qucetione raised %  
grant and aaelgnation of licence*)
73» SMill# V* Dalvell* 1825* 4 8* 136*
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Where the employee ie occupying a dwellinghouse or
other premises qua servant then he must quit the subjects
74upon the termination of the servloe relationship#
formally he does not have the privileges of a tenant,
nor ie he therefore entitled to any v/arning notice or
notice to quit, which has to be given to or served upon
7Hthe ordinary tenant. It seems that if he refuses *go go,
76
a summary application for his removal would be competent.
If the servant refuses to go of hie own accord,
there is old autho&ity which seems to support the view
that the master is quite entitled to turn the servant
out and to remove his effects from the premises without
77process of law, *
It has been held that even where an employer
74# It is important to verify that the occupancy is gua 
servant and not qua tenant. If the latter, the employee 
may not be required to remove immediately or indeed he 
may even be able to continue in occupation under a 
tenancy which is protected by the Rent Acts (meaning by 
that the Rent Restrictions Acts and the Rent Act 1957)#
75* For notice provisions in ordinary tenan.ci©a see the 
Rent Act, 1957*
76, See Whyte v. School Board of Ha.ddington 1874, 1 H, 
3.1343 on questions of oompeîon^ of the
procedures relating to Removals and Ejections see the 
Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Acts 1907 and 19153 and also 
Dobie Sheriff Court Practice and Lewie - Sheriff Court 
Practice,
77# Bee Fraser - Master and Servant page 352 3 Scott v, 
M2#grdo (.1669), 6 S,L,R, 301 g Smith - Master and Servanti 
3rd Edition, p, 112,
wrongfully êlemiaeed an employee (for whloh ho teoome©
Immediately liable in damagoa for breach of oomtraot)* 
who refused to leave the premlaee occupied by him* the 
employer might remove the furmlture to another p3.aoe and 
was not liable for aubeequent damage to It or lo@$ from
It upon the groimd that whem hie aervloe oeaeed he had
TAno right to retain poaaeaalom and become a treepaeaer#
The opinion ha© been expreeaed# with reference to 
thla question which la under consideration* that it ia 
of mo importâmes ivhethcr the âlamlaeal was Juetlfiable or 
mot* What le required therefore le that the act of die** 
mleeal muet be done by eomecme who hae the power to 
dlemiae* When that ie done the dlemleeal 1© valid 
though It ie quite another queetlom whether or mot It le 
justifiable or v/rongcue* Yet oaoe the diemleeal order Im 
validly given the eervant* by mtaying on la the premieee 
without extended contractual permiaaion or apeclal agree*» 
memt* become© a treapaaaer*
78. Per ¥ill:lamp J. ia ML®, v. S ^ s M à  C1862) 9 L.f .i.S, 
582.
79. Ses :PoaaMg.on v* Williams (1833) 1 Or. Btiû M# 345.
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Oonolusioris
There mow remain© the task of looking feaok at the 
field of etudy v/hioh has been the subject of examination 
in thia work and of deciding in what respecta the lav; has 
changed from the close of the Induatrial Revolution 
periodf
I'D a pedal oomraent eoems to be needed n%)on the 
aubjeot-mattor of the first c:hapter In which an attempt 
was made to 0 ketch the :his tor leal background of the 
.period imder revlev;* Oortain observations regarding the 
trade union position and the approach to induetrial 
negotiation wore made In that chapter and those are 
referred to again later in this chapter?, as being two of 
the fields in which the law could be of some asBietanoo 
to both aidee*
As regarda the second chapter, in which an examin­
ation of the nature and formation of the contract of ser­
vice v/as madeç some comment upon the present-day position 
ia undoubtedly required*
Although It is still open for an employer and 
employee to negotiate fx^ eely - within the general limits
‘5'*îri rrs i «yaf'9 «Î */» in/; ? A  eitin P A  \ mi n i A  /A*-,Alaw and bearing in mind the new requirements of
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the Oontraeta of Employment Act, 1963"’  ^this v;ill be 
unusual in relation to the adjustment of the terme of the 
contracto Most cases will depend upon, and will continue 
to depend upon, the exietenco of oollootlTO agreements 
between oonfaderationa of employers and trade unions#
The main points contained in these agreements tend to be 
accepted between employers and workers and therefore they 
become incorporated into the service contracts by implic­
ation# fhio situation requires proof of these implied 
terms to the court’e eatisfaetlonc
There ie a gx^ eai; deal to be said, from, the legal
viewpoint* for giving all such collective agreements the
Pfull protection of the law* ' but it ie fairly obvious that 
both eidee of industry are quite content with the situation 
as it ie* Doubtless they feel that this system has worked 
reasonably well (as they see it) for many years and accord­
ingly they prefer to continue with negotiating maehinery on 
a well-loiown pattern, rather than make the situation more 
rigid (in the sense of strict legal interpretation of 
contract clauses)# History seems to show* for the v/orkers
1# 1963 Co 49o
2# ThCTfâ is at present (March 1965) before the House of 
Gommons a Private Member’s Bill (Mr# H# Graham Page) known 
as the Collective Contracta of Employment Bill, which 
aontd'ins provialone designed to replace certain of the 
nozi-enforeeable oontracts stipulated in the Trade Imion 
Act, 1871e section 4® This Bill ia- receiving very little 
notice and it seems doubtful whether it will pass the 
House in its present form#
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6ind uni oms at any rate* that v/hen resort to law ha© 'been 
neoesBary the outeome hae very seldom been benefloial#
It ie virtually Impossible meantime to dispel this in-’ 
built distrust, although perhaps in the not too distant 
future it may be poBsibXe to see the formulation of a 
Labour Code and the foundation of Labour Courte in 
England mid Sootland* to which Immediate reference can 
be made for the authoritative determination of any 
industrial dispute of importance* the deoision itself 
having the force of 3.aw, This would, in the v/riter’s 
submission* be more likely to be beneficial to industry 
and the public as a v;hole, rather than to allow the 
continued subjection of industrial unrest to political 
whim* political gain and politioefi chicanery in general#
In other oases, wages and salaries v/ill depend upon 
agreed scales of remuneration (e#g# schoolteachers@ civil 
sentrants, local govexTOient employees, University teachers 
etCo) and employees will be appointed generally within 
the particular scale# Their bargaining power would 
normally be limited to the scale range of the individual 
a/ppointment#
In chaptex' three hereof, an attempt was made to 
examine the duties, obligations and remédies of both 
employer and employee# There has been very little change 
in the field of legal x'cmedies, with the exception of the 
complete abandonment of the doctrine of common employment#
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Tills v/ae long overdue# It v;ae, however, perhaps a little 
Bux'px'leing that the Lav/ Reform Gommittee for Scotland was 
not prepared to recommend an extension of the remedies 
against third parties (the ®*qiaod servit lam amislt" 
prinoiple of English law)# Upon refleotion, their view 
seems to be perfectly senaiblo beoauae to hold otherwie© 
might well be to place a limitation upon the liberty and 
the legal rights of the individual, employee.
The duties and obligations upon each side have to bo 
read oarefully and in relation to modern eiroumatanoee.
The feudal and Victorian influences have given way to a 
more reasonable and more friendly approach between 
individual employer and individual employee. The employer 
of today recognises that employees will give of their beat 
when treated with respect and with fairness at all times# 
There ie no room for the autocratic feudalistio baronial 
overlord in modern industrial relations #
Perhaps the most aignifioant change in the field of 
termination of the employment contract la the attempt by 
Parliament to lay down a ’’dismiesal procedure’’ or ’’notice 
procedure’’ in the terms of section 1 to the Contracts of 
Employment Act, 1963.' This is the first time that it has 
ever been done in the United Kingdom. Prior thereto the 
Court was faced with the task of aBoertaining the intent­
ion of parties or attempting to assess what; period, of 
notice was ‘’reasonable’’ in all the olreimstances # What
the statute has done is to preBoribe a mlmimum require­
ment* but it leaves it open to the partleg to negotiate 
a notice period which is outwith the statutory provioions, 
BO long as the agreement does not attempt to lower the 
minimal requirements. The contractual notice period may 
still a?equi2?e to be Interpreted and decided by the court* 
but the fixing of statutory minimum requirements might 
well mean that parties would be prepared to accept an 
amicable adjuetmemt geared to those requirements rather 
than resort to lengthy and expensive litigation#
Once again*' the modern approach to valid grounds 
for termination must be streeaed* Which is reasonable 
in all the circumstances? If there is clearly a breach 
of the principle of natural justice and fairplay, then 
the courts will uphold the claim by the employee and 
award damagee for wrongous dismissal (wrongful dismiBBal 
in ihgland) against the employer*
Her Majesty’s Government is also conoernecl with the 
creation of effective safoguarcla against arbitrary dis- 
mlSBal of employees by their employers* In this connec­
tion* they are prepared to accept Heoommondation Ho# 119g 
dealing with Termination of Employment at the Initiative 
of the Employer* which v;as adopted at the Forty-Bevonth 
(1963) BosbIdb of the International Labour Gonferenoe*^
3* See Oommand Paper B'o. 2548 (December 1964), containing 
a statement of the proposed action by H*M* Government, 
upon inter alia Hecommendation Ho. 119 above-mentioned.
The actual text" of inter alia Heoommendation Ho*119 was 
published in Command'TSper^W* 2159*
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The underlying prinoiple of that Heoommendation is very 
Important# It la as follows .termination of employ"^  
Bient should not take place miless there Is a. valid reason 
o.ôûomioated with the capacity or conduct of the worker 
or based on the operational requirements of the imcler- 
taking* establishment or eerviee’’# H.M* Government now 
proposes to discuss with representatives of employers and 
trade unions the provision of procédures which will give
âeffective safeguards against arbitrary cllemiaBalo
Wiilst the earlior relationship of master and 
sox*vant resembled closely that of the feudal relationship 
of superior and vassal, it must be conceded immédiately 
that progress has been made* to eomo considerable extent, 
towards an equality of bargaining power between employers 
and employees. It ie too early to assess as yet the 
importanoo and effect of the Contracts of IMployaient Act, 
1963 v;hloh ie, ae has been mentioned above, the first 
attempt of statute law to stipulate a minimum requirement 
for a diemiasal procedure between employer and employee 
as well as being the first statutory attempt to regulate 
conditions concerning the formation of the contract of 
employment# It seems to be a step in the s?ight direction, 
although the trade mions complain that it does not go far 
enough#
In the field of Wages, the recent Payment of Wages
4» See CoBimand Paper lo. 2548 at page 7»
5» o<f 49o
Act, I960 huB gone some way to equate the position of 
the v/orker cm the factory floor vrith the wiiite*-collar* 
v/orker in the office - aa both may now receive their wages 
(or salary) in exactly the same way# Therefore, to some 
extent, and in spite of criticisms of payment by any 
methods other than in coinage of the realm, the statue 
of the former has been improved* Yet the gap between 
offio©«'"■’level and ehop«">floor will not truly disappear 
until the worker on the shop-floor io regarded by manage­
ment and executives as being, in the main, a teehnioally 
qualified and highly skilled tradesman who Is every bit 
as valuable and important within the ox'ganisation as the 
aoeoimtasit who eite at his desk preparing a casting 
statement for some new production method which is being 
oonsidered by the board of directors. Aeoordingly, some 
new thisilcingî by the trade unions io needed - along the 
line of an abolition of hourly wages ratas and piooe--v;ork 
rates and the substitution of a salary and grading scheme 
appropriate to skilled trades and unskilled trades, with 
provision for transfer from an unskilled category to a 
skilled category for those who succeed in obtaining the 
proper qualification* How facilities for training 
employees and a new attitude to this concept will be 
needed.from the government and from employers and
6. 8 & 9 Elia, 2, e, 37,
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7employees alike# That new approach may also eomtrlbute 
indirectly to a better attitude from both sides Im the 
whole field of induetrial relatione*
One very important questio'h* upon vjhioh both 
Scottish Law and Biiglish Law are equally silent, is that 
of the position of the displaced employee - the person 
who, after serving an employer for eome thirty-five or 
forty years, ie declared ’’redmidgmt" or who ia suddenly 
faced v;lth the prospect of moving from his family home 
and circle* becauae hie employer’s businose la being 
moved some three or four hundred miles either "for good 
économie reaeone" or "in the intercats of efficlenoy"#
It 1b unrealistic to expect that employee to disrupt his 
life at the whim of an employer or even if the move ia 
finanoiariy necessary* Some protection must bo afforded 
to persona so placed until they are able to find alter- 
native employment * It is suggested that a sohemc7Vlong 
the lines of the Industx'lal InjurlGS scheme might be 
brought into operation for the payment of Industrial 
Displacement (or Redundancy) Benefit* This scheme would 
require the constitution of a new Fund into v;hioh employ­
ing organieations would require to pay according to their 
eiee* atx'uotux’e* capacity and profite and which fund
7* The Local Lm%)loyment and Industrial Training Acts are 
an important step forward and it ie hoped that their 
value will be appreciated and full use be made of them*
7a, Soe now the Redundancy Payments Bill (1965),
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could bo u:adorv/rltte:ii by the State, b o  that PaxGtiament 
would have available in every year a detailed statement 
of Aüoounte showing the financial position of the fimcU 
The prinoiple of payment to the employee deo‘iarecI 
redmidant as well as to the employee who is displaced 
must be the same# as has bean indicated in the preoeding 
paragraph#
In the oaae of the offloe-worker and shop-woi'ker,
.8the new Offiooe, Shops and Railway Premises Act, It/op 
again repreaentB a forward step in that it applies to 
the offieO'-'^ worÆer micl shop*^worker principally, a code of 
safety, health and welfare regulations which Ime been in 
operation In factoa?ies and other establishments for many 
many years# The guiding principle ia again the welfare 
of the employee*
It is, however, in the field of Industrial Relations 
that the greatest developments will com© eventually#
These developments will affect materially the legal 
relationship) of master and servant ae it has been 
examined In this work# Towards the last Oonservatlve 
government and the Judiciary* the trade unions seemed to 
be adopting aai attitude of distrust and grievance# In 
the oaae of the last government* it was very widely felt 
that there would bo no extoneion of protection to employ­
ees and trade unionists during industrial disputes, but
8» 1963, 0# 41*
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that Instead a Royal Commission would be appointed to 
look Into the whole question of the tmione and their 
poeltlon imder the law* with a viev; to limiting tholr 
pZ'oteetlono and their powere# Towards the judiolary* 
the trade unions felt a major grievance over the 
deoielon in Rpokee v# Barnard & Others#^ Siaee the 
Trade© Union Oongreee of 1964# the imione have pursued 
a polioy of oampalgnlng for reform of the law by seeking 
a etatutory olarifioation and etmendment of the Trades 
Disputes Aot# 1906* so that the oiroimatanoea dlaoloaed 
In the Rookea v* Barnard & Others ease can never again 
be made the aubjeot of an aotion in damage©# An examin'^ 
atlon of Her Majesty’a most graoioue epeeoh at the State 
opening of Parliament on Tuesday 3rd November* 1964* will 
reveal t3mt the new Labour Government promised to intro­
duce a short Bill which would deal with this matter and 
give the miiona the proteotion whioh they eeek# This hae# 
In fact* now been done with the presentation of the Trade 
Dleputea Bill* whioh is Govemment-sponeored. The Bill 
propose© to give proteetion to unione and their offloial© 
In oiroumetaneee elmila]? to those in the Roykes v#
Barnard oase and within the ambit of a trade dispute (in 
contemplation or in furtheranoe thereof)# Ho action In
9. [3.964-] 2 W,L,H, 269# [1964 ] 1 All E.R. 36? (H„I.,)»
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damages for tort or in reparation ia nov/ to lie a,gainet 
a trade xmion or its officiale on the ground only of 
threate3i:lng a breach of contract or threatening to indnoe 
another person to break a contract of employment # It 
seems likely that the Bill will pass through Parliament, 
albeit with a very slight majority vote#
Although a detailed consideration of the trade 
unions is outwith the scope of this work* It must be 
pointed out that some reforms may well be necessary on 
the question of the trade union member’s position vls-a- 
vis M b  own union* Does the union have too much power 
over Its membero? Can it virtmilly "destroy" a member 
(io0o take away completely his means of livelihood) if 
it so wishes Y Boee It exercise its disoipXinary powers 
in tyrannical fashion and* if ao* what can be done about 
thia? These are some of the questions which oonoern all 
of us* although nothing may well be done about them under 
the present Labour Government as the matter may well be 
thought to be one which contains so much political 
dynamite that the age-old praotioe of the ostrich may be 
adapted suitably for the occasion* In any event, no 
action will probably be taken until a very full report 
ia available upon the status* power' and funotione of the 
trade unions in modern society* The new Royal Gommiaeion 
on the Trade Unions may well take some three years to
complet© Its taakp 00 that a full pioture* with rooommend- 
ations, is unlikely to emerge until 1968 or 1969#
There does eeem to be a oaae* however, for reviewing 
the funotiona and pov/ara of the Industrial Court # It io 
raepeotfully euggeeted that the Court* ae now eonetitutacl 
by the 1919 etatute* should be abolished and in its place 
there should be created a new Industrial Relations Court* 
which should function In Scotland and in England under 
the chairmanship of a Judge of the Court of Session in 
Scotland and a Judge of the High Court of Justice in 
England respectively each being appointed (aut vitam aut 
>am) for this particular task and each having knowledge 
and experience of Industrial Relations and Industrial 
Lawo The Court might well sit in Glasgow and London 
respectively. In each case* the Judge presiding should 
be aceompanied by three aesessors v/ho should submit 
advisory memoranda (within tm agreed time limit) to the 
Judge before the latter issuoe a final judgBient* which 
should be fully binding upon the parties ae soon as 
pronounced, The Court should be able to compel the 
attendance of witneeaesg to require production of 
documents and to enforce Its judgments, Io appeal (to 
the Inner House in Scotland or Court of Appeal in 
England) should be necessary* unices a gross miscarriage 
of justice could b© established. It is envisaged that
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either eide should bo able to bring hie oaee before the 
Court and servigo of the claim would be offeoted upon the 
other aide, in the same way as mi ordinary civil procaeci-^  
ing# Whore both parties agreed to submit a dispute to 
the Court it should then sit as an Industrial Arbitration 
Court, with full powers, and its award should have binding: 
legal force. . I’roviBion should also be made for the 
Minister of Labour referring any dispute to the Court, 
sitting as an Industrial Arbitration Court# The 
Conciliation Act* 1896 and the arbitration proviaions 
of the Industrial Courts Act, 1919 should be repealed#
It is reoorrnnended5 however, that the Miniater of 
Labour should be allowed to retain the a pedal power of 
setting up a Court of Inquiry, aa meantime provided in 
Part II of the Industrial Courts Act, 1919* where a 
question of public Interost is raised. Thia procedure 
involves a report being submitted to both Houses of 
Parliament. The Government may then take one of tv/o 
major courses, if the recoinmendatione herein proposed 
are aooeptable* namely $- (firstly) pass any legislation 
necessary to correot the situation which caused the 
dispute or (secondly) refer the whole matter - through 
the Minister of Labour - to the Industrial Relations 
Court for the formal issue of a judgment disposing of 
the matter# The Court ivoMd have before it the full
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report amd traneoriptB of evidence„ laoludlng all 
documenta @ from the Oourt of Inquiry# If aecoaearye 
could require the re^-attendance of parties or wltneeeee 
or ooimsel and aolloltora for purpoeee of clarification 
or elucidation of any doubtful or ambiguous points ozi the 
record of the Court of Inquiry*
It would be absolutely eseentlal that any new 
Industrial Relations Courts created along the lines 
euggeeted above^ should oarry out its work both efficient*^ 
ly and expedltioualy# No loopholee for mlause of 
procedure should be left open in any emiotlng and 
procedural legislation*

